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Hayek, Mill, and the Liberal 
Tradition
This book considers the relationship between Hayek and Mill, taking issue with 
Hayek’s criticism of Mill and providing a broader perspective on the liberal tra-
dition. Featuring contributions from the likes of Ross Emmett, Leon Montes and 
Robert Garnett, these chapters ask whether Hayek had an accurate reading of the 
ideas of Mill and Smith, as well as considering themes such as sympathy and 
analytical egalitarianism that play a large part in the liberal tradition. These 
chapters argue that addition of these key ideas to the Hayekian corpus leads to a 
far broader understanding of the liberal tradition than that provided by Hayek.
 One objective is to provide a discussion of the tensions that seemingly 
pervade aspects of Hayek’s account of the intellectual history of the liberal tradi-
tion. For example, one unfortunate consequence of Hayek’s reading of Smith 
and Mill is that certain themes – e.g., sympathy and analytical egalitarianism – 
that played a vitally important role in their thinking are either seriously under-
played in Hayek’s account or, rather worse, apparently ignored. Adding these 
key ideas (e.g., sympathy) to the Hayekian corpus leads to a rather broader 
understanding and conception of the liberal tradition than that usually associated 
with Hayekian social theory per se.
 A broad- based work that is a valuable addition to the literature on Hayek and 
the liberal tradition more generally, this book will be of great use to anyone who 
is interested in social theory, intellectual and economic history alike.
Andrew Farrant is Assistant Professor of Economics at Dickinson College.
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Introduction
Andrew Farrant
Much earlier versions of a number of the chapters included in this volume (those 
by Montes, Peart and Levy, Emmett, and Farrant) were originally written for a 
2006 conference on Hayek and the Liberal Tradition. The relationship between 
Hayek’s ideas and those of J. S. Mill – an often problematic one might I add – 
was front and center throughout formal, and informal, conference discussion. As 
is well known, Hayek, particularly so in his later writings, deemed Mill as being 
by and large outside the classical liberal tradition. Indeed, Hayek charged Mill 
with originating, or providing much intellectual impetus to, all manner of what 
Hayek deemed intellectual sins (e.g., Mill’s alleged advocacy of socialism, his 
supposed constructivist rationalism, and his supposedly baneful advocacy of 
social and distributive justice). For Hayek, Mill was a markedly influential propa-
gator of various ideas that served to much weaken, or outright undermine, the 
intellectual foundations of classical liberalism. Hayek considered Mill to have 
greatly watered down classical liberal ideas: Mill supposedly taking various 
strands of classical liberal thought and combining them with wholly incompatible 
socialistic ideas about the merits of social and distributive justice and the sup-
posed necessity of radically altering the prevailing system of property rights (e.g., 
property rights in land). For Hayek (as for Ludwig von Mises), Mill allegedly 
provided much intellectual groundwork for the adoption of the interventionist and 
socialistic legislation that ultimately led to the contemporary mixed economy and 
welfare state. Hayek and Mill clearly have different understandings of what liber-
alism would entail. The ideas of other liberal thinkers – e.g., Adam Smith and 
Frank H. Knight – similarly featured heavily in conference discussions. All – 
Hayek, Smith, Mill, and Knight – will feature similarly heavily in this volume.
 Accordingly, the basic rationale behind this volume is to provide a rather 
broader perspective on the classical liberal tradition – and Hayek’s place within 
that tradition – than is often provided by standard Hayekian scholarship. For 
example, chapters in the volume examine whether Hayek had an accurate 
reading of the ideas of Mill and Adam Smith (to name but two canonical think-
ers in the classical liberal tradition). Other chapters (those by Robert Garnett and 
Ted Burczak) argue for a conception of the liberal tradition that is markedly 
broader than that which presumably would have found favor with Hayek (or that 
would presumably find favor with many modern Hayekians).
2  A. Farrant
 One objective of the volume is to provide a discussion of the tensions that 
seemingly pervade aspects of Hayek’s account of the intellectual history of the 
liberal tradition. For example, one unfortunate consequence of Hayek’s reading 
of Smith and Mill is that certain themes – for example, sympathy and analytical 
egalitarianism – that played a vitally important role in their thinking are either 
seriously underplayed in Hayek’s account or, rather worse, apparently ignored. 
Adding these key ideas (e.g., sympathy) to the Hayekian corpus leads to a rather 
broader understanding and conception of the liberal tradition than that usually 
associated with Hayekian social theory per se.
 The opening part to the volume, “Hayek and the liberal tradition?,” includes 
three chapters. The chapter by Leon Montes, “Is Friedrich Hayek rowing 
Adam Smith’s boat?,” re- examines Hayek’s well- known (and oft- 
acknowledged) debt to Adam Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment. Leon’s 
narrative primarily focuses on two of Hayek’s most important essays in intel-
lectual history, “Individualism: True and False” (delivered at Dublin in 1945) 
and “Liberalism” (written in 1973), and explores the vitally important role that 
the ideas of Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment play throughout Hayek’s 
thought. The chapter by Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy, “F. A. Hayek’s 
sympathetic agents,” explores the role that sympathy and reciprocity play in 
Hayek’s explanation of the fraught transition from small groups (e.g., “hunter- 
gatherer” bands) to a larger- scale modern commercial civilization. Peart and 
Levy focus heavily on the role that projection – particularly projection about 
other individuals who are “similar” to us and projection about others who are 
at great social distance from us – and sympathy play in Hayek’s analytical 
system. As Peart and Levy note, Hayek argues that one can readily, and 
unproblematically, sympathize with fellow- members of a tribal grouping or 
with family members (they are “similar” to us). As Peart and Levy explain, 
Hayek views sympathy – the projection (or attribution) of one’s own prefer-
ences to fellow group members – as unproblematic on a small scale. As we 
move from the small group to the large group, however, sympathetic projec-
tion generates what Hayek deems the key difficulty plaguing the transition 
from the small group to a large- scale modern industrial civilization: projection 
from the local group – ostensibly characterized by a reasonably well defined 
preference ordering – to the world beyond the local neighborhood may yield 
mistaken beliefs. The latter – assuming democratic political decision- making – 
necessarily translate into undesirable public policies and a concomitant 
decrease in societal well- being. One such supposedly mistaken belief is the 
view that the coherence supposedly inherent to the preferences of the small 
group or family ought to similarly characterize the “preference ranking” of the 
large- scale social order. This, Peart and Levy argue, may create a totalitarian 
temptation: a temptation that might lead to an attempt to transform a spontane-
ous order – a social order lacking anything akin to a unitary goal (e.g., a 
market economy) – into an organization (e.g., a firm or a command economy) 
– a collective with a single aim or well defined and supposedly coherent set of 
goals. Peart and Levy argue that Hayek’s recognition of this possible 
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“totalitarian” problem underlies his deep pessimism about any democratic, and 
supposedly wholly misguided, attempt to attain supposedly “socially just” 
outcomes.
 Ross Emmett’s chapter, “Discussion and the evolution of institutions in a 
liberal democracy: Frank Knight joins the debate,” examines Frank Knight’s 
take on many of the issues which rear their head in the chapter by Peart and 
Levy (e.g., Hayek’s objections to social justice). As Emmett notes, Knight and 
Hayek are usually perceived as ardent co- defenders of free markets and classical 
liberalism per se. Yet, and as Emmett rightly demonstrates, Knight vehemently 
disagreed with various aspects of Hayek’s defense of a free society and liberal 
market order. Emmett’s chapter provides a careful and thoughtful examination 
of Knight’s objections to Hayek’s social philosophy: As Emmett wryly explains, 
Hayek and Knight could no more agree on social philosophy than on capital 
theory. In particular, Knight places a heavy emphasis on the importance of 
public deliberation and discussion concerning the supposed merits of various 
purported policy “solutions” to social problems. As Emmett notes, Knight 
argued that public deliberation (discussion) over these issues in any liberal 
democracy would inevitably lead ethical considerations to come, for good or ill, 
to the fore. Hayek, of course, is less than enamored with public deliberation and 
discussion over policy issues per se: in particular, Hayek is greatly worried by 
any public deliberation over such allegedly baneful notions as social and distrib-
utive justice. For Knight, however, deliberation over ethical ideals (social justice 
included), whether for good or ill, is inevitable in a free society. Indeed, for 
Knight, social change in any free society occurs because of discussion and delib-
eration per se. As Emmett notes, Knight views discussion as ultimately being 
about the way in which individuals can construct a society which is closer to 
their ethical ideas. As is well- known, Hayek sought to restrain “dangerous” 
public policy (e.g., any supposed attempt to attain social justice) by insisting that 
any adopted public policy accord with the rule of law. The rule of law would 
supposedly restrain dangerous public policy and thereby buttress the long- run 
viability of the liberal order. Unsurprisingly, Knight is markedly critical of 
Hayek’s view of the rule of law. As Emmett explains, Knight is similarly critical 
of Hayek’s strictures against the idea of social justice. As Knight notes, stark 
economic inequalities often translate into inequalities of effective freedom and 
unequal power.
 The concluding part of the volume is titled “Pushing the boundaries of the 
liberal tradition?” and includes chapters by Andrew Farrant, Theodore Burczak, 
and Robert G. Garnett. Farrant’s chapter, “A renovated social fabric: Mill, 
Hayek, and the problem of institutional change?,” critically examines Hayek’s 
oft- repeated charge that Mill was the great nineteenth- century advocate of social-
ism. Hayek and Mill have markedly incongruent institutional frameworks in 
mind whenever they invoke socialism or communism: Mill favoring a system of 
democratic worker co- operatives rather than anything akin to command plan-
ning. Similarly, Hayek and Mill have markedly incongruent conceptions in mind 
when they invoke social justice. Indeed, Mill’s view of social justice – Mill 
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ardently advocating equality of opportunity – is rather closer to Frank Knight’s 
view of social justice (see the chapter by Emmett) than to Hayek’s idea of what 
social justice per se supposedly necessitates (wholesale command planning).
 Ted Burczak’s thought- provoking chapter, “A socialist spontaneous order,” 
tentatively outlines a variety of socialism that is ostensibly consistent with 
Hayek’s advocacy of the rule of law as the appropriate meta- principle guiding 
public policy. Burczak, much like Mill, defends worker ownership and demo-
cratic self- management in the context of a rivalrous market process. Similarly, 
Burczak argues for the establishment of a universal basic income grant large 
enough to insure against need deprivation. Burczak’s chapter should generate 
much dialogue (and possibly disagreement) from contemporary Hayekians. 
Robert Garnett’s chapter, “Hayek and philanthropy: a classical liberal road not 
(yet) taken,” explores the role that philanthropy plays (and might play) in Haye-
kian thinking. In particular, Garnett argues that a variety of philosophical dual-
isms plague Hayek’s analysis of liberal society (e.g., the sharp dualism of 
command plan per se and market economy). Taking heed of the analytical lim-
itations induced by such dualisms, Garnett reformulates Hayek’s image of the 
Great Society (Hayek’s favored term for the spontaneous order of civil society) 
to provide a richer view of civil and commercial society. Garnett argues that by 
stepping beyond traditional Hayekian dualisms such as plan and market per se, 
and paying careful analytical attention to the importance of philanthropy and 
gift- giving (among other non- market modes of social provisioning), Hayekian 
theorizing can be much strengthened. As it was, Hayek’s dogged efforts to 
defend market processes against socialist critics (supposedly advocating an ata-
vistic morality – social justice – that necessitated the adoption of full- blown 
command planning) placed strict limits on his ability to integrate philanthropy 
into his baseline conception of the Great Society.
 Books written on Hayek alone could no doubt fill a library. Much the same 
can be said about Mill (or Smith). To our knowledge, this is the first book to 
bring the voices of Hayek, Mill, Knight, Smith, Bowles, Gintis, and Vanek 
(among other thinkers) together.
Part I
Hayek and the liberal 
tradition?

1 Is Friedrich Hayek rowing Adam 
Smith’s boat?1
Leonidas Montes
Introduction
When we think about Adam Smith and Friedrich Hayek, several connections 
easily come to mind. It is even difficult to refrain from imagining some similar-
ities in their characters. Both were serious, responsible and even austere. Both 
had intellectually outstanding minds. Although they were separated by almost 
two centuries, they shared striking commonalities, especially in their perception 
of society. If Hayek was a great economist, he knew Smith was the father of 
economics. If Hayek was a great intellectual, he also knew he was inheriting a 
vision already developed by Smith and some of his contemporaries. And he 
often made his debt explicit in his writings.
 Dugald Stewart, in his Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith (EPS: 
269–352), explains that Smith divided his Moral Philosophy course at Glasgow 
University into four parts: Ethics, Jurisprudence, Political Economy and Natural 
Theology (EPS: 274).2 Although in my personal view he did not take theology 
that seriously,3 he delved into the other three branches of his course. In 1759, 
based on his lectures, he published The Theory of Moral Sentiments. This book 
brought Smith intellectual prestige and, because of this, he was offered the 
opportunity to accompany the Duke of Buccleuch to a grand tour in 1764. It was 
an invitation he could not decline: the opportunity to meet the great intellectual 
figures on the Continent, and a considerable salary increase. The tour lasted until 
1766, and after their return, due to the death of the duke’s younger brother, 
Smith remained with a pension for life. This pension allowed him to retire to his 
birthplace Kirkcaldy. There he spent ten years working on his magnum opus, 
which was finally published in the emblematic year of 1776. An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations was well received,4 but Smith never 
forgot his original plan of writing a treatise of Jurisprudence. In the advertise-
ment of TMS’s last edition (the sixth edition published posthumously), Smith 
acknowledges that:
In the last paragraph of the first Edition of the present work, I said, that I 
should in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general 
principles of law and government,5 and of the different revolutions which 
8  L. Montes
they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society; not only in 
what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and 
whatever else is the object of law. In the Enquiry concerning the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations, I have partly executed this promise; at 
least so far as concerns police, revenue, and arms. What remains, the theory 
of jurisprudence, which I have long projected, I have hitherto been hindered 
from executing, by the same occupations which had till now prevented me 
from revising the present work. Though my very advanced age leaves me, I 
acknowledge, very little expectation of ever being able to execute this great 
work to my own satisfaction; yet, as I have not altogether abandoned the 
design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of doing what I 
can, I have allowed the paragraph to remain as it was published more than 
thirty years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to execute every 
thing which it announced.
(TMS Adv.: 3–4)
It is well- known that before his death Smith ordered his executors to burn files 
of documents which might have contained a draft of his promised treatise on 
Jurisprudence. This single event has triggered some provocative theses, mainly 
suggested by Charles Griswold (1999) and then exposed by Sam Fleischacker 
(2004) that Smith’s concept of justice could not fit within his social system. 
However, we have his Lectures on Jurisprudence, and as Knud Haakonssen 
(1981) has brilliantly shown, there is much to be inferred from these students’ 
reports.
 But there is another common context for both economists. They were against 
the generally accepted paradigm. Just after Hume’s death in 1776, in a letter to 
his editor, William Strahan, Smith concluded: “Upon the whole, I have always 
considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly 
to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human 
frailty will permit” (Corr.: 221). This letter was published the same year by 
Strahan and Caldwell in a small book, just after The Life of David Hume Written 
by Himself. Approximately four years after Hume’s death, Smith famously 
wrote:
A single, and as, I thought a very harmless Sheet of paper, which I happened 
to Write concerning the death of our late friend Mr. Hume, brought upon me 
ten times more abuse than the very violent attack I had made upon the whole 
commercial system of Great Britain.
(Corr.: 251)
As Smith acknowledges, his very personal and beautiful account of Hume’s life 
brought him much trouble. But what is interesting is that he refers to his WN as 
a “very violent attack . . . upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain” 
(ibid.). Smith was fully aware not only of the nature of his magnum opus, but 
also of its implications. He knew that by harshly criticizing the “mercantile 
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system” (especially in Book IV), he was turning upside down the economic 
status quo of his time. It is also true that WN was not fully understood by his 
contemporaries. Many times WN was adopted and adapted for different pur-
poses, hiding the real essence of its main objective. In many ways Smith’s WN 
was often caricaturized for political purposes.6 If Smith was against the preval-
ent system of his time, so was Hayek.
 It is clear that Smith attempted to build a system, as Andrew Skinner (1976, 
1979) has continuously reminded us. Smith’s social system can be defined as a 
“social science,” a term not used in the eighteenth century. Smith’s main purpose 
was the study of society as a whole. But society is composed by human beings, 
which are not literally “in- dividuals” detached from it, but social beings in con-
tinuous interaction. Man without society would be like exchange without a 
market economy; something utterly unconceivable for Smith. Hayek also agreed 
with Smith’s plan and the interrelationship between men and society. This ambi-
tious aim of understanding what is society, how does it work and why in differ-
ent historical contexts it could not work as it should, is an important common 
theme for both Smith and Hayek.
 Both intellectual colossi strived to understand social phenomena. Both knew 
the importance of economics for society. Both knew the risks of pure economics 
without ideas, of theory without principles. Both shared the same apprehensions 
about those enlightened men who knew what was best for society. Both 
respected empirical reality over rational constructions. Both were concerned 
about the “great body of the people.” Both were misunderstood. And both were 
writing in an intellectual context not very favorable to their ideas.
 In this chapter I will attempt to uncover Hayek’s debt to Adam Smith and the 
Scottish Enlightenment in general. As he continuously refers to Smith, I will 
mainly concentrate on two of Hayek’s most important essays from the perspec-
tive of history of ideas: “Individualism: True and False” (delivered at Dublin in 
1945) and “Liberalism” (written in 1973). They are separated by almost 30 
years. However, I will refer incidentally to other writings (principally “The 
Trend of Economic Thinking,” “The Legal and Political Philosophy of David 
Hume,” “The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design” and his Con-
stitution and Liberty). The aim of this chapter is to investigate the context of 
Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment as fundamental sources for Hayek’s 
thought. Given that Hayek’s debt to Smith is explicit in most of his writings, my 
attempt, within this revealed preferences framework, will be more selective than 
exhaustive.
 In the next section Hayek’s famous essay, “Individualism: True and False,” 
will be analyzed. Special emphasis will be given to the importance for Hayek of 
Smith’s conception of social beings and self- interest. The famous Fergusonian 
passage of “human action, human design” will be discussed, and some moral 
implications of true and false liberalism, especially regarding egalitarianism, will 
be drawn. The third section will study his essay “Liberalism” in order to show 
that Hayek’s position on Smith and the Scottish Enlightenment remained almost 
unaltered. In addition, the importance of justice and education will be traced 
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back to Smith. Also, as Hayek frequently refers to those “ends which were no 
part of his purpose,” I will briefly refer to Smith’s three invisible hands and their 
interpretations, emphasizing Hayek’s own reading of the most important, elusive 
and controversial metaphor in the history of economic thought. Finally some 
brief conclusions, underlining their main differences, will be drawn.
Hayek’s “Individualism: True and False”
Introducing the two traditions
Already in 1933, during his inaugural lecture at the London School of Eco-
nomics suggestively entitled “The Trend of Economic Thinking,” Hayek defined 
“continental socialism,” attributing this social phenomenon to the German His-
torical School.7 He discusses themes that will accompany him during his long 
intellectual life, such as planning and socialism. More important for the purpose 
of this chapter are his embryonic views about spontaneous order and unintended 
consequences. Hayek asserts:
From the time of Hume and Adam Smith, the effect of every attempt to 
understand economic phenomena – that is to say, of every theoretical analy-
sis – has been to show that, in large part, the co- ordination of individual 
efforts has been brought about, and in many cases could only have been 
brought about, by means which nobody wanted or understood . . . In short, it 
showed an immensely complicated mechanism existed, worked and solved 
problems, frequently by means which proved to be the only possible means 
by which the result could be accomplished, but which could not possibly be 
the result of deliberate regulation because nobody understood them. Even 
now, when we begin to understand their working, we discover again and 
again that necessary functions are discharged by spontaneous institutions.
(Hayek 1991 [1933]: 129)
This passage is more than an eye- blink to Hayek’s lifelong project.8 He refers to 
Adam Smith and David Hume as pioneers of his already developing idea of 
“spontaneous institutions.” Later, throughout Hayek’s successive works, this 
idea will become a common ground.
 In 1945 he gave another lecture at Dublin: his famous “Individualism: True 
and False” (Hayek 1948: 1–32). In this important essay Hayek makes a sharp 
distinction, as the title suggests, between two different kinds of liberalism: true 
and false individualism.9 This essay is quite important; true individualism is key 
to understand what will be termed classical liberalism.
 In his essay, Hayek begins by looking at the historical situation of the last 30 
years, calling for those “general principles,” as “the ‘inevitability of gradualness’ 
leads us back from a social order resting on the general recognition of certain 
principles to a system in which order is created by direct commands” (1948: 1). 
As religion is impotent to give us guidance (and when it has done so, its results 
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have been disastrous), and considering that terms “like ‘liberalism’ or ‘demo-
cracy’, ‘capitalism’ or ‘socialism’, today no longer stand for coherent systems” 
(ibid.: 2–3), Hayek attempts to search for those real, but not necessarily mani-
fest, principles. He then complains about the caricatures erected by defining 
“individualism,” recalling that this word entailed for Saint- Simonians “competit-
ive society,” as opposed to “socialism,” describing a centrally planned society.10 
Hayek immediately states that he is developing his own position as an altern-
ative to “socialism,” that is, from a competitive society perspective.
 Hayek also claims that the roots of “individualism true” may be traced to “John 
Locke, and particularly with Bernard Mandeville and David Hume, and achieved 
full stature for the first time in the work of Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson, and 
Adam Smith” (1948: 3–4). The second strand of thought labeled as false individual-
ism “is represented mainly by French and other Continental writers – a fact due, I 
believe, to the dominant role which Cartesian rationalism plays in its composition” 
(ibid.: 4). The Encyclopedists, Rousseau and even the physiocrats are “the outstand-
ing representatives” of this kind of “rationalistic individualism” that “always tends 
to develop into the opposite of individualism, namely, socialism or collectivism” 
(ibid.).11 This idea is crucial to understand the intellectual process that led Hayek to 
the political and philosophical argument against social planning.
Conception of social beings
Hayek’s definition of true individualism focuses on the process of competition, 
not on the nature of the individual. But, what is the connection between individ-
ualism and self- interest and then to selfish behavior? At this stage Hayek seems 
to avoid any moral dimension of self- interest by referring more generally to 
society. In fact, not surprisingly Hayek begins section 3 of “Individualism: True 
and False” by clarifying that “the essential characteristic of true individualism 
. . . is that it is primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces 
which determine the social life of man” (ibid.: 6, italics in the original). 
However, individualism and market competition implicitly suggest self- interest.
 Regardless of the fact that Hayek focuses on a theory of society, and society 
as a process, he has a view of human nature. It is a distinctively Humean and 
Smithian idea. Both Scottish philosophers recognized human beings as social 
beings, not as isolated atoms, or fully independent individuals. Sympathy, for 
Smith, not only presupposes the social nature of human beings, very much like 
Hume’s concept of sympathy, but it is the sympathetic process, through the 
attainment of mutual sympathy, that finally determines Smith’s ethics of social 
interaction. For Smith, as for Hayek, but for different reasons, a human being 
without society would simply not be a human being. And a fortiori society 
without sympathy would simply not be society.
Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some 
solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could 
no more think of his own character, of the propriety or demerit of his own 
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sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of 
the beauty or deformity of his own face. All these are objects which he 
cannot easily see, which naturally he does not look at, and with regard to 
which he is provided with no mirror which can present them to his view. 
Bring him into society, and he is immediately provided with the mirror 
which he wanted before.
(TMS III.1.3: 129)
If sympathy is the cement of society for Smith, for Hayek it is the necessary 
interaction of free and literally responsible individuals in a competitive society. 
Not surprisingly Hayek also attacks the “silliest of the common misunderstand-
ings: the belief that individualism postulates . . . the existence of isolated of self- 
contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and 
character is determined by their existence in society” (1948: 6). Hayek knew 
there was no “Adam Smith Problem.” In an article entitled “Adam Smith’s 
Message in Today’s Language,” written for the Daily Telegraph in 1976, he says 
“It is an error that Adam Smith preached egotism . . . He was concerned with 
how to make it possible for people to make their contribution to the social 
product as large as possible” (Hayek 1978 [1976]: 268). What is more important 
is that his own conception of human nature resembles the one developed by 
Hume and Smith. As a matter of fact, for Hayek self- love:
did not mean egotism in the narrow sense of concern with only the imme-
diate needs of one’s proper person. The “self ”, for which alone people were 
supposed to care, did as a matter of course include their family and friends; 
and it would have made no difference to the argument if it had included 
anything for which people in fact did care.
(1948: 13)
Hayek is referring in this passage to two important topics. First, relying on Adam 
Smith, he follows the Stoic classical tradition of oikeiosis, and second, prefer-
ences are subjective. As the latter is an embedded Austrian theme, I will only 
briefly refer to the former. Montes (2009) and Levy and Peart (2008) underline 
the importance of oikeiosis as a crucial Stoic source for understanding Smith’s 
social system. Hierocles, according to Stobaeus, with his idea of the concentric 
circles epitomized this concept:
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles . . . the 
first and closest circle is the one which a person has drawn as though around 
the center, his own mind . . . Next . . . contains parents, siblings, wife, and 
children. The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, 
nieces, and cousins . . . The next circle includes other relatives, and this is 
followed by the circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow- tribesmen, 
next that of fellow- citizens, and the in the same way the circle of people 
from neighbouring towns, and the circle of fellow- country men. The 
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outermost and largest circle, which encompasses all the rest, is that of the 
whole human race . . . it is the task of a well tempered man . . . to draw the 
circles together somehow towards the center.
(Long and Sedley 1987: 349)
This relates to the Stoics’ fundamental concept of oikeiosis, which after Pohlenz 
(1987 [1940]) became firmly linked as a crucial idea of Stoic ethics. It is ably 
treated in Brown (1994, chs 4 and 5).12 This concept is a primary impulse of 
human beings to what is familiar, to what belongs to oneself. Oiken is the oppos-
ite of allotrion, what is alien. Therefore it relates to what is familiar and also to 
the process of making a thing belong to you. It is self- love in a morally good 
sense, not related to selfishness. It relates, one might say, to Smith’s enlightened 
self- interest, or, recalling Rousseau’s famous defence in his second Discourse of 
natural amour de soi- meme over amour propre. The former is morally correct, 
but not the latter. Although Hayek perhaps might not have liked this connection 
with Rousseau, the crucial concept of oikeiosis is fundamental to understand 
what Smith actually meant by self- interest and sympathy. For Hayek the self 
“for which alone people were supposed to care, did as a matter of course include 
their family and friends” (1948: 13). Moreover, he claims that “all man’s mind 
can effectively comprehend are the facts of the narrow circle of which he is the 
center” (1948: 14). This is the notion of the concentric circles or Smith’s more 
developed idea of “sympathetic gradient,”13 much influenced by the Stoics’ dis-
tinctive concept of oikeiosis. In Smith’s own words:
Every man, as the Stoics used to say, is first and principally recommended 
to his own care; and every man is certainly, in every respect, fitter and abler 
to take care of himself than of any other person. Every man feels his own 
pleasures and his own pains more sensibly than those of other people. The 
former are the original sensations; the latter the reflected or sympathetic 
images of those sensations. The former may be said to be the substance; the 
latter the shadow.
(TMS VI.ii.1.1: 256; see also TMS VII.ii.1.15: 321)14
The importance of the Stoics’ concept of oikeiosis for Smith’s concept of sym-
pathy and his hotly debated concept of self- interest must not be underestimated 
within the tradition of classical liberalism. Vivienne Brown is quite clear about the 
significance of oikeiosis for Smith’s discourse. She argues that the “Stoic concept 
of self- love falls under the doctrine of oikeiosis” (1994: 95).15 Moreover a possible 
connection between the Stoics concept of oikeiosis and property would suggest a 
political connection between classical republicanism and classical liberalism.16
Human action, human design
Then Hayek, while arguing that institutions have arisen and are functioning 
without a “designing and directing mind,” quotes Ferguson’s most famous 
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passage of human action and human design.17 Actually, it was a pervasive idea 
within the Scottish Enlightenment.
 The “human action, human design” motto appears in his most important book 
An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767). In section 2, “The History of 
Subordination,” in Part III entitled “Of the History of Policy and Arts,” Adam 
Ferguson begins by describing how society has evolved from savages and bar-
barians up to “the foundation of commercial arts” (Ferguson 1995 [1767]: 119). 
“Mankind,” Ferguson continues,
arrive at ends which even their imagination could not anticipate . . . He who 
first said, “I will appropriate this field: I will leave it to my heirs”; did not 
perceive, that he was laying the foundation of civil laws and political estab-
lishments. He who first ranged himself under a leader, did not perceive, that 
he was setting the example of a permanent subordination, under the pretence 
of which, the rapacious were to seize his possessions, and the arrogant to lay 
claim to his service.
(ibid.)
Ferguson is here beginning to show the unintended character of human institu-
tions that captured Hayek’s mind. It is an empirical question for the Scottish 
Enlightenment related to Smith’s famous “four stages of society” (hunters, shep-
herds, agriculture and commercial society, see LJ: 14–16).
 Soon after Ferguson claims that “Men, in general, are sufficiently disposed to 
occupy themselves in forming projects and schemes,” but:
Like the winds, that come we know not whence, and blow whithersoever 
they list, the forms of society are derived from an obscure and distant origin; 
they arise, long before the date of philosophy, from the instincts, not from 
the speculations, of men. The croud [sic] of mankind, are directed in their 
establishments and measures, by the circumstances in which they are placed; 
and seldom are turned from their way, to follow the plan of any single 
projector.
(Ferguson 1995 [1767]: 119)
Ferguson is already describing the complexity of human institutions in words 
that certainly inspired Hayek. He is also advancing a crucial idea for the Scottish 
Enlightenment, that is, the fact that “projectors” with a plan or a scheme should 
bear in mind that social reality is, to say the least, multifaceted.18
 In the next paragraph, his most important and well- known passage, Ferguson 
states his famous distinction between “human action” and “human design”:
Every step and every moment of the multitude, even in what are termed 
enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations 
stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, 
but not the execution of any human design. If Cromwell said, That a man 
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never mounts higher, than when he knows not whither he is going; it may 
with more reason be affirmed of communities, that they admit of the great-
est revolutions where no change is intended, and that the most refined politi-
cians do not always know whither they are leading the state by their 
projects.
(Ferguson 1995 [1767]: 119; emphasis added)
Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society was published in 1767, 
almost ten years before Adam Smith’s WN. Adam Smith, who was born the 
same year as Ferguson, apparently did not get on very well with Ferguson. In his 
exhaustive biography of Smith, Ross claims that their personal relationship “had 
its up and downs” (Ross 1995: 191). Actually some testimonies by Alexander 
Carlyle claim that Smith accused Ferguson of plagiarism, quite an accusation at 
the time. Certainly their most serious encounter was when Smith published his 
WN. Adam Ferguson had published in 1756 a pamphlet entitled Reflections Pre-
vious to the Establishment of a Militia. Although he was a supporter of the Act 
of Union, and commercial progress, Ferguson firmly believed in a society that 
should “mix the military Spirit with our civil and commercial Policy” (Ferguson 
1756: 3). In a way, Ferguson attempted to combine economic progress with 
public spirit, the latter characterized by the establishment of a militia. Smith, 
who was one of the founders, or at least one of the original members of the Edin-
burgh Poker Club established in 1762,19 in his WN publicly and bluntly declared 
that he considered “a well- regulated standing army is superior to every militia” 
(WN V.i.a.39: 705; cf. V.i.a.25: 700). This claim ignited the justified reaction of 
Adam Ferguson and Alexander Carlyle, who were the most animated promoters 
of the militia cause.20
 The important thing for the purpose of this chapter is that Ferguson, in associ-
ation with his contemporaries, represents for Hayek an understanding of social 
phenomena which necessarily leads to his theory of competition and spontane-
ous order in full. It is noteworthy how Hayek continues:
spontaneous collaboration of free men often creates things which are greater 
than their individual minds can ever fully comprehend. This is the great 
theme of Josiah Tucker and Adam Smith, of Adam Ferguson and Edmund 
Burke, the great discovery of classical political economy which has become 
the basis of our understanding not only of economic life but of most truly 
social phenomena.
(Hayek 1948: 7–8)
Once again, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson are in the background.
Reason, moral character and egalitarianism
The liberal tradition of Hume, Ferguson and Smith is reckoned as the forebear of 
“Individualism True.” According to Hayek, the idea of social order as the 
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unforeseen result of individual actions is truly distinctive of this tradition. The 
other dark face of individualism – false individualism – relies on the assumption 
that social order is due to deliberate design. The former is “the true individual-
ism of the British thinkers of the eighteenth century” and the latter comes from 
the “Cartesian school.” With Hume and Smith, Hayek believes that human 
beings are “only partly guided by reason” because “individual reason is very 
limited and imperfect” (1948: 8). He scorns the idea of Reason with capital R, 
that is, the abuse of reason. So did Hume, who famously slaved reason to pas-
sions, and Smith, whose first book is duly entitled The Theory of Moral Senti-
ments. For Adam Smith:
But though reason is undoubtedly the source of the general rules of moral-
ity, and of all the moral judgments which we form by means of them; it is 
altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the first perceptions of 
right and wrong can be derived from reason, even in those particular cases 
upon the experience of which the general rules are formed.
(TMS VII.iii.2.7: 377)
Hayek continues touching another crucial point. True individualism has the 
virtue of humility and false individualism is pedantic. The former “induces an 
attitude of humility toward the impersonal and anonymous social processes by 
which individuals help to create things greater than they know” (1948: 8). The 
latter “is the product of an exaggerated belief in the powers of individual reason 
and of a consequent contempt for anything which has not been consciously 
designed by it or is not fully intelligible to it” (ibid.).21 Levy and Peart (see espe-
cially 2005), through the moral and philosophical implications of the street 
porter and the philosopher in Adam Smith, have consistently and persuasively 
argued about this and other interesting points. I will fully quote Smith’s passage:
The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philo-
sopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much 
from nature, as from habit, custom, and education . . . The difference of 
talents comes then to be taken notice of, and widens by degrees, till at last 
the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resem-
blance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and exchange, every 
man must have procured to himself every necessary and conveniency of life 
which he wanted.
(WN I.ii.4: 28–9; emphasis added)
Smith’s egalitarianism is undeniable. For Levy and Peart, Smith’s position 
entails egalitarianism and humility. But for Hayek there is only formal equality. 
True individualism rests upon the argument that “nobody can know who knows 
best and that the only way by which we can find out is through a social process 
in which everybody is allowed to try and see what he can do” (Hayek 1948: 15). 
It is all about variety and diversity of interests and desires conceived as an 
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interpersonal process. His argument “does not assume that all men are equal in 
their natural endowments and capacities but only that no man is qualified to pass 
final judgement on the capacities which another possesses or is to be allowed to 
exercise” (ibid.). But for Smith differences do not stem from nature, but “from 
habit, custom, and education.” Hayek does not believe in natural equality but 
simply proposes to formalize “equality of the rules applying in the same manner 
to all” (ibid.: 16). So does Smith with his conception of negative justice. But 
Smith has an egalitarian framework from which Hayek inevitably deviates. 
There is one explanation for this difference: if Hayek is more concerned with 
political philosophy, Smith is always thinking as a moral philosopher.
 In fact, Hayek’s social theory of spontaneous order demands different capaci-
ties and inclinations. According to Hayek, natural equality could not achieve 
social organization. It is “only because men are in fact unequal” that we can 
“treat them equally” (ibid.: 15).22 If Smith could use the division of labor as a 
basis to explain and defend equality, perhaps Hayek’s reliance on evolutionary 
processes does not allow him to follow suit. Egalitarianism is a starting point for 
Smith. For Hayek egalitarianism is a political point:
[t]here is all the difference in the world between treating people equally and 
attempting to make them equal. While the first is the condition of a free 
society, the second means, as de Tocqueville described it, “a new form of 
servitude”.
(ibid.: 16)
The tyranny of democracy is what really matters to Hayek. This is the risk he 
fears and he fights in his own context.
 Before proceeding let me point out that Hayek’s basic point, that men are not 
omniscient, entails spheres of individual responsibility that must be granted by 
“such general rules to delimit the sphere in which the decision is his” (ibid.: 
17).23 Hayek’s concept of the “spheres of responsibility” and the general rules to 
delimit the scope of our decisions is similar to Smith’s account of the “sacred 
rules of justice.”24 Of course here we find an obvious and enormous debt that we 
can trace back to the Scottish Enlightenment as an intellectual phenomenon. It 
was the jurisprudential tradition (Haakonssen 1981, 1996), initiated by Grotius 
and his ablest student Pufendorf, that found its way through Carmichael and the 
“never to be forgotten” Hutcheson (Corr. 309) up to Adam Smith.
 Another important point of coincidence is that Hayek believes in the beneficent 
consequences that “the pursuit of his interests contribute as much as possible to the 
needs of other men” (1948: 20). Smith, since the Introduction and Plan of WN and 
throughout WN, is concerned with the “consequences upon the general welfare of 
the society” (WN I.8: 11) and continuously reminds us of this virtuous circle.25 But 
talking about general welfare, perhaps it could be argued that a concern with the 
poor is much more explicit in Adam Smith than in Hayek.
 Hayek’s social theory requires interpersonal spontaneous co- ordination. In his 
own, and much better words, in opposition to conscious direction, voluntary 
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association “can be better achieved by the voluntary and spontaneous collabora-
tion of individuals” (1948: 16; emphasis added). It is remarkable that Smith, in 
the second chapter of Book I of WN, describes the importance of exchange as a 
human propensity,26 using the word “assistance” twice and once the word “coop-
eration” (see WN I.ii.2: 26).
 I tend to view Smith’s account of the market mechanism as an “as if,” maybe 
from the standpoint of an impartial spectator unaware of how the market oper-
ates. People act motivated by self- interest, but if we see the unintended effects of 
her or his self- interested actions, it is as if “cooperation and assistance” were 
manifest in this exchange social phenomena. But co- operation and assistance is 
actually not intended. This is of course very Hayekian. In this sense, chapter 2 of 
Book I is an important precursor of Hayek’s unintended consequences. In 
Hayek’s words:
each man is to use his peculiar knowledge and skill with the aim of further-
ing the aims for which he cares . . . in so doing, he is to make as large a con-
tribution as possible to needs which are beyond his ken.
(1948: 17; emphasis in the original)
 Hayek’s recurrent idea that government must be a framework within which 
men interact and collaborate through voluntary associations, is also Smithian. It 
contrasts with the false individualism that ironically demands atomistic indi-
viduals under a coercive state. Hayek also calls false individualism a “social 
contract individualism” (ibid.: 10). Spontaneous order is not an organized system 
that pre- assumes a social contract. Therefore he also assigns to Hobbes a Carte-
sian rationalism leading to false individualism.
 As is well- known, Hayek gives notorious prominence to the legacy of 
Bernard Mandeville.27 He is labeled as the forerunner of true individualism in 
terms of a view of man as “very irrational and fallible being, whose individual 
errors are corrected only in the course of a social process, and which aims at 
making the best of the very imperfect material” (ibid.: 9). This realism about 
human nature and society is also quite Smithian. A common Smithian theme is 
his pragmatic view on many issues: “[w]hen he cannot establish the right, he 
will not disdain to ameliorate the wrong; but like Solon, when he cannot estab-
lish the best system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the 
people can bear” (TMS VI.ii.2.16: 275; emphasis added).28
 Human beings are far from perfect. This entrenched skepticism is common to 
Smith and Hayek, but even more explicit in Hume’s idea that “every man must 
be supposed a knave.” This is not only an attitude, but an intellectual framework 
to approach reality.
 But those who pretend a human design are not only wrong, but can be quite 
dangerous to society. Hayek continuously traces this constructivistic tradition to 
Descartes’s rationalism. Quoting some passages from his Discourse on Method, 
Hayek finds in Descartes’s rationalism a clear political interpretation for a design 
theory of social institutions (1948: 9–10). Although he already traces this 
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tradition in his “Scientism and the Study of Society” (1942), in his “Individual-
ism: True and False” he clearly characterizes a trend “from Descartes through 
Rousseau and the French Revolution down to what is still the characteristic atti-
tude of the engineers to social problems” (1948: 10).
 Human ends cannot be subdued to human reason, as free individuals attain 
social ends through a spontaneous process. This is the abuse of reason initiated 
by Descartes and promoted by the French Enlightenment. Then Hayek goes on 
to blame John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, as they were also influenced by 
the French strand of thought. This tradition has led to “the bogey of the ‘eco-
nomic man’ ” (Hayek 1948: 11), which has been wrongly attributed to Adam 
Smith. The father of economics, according to Hayek, was far from this simplistic 
interpretation. He would have been closer to consider men by nature as lazy and 
indolent, but “even this would be unjust to the very complex and realistic view 
which these men took of human nature” (ibid.: 11).29 He concludes with a great 
passage about the importance of Smith’s WN:
Since it has become fashionable to deride Smith and his contemporaries for 
their supposedly erroneous psychology, I may perhaps venture the opinion 
that for all practical purposes we can still learn more about the behaviour of 
men from the Wealth of Nations than from most of the more pretentious 
modern treatises on “social psychology”.
(Hayek 1948: 11)
Smith in not the father of simple selfish rational choice.30 In chapter 4 of his 
Constitution and Liberty (1960), Hayek is even more assertive, blaming again 
Mill for the narrow conception of homo oeconomicus:
Even such a celebrated figment as the “economic man” was not an original 
part of the British evolutionary tradition. It would be only a slight exaggera-
tion to say that, in the view of those British philosophers, man was by nature 
lazy and indolent, improvident and wasteful, and that it was only by the 
force of circumstances that he could be made to behave economically or 
would learn carefully to adjust his means to an end. The homo oeconomicus 
was explicitly introduced, with much else that belongs to the rationalist 
rather than the evolutionary tradition, only by the younger Mill.
(Hayek 1960: 61)
At the end of his “Individualism: True and False,” Hayek then refers to the 
main theme of his Road to Serfdom (1944), “the fatal course of progressive cen-
tralization” for which “despotism in the end comes to appear as the only salva-
tion” (1948: 28). Moreover, “the poison of nationalism, which is both an 
inducement to, and a result of, that same striving for a society which is con-
sciously organized from the top” is, under the intellectual framework of the 
rationalistic individualism, “a twin brother with socialism” (ibid.). Then he 
makes an original and provocative distinction between English and Continental 
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liberalism: “It was only liberalism in the English sense that was generally 
opposed to centralization, to nationalism and socialism, while the liberalism 
prevalent on the Continent favoured all three” (ibid.: 28). Hayek finishes this 
important essay concluding that both traditions of thought “are divided by 
fundamentally opposed principles” (ibid.: 31), recalling that “the fundamental 
attitude of true individualism is one of humility” (ibid.: 32). Then Hayek fin-
ishes “Individualism: True and False” with his main political concern: “The 
great question at this moment is whether man’s mind will be allowed to con-
tinue to grow as part of this process or whether human reason is to place itself 
in chains of its own making” (ibid.: 32).
Hayek’s “Liberalism”
The same distinction revisited
In chapter 4 of his Constitution and Liberty (1960), entitled “Freedom, Reason, 
and Tradition,” Hayek refers to a theory of liberty that took place mainly in the 
eighteenth century, “[i]t began in two countries, France and England. The first of 
these knew liberty, the second did not” (1960: 54). After blaming the Benthamite 
Philosophical Radicals for blurring those principles developed by the Whigs,31 
he goes on to refer to the “British tradition” represented “mainly by a group of 
Scottish moral philosophers led by David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Fergu-
son” (1960: 55). These three writers understood for the first time “how institu-
tions and morals, language and law, have evolved by a process of cumulative 
growth and that it is only with and within this framework that human reason has 
grown and can successfully operate” (1960: 57).
 In “The Legal and Political Philosophy of David Hume” (1967) Hayek anal-
yses the consequences of the Enlightenment graciously referring to “the English 
ideas of the time (which were, of course, mainly expounded by Scotsmen – but 
I cannot rid myself of the habit of saying ‘English’ when I mean ‘British’)” 
(1967: 107). In this wonderful summary of the legacy of “le bon David,” Hayek 
recalls the famous encounter between Hume and Rousseau. He is confident that 
today we know without doubt “which of the two was the greater intellectual and 
moral figure” (ibid.: 120). Of course he sides with “the serene and even placid 
philosopher” who had to put up with “the emotionally unstable, unaccountable 
and half- mad idealist who in his personal life disregarded all moral rules” 
(ibid.). Then Hayek invites the reader to imagine this encounter and wonders 
who
would have believed that it would be the ideas of Rousseau and not those of 
Hume which would govern the political development of the next two 
hundred years? Yet this is what happened. It was the Rousseauesque idea of 
democracy, his still thoroughly rationalist conceptions of the social contract 
and of popular sovereignty, which were to submerge the ideals of liberty.
(ibid.)
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 Soon after Hayek continues with the same question:
[i]t was Rousseau and not Hume who fired the enthusiasm of the successive 
revolutions which created modern government on the Continent and guided 
the decline of the ideals of the older liberalism and the approach to totalitar-
ian democracy in the whole world. How did this development come about?
(1967: 120)
For Hayek the explanation is quite simple: the negativity of Hume’s philosophy. 
He asserts that “the great sceptic, with his profound conviction of the imperfec-
tion of all human reason and knowledge, did not expect much positive good 
from political organization” (ibid.). The idea that “every man must be supposed 
a knave,” the distrust towards human beings and human institutions, which later 
pervades Smith, was a feasible causal explanation for the triumph of idealism. 
For Hayek the liberal discourse presupposed a conception of human beings and 
society which could not engage the imagination of people, nor fulfil their 
dreams. One cannot avoid imagining Hayek thinking the same about his own 
legacy.
 In “The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design” (1967), after 
distinguishing the complexities of the Greeks’ distinction between physis and 
nomos, nature and convention, Hayek acknowledges that Adam Ferguson “at 
least clearly singled out as due to human action but not human design either as 
natural or as conventional according as one or the other of these distinctions was 
adopted” (1967: 97).32 Immediately he argues that for the next 2,000 years 
nobody came out with a systematic social theory of the unintended consequences 
of human action. Descartes’s rationalism was also to be blamed, but the British 
moral philosophers of the eighteenth century
starting from the theory of common law as much as from that of the law of 
nature, built up a social theory which made the undersigned results of indi-
vidual action its central object, and in particular provided a comprehensive 
theory of the spontaneous order of the market.
(ibid.: 98–9)
For Hayek the first anti- rationalist was, of course, Mandeville, but “the full 
development comes only with Montesquieu and particularly with David Hume, 
Josiah Tucker, Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith” (ibid.: 99).
Hayek’s “Liberalism” and Smith on justice and education
The wonderful essay entitled “Liberalism” (1978) was originally written in 
1973. One can feel in Hayek’s narrative a sense of disappointment. His 
lifelong project is still a struggle, not a reality, and the economic situation is 
not encouraging at all. He begins again by distinguishing “English,” “class-
ical” or “evolutionary” liberalism, as opposed to “Continental,” “rationalistic” 
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or “constructivistic” liberalism. Hayek traces the roots of classical liberalism 
from the Greeks, to the English Middle Ages up to the Glorious Revolution. 
Then he argues that:
In Britain the intellectual foundations were further developed chiefly by the 
Scottish moral philosophers, above all David Hume and Adam Smith . . . 
Adam Smith’s decisive contribution was the account of a self generating 
order which formed itself spontaneously if the individuals were restrained 
by appropriate rules of law. His Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations marks perhaps more than any other single work the 
beginning of the development of modern liberalism. It made people under-
stand that those restrictions on the powers of government which had origin-
ated from sheer distrust of all arbitrary power had become the chief cause of 
Britain’s economic prosperity.
(Hayek 1978: 125)
Hayek’s account of Smith’s WN is perhaps the strongest assertion one can find 
in his writings of Smith as the father of classical liberalism. From this tradition, 
the American Constitution summarized what the colonist
understood to be the essentials of the British tradition of liberty, intended to 
limit the powers of government . . . provided a model of political institutions 
which profoundly affected the development of liberalism in Europe . . . for 
the Europeans they became the dreamland of liberty.
(ibid.: 126–7)
 In an important passage, Hayek insists on Adam Smith’s relevance:
The importance which liberal theory attached to the rules of just conduct is 
based on the insight that they are an essential condition for the maintenance 
of a self generating or spontaneous order of the actions of the different indi-
viduals and groups, each of which pursues his own ends on the basis of his 
knowledge. At least the great founders of liberal theory in the eighteenth 
century, David Hume and Adam Smith, did not assume a natural harmony 
of interests, but rather contended that the divergent interests of the different 
individuals could be reconciled by the observance of appropriate rules of 
conduct . . . Those eighteenth century writers were indeed as much philoso-
phers of law as students of economic order, and their conception of law and 
their theory of market mechanism are closely connected. They understood 
that only recognition of certain principles of law, chiefly the institution of 
several property and the enforcement of contracts, would secure such a 
mutual adjustment of the plans of action of the separate individuals that all 
might have a good chance of carrying out the plans of action which they had 
formed. It was, as later economic theory brought out more clearly, this 
mutual adjustment of individual plans which enabled people to serve each 
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other while using their different knowledge and skills in the service of their 
own ends.
(Hayek 1978: 135–6)
The formation of spontaneous order requires “long experimentation” in which 
“improvement must proceed slowly and step by step” (ibid.: 136). This is also a 
common Smithian theme. Throughout WN Adam Smith emphasizes the impor-
tance of gradual changes.
 Regarding the liberal conception of justice, for Hayek “it is founded on a 
belief in the possibility of discovering objective rules of just conduct independ-
ent of particular interests . . . it is concerned with commutative justice and not 
with what is called distributive or now more frequently ‘social’ justice” (Hayek 
1978: 139). This conception of justice is quite Smithian:
The rules of justice may be compared to the rules of grammar; the rules of 
the other virtues, to the rules which critics lay down for the attainment of 
what is sublime and elegant in composition. The one, are precise, accurate, 
and indispensable. The other, are loose, vague, and indeterminate, and 
present us rather with a general idea of the perfection we ought to aim at, 
than afford us any certain and infallible directions for acquiring it. A man 
may learn to write grammatically by rule, with the most absolute infallibil-
ity; and so, perhaps, he may be taught to act justly. But there are no rules 
whose observance will infallibly lead us to the attainment of elegance or 
sublimity in writing; though there are some which may help us, in some 
measure, to correct and ascertain the vague ideas which we might other-
wise have entertained of those perfections. And there are no rules by the 
knowledge of which we can infallibly be taught to act upon all occasions 
with prudence, with just magnanimity, or proper beneficence: though there 
are some which may enable us to correct and ascertain, in several respects, 
the imperfect ideas which we might otherwise have entertained of those 
virtues.
(TMS III.6.11: 205)
And even if Smith does not completely dismiss distributive justice (see Young 
1997), his concept of justice is mainly commutative or negative, as he ironically 
suggests in the following passage:
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders 
us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains from violating 
either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, has 
surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is 
peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which his equals can with 
propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not doing. We 
may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.
(TMS II.ii.1.9: 95–6; emphasis added)33
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Hayek asserts that distributive justice should be rejected for two reasons:
there exist no recognized or discoverable general principles of distributive 
justice, and that, even if such principles could be agreed upon,34 they could 
not be put into effect in a society whose productivity rests on the individuals 
being free to use their knowledge and abilities for their own purposes.
(1978: 140)
It is all about competition:
equal treatment under the same general laws must result in very different 
positions of the different persons; while in order to make the position of the 
opportunities of the different persons equal, it would be necessary that gov-
ernment treats them differently. Liberalism, in other words, merely demands 
that the procedure, or the rules of the game, by which the relative positions 
of the different individuals are determined, be just (or at least not unjust), 
but not that the particular results of this process for the different individuals 
be just.
(ibid.: 141)
Hayek does not believe in the vague idea of “equal opportunities” because it is 
flawed and incapable of realization in a free society. It would demand deliberate 
manipulations and induce unintended consequences. Hayek is aware of the dif-
ferent individual capacities, “but above all the inevitable differences of their 
individual environments, and in particular the family in which they grew up, 
would still make their prospects very different” (ibid.: 141). Liberalism is not 
about egalitarianism, but “formal” equalities. Hayek’s aim was to foster a “pro-
gressive increase of vertical mobility” and for that purpose
[t]he chief instrument by which this was to be secured was the provision 
(where necessary out of public funds) of a universal system of education 
which would at least place all the young at the foot of the ladder on which 
they would then be able to rise in accordance with their abilities.
(ibid.: 142)35
Smith is also pioneering with his famous proposal for universal basic education, 
although it must be pointed out that this was a Scottish Enlightenment phenome-
non which has had religious Presbyterian roots since John Knox.
 In his famous passage about the negative consequences of division of labor, 
loved by Marx who found in it support for his concept of alienation, Smith 
claims that people “generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for 
a human creature to become” (WN V.i.f.50: 782), then calling for government 
intervention through education.
 Hayek, as Smith, is not a laissez- faire economist: “[f]reedom of economic 
activity had meant [for Smith] freedom under the law, not the absence of all 
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government action” (1960: 220). They defend education as a public duty, and 
they understand the role of regulation in terms of fostering competition to 
increase “vertical mobility.”
Hayek and Smith’s invisible hand
Before analyzing what Hayek actually said and meant by this metaphor, let’s go 
over Smith’s three invisible hands. The first appearance of Smith’s invisible 
hand is in section III, “Of the Origin of Philosophy,” in The Principles Which 
Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astron-
omy (EPS: 31–105). This great essay, which was not burnt with Smith’s other 
folios before his death, was certainly written before 1758 (EPS: 103), and 
perhaps even during his stay at Oxford.36
 An extract of the full paragraph reads:
The reverence and gratitude, with which some of the appearances of nature 
inspire him, convince him that they are the proper objects of reverence and 
gratitude, and therefore proceed from some intelligent beings, who take 
pleasure in the expressions of those sentiments . . . Hence the origin of Poly-
theism, and of that vulgar superstition which ascribes all the irregular events 
of nature to the favour or displeasure of intelligent, though invisible beings, 
to gods, daemons, witches, genii, fairies. For it may be observed, that in all 
Polytheistic religions, among savages, as well as in the early ages of 
Heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that are ascribed 
to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water refreshes; 
heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity 
of their own nature; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended 
to be employed in those matters. But thunder and lightning, storms and sun-
shine, those more irregular events, were ascribed to his favour, or his anger 
. . . And thus, in the first ages of the world, the lowest and most pusillani-
mous superstition supplied the place of philosophy.
(EPS: 49; emphasis added)
This polytheistic context is alien to an economic interpretation.37 Smith’s second 
invisible hand appears in chapter 1, “Of the Beauty Which the Appearance of 
Utility Bestows upon All the Productions of Art, and of the Extensive Influence 
of This Species of Beauty,” of Part IV, “Of the Effect of Utility upon Sentiment 
of Approbation,” of TMS. After explaining how nature deceives us and promotes 
industry, Smith follows:
The homely and vulgar proverb, that the eye is larger than the belly, never 
was more fully verified than with regard to him. The capacity of his stomach 
bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, and will receive no 
more than that of the meanest peasant. The rest he is obliged to distribute 
among those, who prepare, in the nicest manner, that little which he himself 
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makes use of, among those who fit up the palace in which this little is to be 
consumed, among those who provide and keep in order all the different 
baubles and trinkets, which are employed in the oeconomy of greatness; all 
of whom thus derive from his luxury and caprice, that share of the necessar-
ies of life, which they would in vain have expected from his humanity or his 
justice. The produce of the soil maintains at all times nearly that number of 
inhabitants which it is capable of maintaining. The rich only select from the 
heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than 
the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they 
mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose 
from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification 
of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the 
produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to 
make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would 
have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all 
its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance 
the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the 
species.
(TMS IV.I.10: 215–16; emphasis added)
Here we can clearly find the idea of unintended consequences, although the com-
plete passage is charged with religious overtones. The last and most important 
invisible hand is in chapter II, “Of Restraints upon Importation from Foreign 
Countries of such Goods as Can Be Produced at Home,” of Book IV, “Of 
Systems of Political Economy,” in WN. It reads:
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends 
only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its 
produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he 
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end 
which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society 
that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes 
that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote 
it.
(WN IV.ii. 9: 456; emphasis added)
It would not be bold to assert that Smith’s invisible hand is the most important 
metaphor in the history of economic thought. But it is also the most elusive, as 
different interpretations have been drawn. For example Grampp (2000) enumer-
ates ten different interpretations including his own.38 The latter is “more interest-
ing than important” (Grampp 2000: 442) and simply relates to the context in 
which WN’s invisible hand appears. But his criticism of the Hayekian interpreta-
tion argues that this “[i]nquiry . . . could have the unexpected consequence of 
revealing that Smith was not as loyal to the simple system of natural liberty as 
the Austrians are” (ibid.: 446). His argument against this interpretation is that 
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even though there are unintended consequences, they only relate to the defence 
of a nation, that is, “nothing so complex and so grand as the social order of the 
price mechanism within it” (ibid.).
 Hayek often refers to the social function of the invisible hand, that is “to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention,” but he exceptionally refers 
to the metaphor as such. To my knowledge, the invisible hand appears directly 
only three times. The first in “The Trend of Economic Thinking”:
It is, of course, supremely easy to ridicule Adam Smith’s famous “invisible 
hand” – which leads “man to promote and end which was no part of his 
intention”. But it is an error not very different from this anthropomorphism 
to assume that the existing economic system serves a definite function only 
in so far as its institutions have been deliberately willed by individuals.
(Hayek 1991 [1933]: 27)
Then in “Comte and Hegel”:
Hegel and Comte both singularly failed to make intelligible how the inter-
action of the efforts of individuals can create something greater than they 
know. While Smith and the other great Scottish individualists of the eight-
eenth century – even though they spoke of the “invisible hand” – provided 
such an explanation, all that Hegel and Comte give us is a mysterious teleo-
logical force. And while eighteenth- century individualism, essentially 
humble in its aspirations, aimed at the understanding as well as possible the 
principles by which the individual efforts combined to produce a civilization 
in order to learn what were the conditions most favourable to its further 
growth, Hegel and Comte became the main source of that hubris of collec-
tivism which aims at “conscious direction” of all forces of society.
(Hayek 1952 [1951]: 203–4)
Regarding the latter, Hayek, in his “The Results of Human Action but not of 
Human Design” (1967), goes on to claim:
The uncomprehending ridicule later poured on the latter’s expression of the 
“invisible hand” by which “man is led to promote an end which was no part 
of his intention”, however, once more submerged this profound insight into 
the object of all social theory, and it was not until a century later that Carl 
Menger at last resuscitated it in a form which now, yet another eighty years 
later, seems to have become widely accepted, at least within the field of 
social theory proper.
(Hayek 1967: 99–100)39
Bruce Caldwell has kindly suggested to me that as Smith’s “invisible hand” was 
ridiculed as having religious or mystical connotations, the scientific and anti- 
clerical environment in which Hayek was raised might explain his reluctance to 
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use it directly. The context of the TMS invisible hand would explain a common 
religious interpretation during the first half of the twentieth century.40 Also 
Hayek’s rhetoric referring to the invisible hand is clear about this supposition.
 The idea of promoting an end which was no part of his intention is clear in 
the TMS and WN invisible hand. Grampp (2000) too readily dismisses the Hay-
ekian interpretation by simply focusing on the context of the WN invisible hand. 
Moreover, there are other passages where Smith repeats the idea of unintended 
consequences, and his “conjectural history,” including his four- stages theory, 
might be considered a precursor of Hayek’s unintended consequences. It is my 
personal view that Hayek’s interpretation is quite feasible, as Otteson (2002) has 
persuasively suggested.
Conclusions
This analysis, by no means exhaustive, covers perhaps some of the most signi-
ficant essays in which Hayek refers to his classical liberal sources, and Adam 
Smith in particular. One cannot refrain from imagining Hayek as a true inheri-
tor of this tradition, as a staunch and committed follower of Smith’s “liberal 
plan of equality, liberty, and justice” (WN IV.ix.3: 664). Throughout his writ-
ings Hayek explicitly and implicitly acknowledges that he is standing on the 
shoulders of giants. Mandeville, Ferguson, Hume, Burke, Tucker and, last but 
not least, Smith, are consciously referred to as his “true” intellectual ancestors. 
One cannot avoid imagining that his long wait for finally witnessing the imple-
mentation of his ideals was undertaken with patience and restless intellectual 
rigor.
 Although there is intellectual evolution from his 1933 “The Trend of Eco-
nomic Thinking” up to his “Individualism: True and False” (1945), from the 
latter onwards there is a solid intellectual background that keeps the same frame-
work. As his late essay “Liberalism” (1973) maintains basically the same argu-
ments, we can conclude that Hayek’s classical liberal principles are consistent. It 
can also be suggested that if Smith was always a prominent influence in Hayek, 
his later writings show a more explicit commitment with Adam Smith’s WN as a 
crucial foundation of classical liberalism. It is also surprising that, as with 
Stigler, Hayek does not touch some fundamental moral aspects of Smith’s TMS, 
neither does he develop his concept of sympathy.
 In his “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility” (1963), Hayek makes, to my 
knowledge, the only connection to sympathy while discussing “other people’s 
actions.” According to Hayek, our 
understanding of the meaning of actions is of the same kind as the under-
standing of communications (i.e. of action intended to be understood). It 
includes what eighteenth century authors described as sympathy and what 
has more recently been discussed under the heading of “empathy” 
(Einfuhlung).
(Hayek 1967 [1963]: 58)
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It is really interesting that Hayek does not develop sympathy. Certainly he had 
read TMS. But sympathy, the impartial spectator and even the famous Adam 
Smith Problem were ignored by Hayek. As I have suggested, perhaps Jacob 
Viner’s overwhelming influence with his religious account of TMS might 
explain why, up to the bicentenary of WN, economists rarely referred to Smith’s 
TMS (for example, see lectures commemorating the bicentennial anniversary of 
WN in Fry 1992).41
 But throughout Hayek’s essay, although the traces of Smith and the Scottish 
Enlightenment for classical liberalism are clear, his main concern is political. 
Smith remains a moral philosopher, concerned with sympathy, virtues and the 
impartial spectator. Hayek, a political philosopher, is against social planning and 
concerned with economics as catalaxia. If Smith was a staunch egalitarian, 
Hayek was only a “formal” egalitarian. For Smith there are no differences 
between the street porter and the philosopher. For Hayek, there are differences, 
and that is the reason why we have to treat them as equal.
 If there is a single passage in Smith that best represents Hayek’s intentions, it 
is the great metaphor of the man of system and society as a chess board.42 It is 
plausible that this passage was written by Smith during the French “distur-
bances.” Let me quote the whole passage again, as it entails great political 
insights very dear to Hayek:
The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; 
and is often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of 
government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it. 
He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, without any regard 
either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. 
He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great 
society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a 
chess- board. He does not consider that the pieces upon the chess- board have 
no other principle of motion besides that which the hand impresses upon 
them; but that, in the great chess- board of human society, every single piece 
has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the 
legislature might chuse to impress upon it. If those two principles coincide 
and act in the same direction, the game of human society will go on easily 
and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they are 
opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be 
at all times in the highest degree of disorder.
(TMS VI.ii.2.17: 275)
It is noteworthy that in his quite brief 1976 newspaper article, “Adam Smith’s 
Message in Today’s Language,” Hayek’s only quote from Smith is this passage 
almost in full (Hayek 1978 [1976]: 269). Actually it is more than noteworthy: 
this passage fully reflects Hayek’s main criticism of a planned society. Smith 
had beautifully put forward this criticism almost 200 years ago. And Hayek 
knew it.43
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 I have argued that Hayek and Smith share a common understanding of human 
nature as social beings. Their idea of self- interest is that of oikeiosis, which has 
nothing to do with selfishness. They also coincide with the social beneficial 
effects of individual responsibility, with the “slow and gradual” process of 
society. They both see the market as an opportunity, not as a threat. Both share 
the economist’s pragmatism about human nature, but differ in terms of their 
egalitarianism. They understand social phenomena as a complex matter that 
cannot be directed by a “man of system.” If Smith actually predicted what Hayek 
had to live, the latter adopted, adapted and spread out the political implications 
of Smith’s visions.
 It is not difficult to see that both intellectuals, Hayek and Smith, represent a 
common strand in the history of ideas. As I began this chapter pinpointing some 
similarities between Smith and Hayek, even some psychological ones, there is 
another virtuous connection. Smith’s chief virtue, from which all the other 
virtues derive, is self- command.44 Let me finish with a quotation from TMS 
which in my view represents both Hayek and Smith: “[t]he most perfect know-
ledge, if it is not supported by the most perfect self- command, will not always 
enable him to do his duty” (TMS VI.iii.1: 279). Although the idea of self- 
command is refraining from something, it has a sense of direction. This virtue 
can be interpreted not only as a negative virtue, but also as a positive one. If 
Hayek continued rowing Smith’s boat, he did so with patience and humility, in 
sum, with self- command. All these virtues are paramount to a “true” liberal tra-
dition. As Hayek would say: a good economist is not only an economist.
Notes
 1 This chapter was presented and discussed at a Liberty Fund Symposium in December 
2006. I am much indebted to Bruce Caldwell, Ross Emmett, David Levy, Deirdre 
McCloskey, Andrew Farrant, Sandra Peart and Vernon Smith for their comments. An 
improved version was presented at the 2009 History of Economics Society Meeting at 
Denver, Colorado. I am especially grateful to Bruce Caldwell and to the editor of this 
volume, Andrew Farrant, for their helpful comments.
 2 In this chapter I shall refer to four of the six standard books of The Glasgow Edition 
of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith by their abbreviations for references 
and quotations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(WN); Essays on Philosophical Subjects (EPS); Lectures on Jurisprudence (LJ); and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith (Corr.). All references are taken from the Online 
Library of Liberty publicly available at www.libertyfund.org. For The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments (TMS), I have quoted from Knud Haakonssen’s edition of TMS 
published in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (Smith 2002 
[1759]).
 3 I tend to believe that Smith was a practical agnostic (see Montes 2004: 37–8). Modern 
interpreters like Veblen (1933 [1899–1900]), Viner (1927, 1972) and most recently 
Fleischacker (2004) and Evensky (2005) argue that Smith believed. This issue will 
remain a matter of speculation, but in my view there are good reasons to defend that 
Smith believed less than we think, and Hume probably more than we assume. If Smith 
was actually an agnostic, this would be another interesting similarity with Hayek.
 4 On WN’s reception, there is debate. Some scholars believe it has been overestimated. 
See especially Teichgraeber (1987), Rothschild (1992, 2001: 52–71) and Rashid (1998).
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 5 It says:
I shall in another discourse endeavour to give an account of the general principles 
of law and government, and of the different revolutions they have undergone in 
the different ages and periods of society, not only in what concerns justice, but in 
what concerns police, revenue, and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. I 
shall not, therefore, at present enter into any further detail concerning the history 
of jurisprudence.
(TMS VII.iv.37: 404)
He kept this final paragraph.
 6 For example, Marx admired Smith, for the wrong reasons, as a classical economist, 
and Rothbard criticized him for the same wrong reason.
 7 Caldwell (1987 and passim) has analyzed the German Historical School as a social 
phenomenon in itself and from Hayek’s own perspective. It is worth noting that even 
though Hayek in “The Trend of Economic Thinking” attributes to the German Histor-
ical School a leading role in the intellectual shaping of Continental socialism, and to 
Adam Smith a key position towards classical liberalism, a notorious member like 
Hildebrand would see Adam Smith as a philosopher of the French Revolution (Hilde-
brand 1848).
 8 “The Trend of Economic Thinking” is, according to Caldwell,
a manifesto and a starting point. It is a manifesto because it is rich in ideas that are 
not yet systematically articulated. And it is a starting point because . . . he was 
forced to pay increasing attention to the problems he first mentioned in this 
article.
(Caldwell 1987: 177–8)
Caldwell argues that Hayek’s crucial idea for the “Calculation Debate” began three 
years later with his “Economics and Knowledge” (1937).
 9 For an excellent brief account of this essay see Caldwell (2004: 279–87).
10 Hayek had already developed this distinction in The Counter- Revolution of Science 
(1942).
11 On this issue, initially the focus of the “Continental writers of false individualism” 
was on the German Historical School (Hayek, 1991 [1933]). Then the French acquired 
notorious pre- eminence.
12 On the Stoics’ concept of oikeiosis see Schofield (1995, 1999: 760–8), Inwood and 
Donini (1999: 677–82), Long (1996: 250–64), Sandbach (1975: 34–5), Engberg- 
Pedersen (1990, 1995), and Edelstein (1966: 35). On Smith and the Stoics see also 
Vivenza (2001). Heise (1995) also analyses the importance of oikeiosis for Smith.
13 I am indebted to David Levy for calling my attention to this simple neoclassical term 
which involves important philosophical issues.
14 Another important passage reflecting this point is:
Regard to our own private happiness and interest, too, appear upon many occa-
sions very laudable principles of action. The habits of oeconomy, industry, discre-
tion, attention, and application of thought, are generally supposed to be cultivated 
from self- interested motives, and at the same time are apprehended to be very 
praise- worthy qualities, which deserve the esteem and approbation of everybody.
(TMS VII.ii.3.16: 359)
15 Heise (1995: 19) also states that “the self- interest or self- betterment of Smith is the 
oikeíosis of the Stoics,” but he, too, readily concludes that “[i]n the sixth edition of 
TMS, Smith became even more Stoic” (ibid.: 23), which in my view is just the oppos-
ite (see Montes 2009).
16 I suggest that Smith’s concept of propriety, which literally relates to proprius, to 
something belonging to one, might also have an important connection with this 
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all- encompassing classical source of oikeiosis. Propriety has a moral meaning related 
to one’s own, in particular to property in its liberal Lockean sense of “Lives, Liber-
ties and Estates.” Propriety and property were both used interchangeably during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The connection between property’s particular 
meaning of material possession and propriety’s more general and broader classical 
liberal meaning, which also includes a moral connotation, is quite interesting. Prop-
erty finally acquired a material meaning, but retained a moral connotation, e.g. 
“acting with propriety.” In my view this might be a reflection of the corruption 
debate – commercial progress versus moral decay, or wealth versus virtue – that 
began to take place in seventeenth- century England up to the eighteenth century. 
This classical tradition that morally supports self- interest as concern for what is close 
to us (with the self in the centre, as Hayek and Smith knew) was transmitted to Smith 
and adopted by Hayek. I have argued that in a way Adam Smith represents the twi-
light of a republican tradition, and that some important vestiges of this tradition can 
be found in his works (see Montes 2004, chs 3 and 4). Hayek was an admirer of the 
Glorious Revolution and the classical republican tradition that preceded it. It is note-
worthy that Hayek’s title page of his The Constitution of Liberty is introduced by a 
quotation from Algernon Sydney: “Our inquiry is not after that which is perfect, well 
knowing that no such thing is found among men; but we seek that human Constitu-
tion which is attended with the least, or the most pardonable inconveniences” (see 
also note 28).
17 For additional sources, in footnote 8 Hayek (1980 [1948]: 7) quotes another passage 
from Ferguson, one from Tucker, Smith’s invisible hand in his WN and another 
passage from Burke. At the end he quotes a passage from Lerner’s The Economics of 
Control supporting Smith’s market mechanism, simply referring to this apparent 
paradox as “interesting.”
18 Remember that Smith blamed “projectors” for “excessive circulation of paper money” 
(WN II.Ii.57: 304). Projectors “had in their golden dreams the most distinct vision of 
this great profit” (WN II.ii.69: 310). They were even the cause of a fixed rate of inter-
est (WN II.iv.15: 357). Financial crises like the South Sea Bubble partly explain this 
rhetoric.
19 The club got its name in analogy to the tool’s purpose of “stirring” the establishment 
of a Scottish militia. On Smith and the Poker Club, see especially Rae (1965 [1895]: 
134–40). For other sources on this club, related to Smith and the militia, see Ross 
(1995: 141–2, 282, 288, 346–8); Robertson (1985: 200–32); Winch (1978: 103–20). 
Ferguson, although he saw the commercial benefits of the 1707 Act of Union, was a 
republican who staunchly defended the militia. He is a good example of the corrup-
tion debate. In his influential The Machiavellian Moment, John Pocock appropriately 
labeled Ferguson’s An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767) as “the most 
Machiavellian of the Scottish disquisitions” (Pocock 1975: 499).
20 An anonymous pamphlet dedicated to the Duke of Buccleuch against Adam Smith 
was published in 1778. On the context of this interesting debate and Smith’s apparent 
change of mind, see Montes (2010).
21 For a similar but more direct argument, in chapter 4 of his Constitution and Liberty 
(1960), Hayek remarks that “[t]he sweeping success of the political doctrines that 
stem from the French tradition is probably due to their great appeal to human pride 
and ambition” (1960: 56).
22 At the end of the essay he claims that “true individualism is not equalitarian in the 
modern sense of the word” (1980 [1948]: 30).
23 Together with Smith, it might be argued that both thinkers are precursors of Isaiah 
Berlin’s distinction of negative and positive liberty. Undoubtedly more provocatively, 
Berlin had the ability to simplify what perhaps could have been an obvious insight for 
both thinkers.
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24 Actually Smith also refers in TMS to the “sacred and religious regard not to hurt or 
disturb in any respect the happiness of our neighbour” (TMS VI.ii.intro.2: 256), and 
elsewhere the “sacred laws of justice,” and a “sacred and conscientious regard to the 
general rules of justice.”
25 I must underline that not all is optimism for Smith, as the pragmatic father of eco-
nomics also foresees some significant problems (see Alvey 2003).
26 Smith graciously claims “[n]obody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate 
exchange of one bone for another with another dog” (WN I.ii.2: 26).
27 Hayek continuously praises Mandeville. His “Dr. Bernard Mandeville” (1967) is a 
proof of his admiration. The fact that Keynes mentions Mandeville in his General 
Theory is suggestive. On the first page of his “Dr. Bernard Mandeville,” Hayek pin-
points that “an authority like Lord Keynes has given him high praise” (1978 [1967]: 
249).
28 On this account it is noteworthy that Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty title page epi-
graph reads: “Our Inquiry is not after that which is perfect, well knowing that no such 
thing is found among men; but we seek that human Constitution which is attended 
with the least, or the most pardonable inconveniences.” This quotation was written by 
the emblematic republican martyr Algernon Sidney.
29 Hayek’s distrust for economic theory is also reflected in his remarks about general 
economic equilibrium at the end of his classical “The Use of Knowledge in Society” 
(1945).
30 Hayek has a view of Adam Smith’s self- interest different from that attributed to Smith 
by Stigler. The latter considers self- interest as the “crown jewel” (Stigler 1982: 60) of 
WN, by extension Smith’s magnum opus is “a stupendous palace erected upon the 
granite of self- interest” (ibid.: 136). David Levy has suggested to me that this inter-
pretation, which ignores TMS and sympathy, might be a consequence of Jacob Viner, 
who, in his seminal “Adam Smith and Laissez Faire” (1927), declared the inconsist-
ency between TMS and WN.
31 Hayek argues that “the new liberalism that gradually displaced Whiggism came more 
and more under the influence of the rationalist tendencies of the philosophical radicals 
and the French tradition, Bentham and his Utilitarians did much to destroy the beliefs” 
(1960: 174).
32 In Rules and Order (1973), Hayek distinguishes between “spontaneous order” and 
“organizations.” The former is related to the Greek kosmos and it is self- generating, 
the latter to taxis, and it is created. He also applies this distinction to clarify the 
concept of justice by arguing that rational constructivism requires command with an 
end in mind. This end would be, according to Hayek, what Adam Smith defined as 
“the Great Society” (Hayek 1973: 2).
33 Smith’s concept of justice as commutative, and its historical development, is analyzed 
in WN as the second duty of government in Book V, “Of the Expences of the Sover-
eign or Commonwealth” (WN V.i: 708–23).
34 It has always struck me that on the few occasions that Hayek refers to Rawls he does 
so approvingly. His influential A Theory of Justice (1971) marked such a revolution in 
political philosophy that is difficult to explain why Hayek did not get involved with 
Rawls’ concept of distributive justice.
35 Elsewhere Hayek refers to the speed needed for this process to take place:
In a stationary society there will be about as many who will be descending as 
there will be those rising. In order that the great majority should in their individual 
lives participate in the advance, it is necessary that it proceed at a considerable 
speed. There can therefore be little doubt that Adam Smith was right when he 
said: “it is in the progressive state, while the society is advancing to the further 
acquisition, rather than when it has acquired its full complement of riches, that the 
condition of the labouring poor, of the great body of the people, seems to be 
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the happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in the stationary, and miserable 
in the declining state. The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the hearty 
state to all the different orders of the society. The stationary is dull; the declining 
melancholy.”
(1960: 42)
36 Some interpreters have simply taken this essay as a “juvenile” work. For example, 
Wightman, editor of EPS, considers that “[t]o none of them [Smith’s main essays] 
would a modern scholar turn for enlightenment on the history of the sciences” (EPS: 
5). Specifically, HA, “[t]hough acceptable to a modern historian in its main lines, it 
contains so many errors of detail and not a few serious omissions as to be no longer 
more than a museum specimen of its kind” (EPS: 11). I believe this is not correct, as 
this essay, labeled by Schumpeter as “the pearl of the collection” (1994 [1954]: 182), 
is original in many senses. In Montes (2006) I have argued the relevance of this essay 
to understand Smith’s methodology.
37 Rothschild (1994) provocatively interpreted, based on the invisible hand of Jupiter, 
the other two invisible hands of TMS and WN as a joke. In WN and TMS, the invisi-
ble hand would be the murderous hand of Macbeth, the evil of a free market.
38 Since 2001 Warren Samuels has been working on the invisible hand, uncovering over 
48 different readings of this metaphor. For a good interpretation of Smith’s invisible 
hand, expanding on Otteson’s (2002, 2007) Hayekian interpretation as unintended 
consequences, see Smith (2007). And for a good collection of essays following some 
ideas of this chapter, see Hunt and McNamara (2007).
39 In a footnote Hayek states that
the more recent revival of this conception seems to date from my own article “Sci-
entism and the Study of Society” (1942) . . . where I argued that the aim of social 
studies is “to explain the unintended or undersigned results of many men.”
(1967: 100 n. 12)
Caldwell (2004: 72–3) wonders how Menger got Smith so wrong. Throughout this 
essay, and other sources, Hayek insists on Menger’s possible connection with Savigny 
and the older historical school, although the latter relied on natural laws, it is finally 
due to the French, through a “Cartesian constructivism” (1967: 104) helped by posit-
ivism, that history of ideas arrives at the wrong path.
40 Caldwell’s suggestion is quite plausible. Perhaps Jacob Viner’s overwhelming influ-
ence can even be extended to Hayek. Not surprisingly, in his “Two Types of Mind” 
(1978 [1975]), Hayek refers to Viner (together with von Wieser and Schumpeter) as 
“master of his subject” (Hayek 1978 [1975]: 51).
41 Incidentally Max Scheler, the author of The Nature of Sympathy (1954) was a good 
friend of Ludwig von Mises who was quite an influence on Hayek. In his Memoirs, 
Ludwig von Mises recalls “I also met men in both of these German societies whose 
company enriched me greatly. I recall, above all, Max Scheler, the philosopher and 
sociologist” (von Mises 2009: 88).
42 See analytical egalitarianism developed by Levy and Peart (2005, 2008). For Smith, 
social nature under the sympathetic process requires more than reciprocity; it is not 
simply a social contract between atomistic or rational individuals.
43 Later he wrote
[s]ince Adam Smith the process by which the shares of individuals are determined 
in a market economy has therefore often been likened to a game in which the 
results for each depend partly on his skill and effort and partly on chance.
(1978: 137)
44 According to Smith, self- command “is not only a great virtue, but from it all the other 
virtues seem to derive their principal lustre” (TMS VI.iii.11: 284).
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2 F. A. Hayek’s sympathetic agents
Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy
Introduction
In his 2002 Nobel Lecture, Vernon Smith refers to “the simultaneous existence 
of two rational orders,” which “are distinguishing characteristics of what we are 
as social creatures” (Smith 2003: 466). For Smith, who invokes David Hume 
and F. A. Hayek in this regard, both orders “are essential to understanding and 
unifying a large body of experience from socioeconomic life and the experimen-
tal laboratory, and in charting relevant new directions for economic theory as 
well as experimental- empirical programs” (Smith 2003: 466).1 This chapter 
examines the nature and consequences of Hayek’s concept of human agency by 
exploring the Hayekian two worlds of human conduct. We argue that Hayek 
renounced the use of an explicit model of reclusive agency in favor of an implicit 
model of sympathetic (correlated) agency.
	 In	 what	 follows,	 we	 show	 first	 that,	 for	 Hayek,	 behavior	 within	 the	 small	
group – the “small band or troop,” or “micro- cosmos” – is correlated, resulting 
from agents who are sympathetic one with another. We shall argue that sym-
pathy in this context for Hayek entails the projection of one’s preferences onto 
the preferences of others. With such correlated agency as the default in small- 
group situations, Hayek attempts to explain the transition from small groups to a 
larger civilization. We consider the role of projection in Hayek’s system at 
length,	because	projection	from	the	local	group	characterized	by	a	well-	defined	
preference ordering to the world beyond the neighborhood may yield mistaken 
beliefs. We shall argue that Hayek’s recognition of this outcome underlies his 
pessimism about the democratic attempt to effect “social justice.”
 Finally, we shall take up the question of whether and how to avoid this temp-
tation to impose one set of preferences on another when local optima differ. We 
address this question by considering how sympathetic projection can go awry in 
the	Classical	tradition,	specifically	in	Adam	Smith’s	system.	The	problem	is,	we	
shall argue, one of “factions.” Smith famously worried about the destructive 
nature of factions, their tendency to exploit the larger society (Levy and Peart 
2008a). In the case of religious factions – perhaps the most famous example of 
destructive behavior of this sort – Smith held that competition among small 
groups might resolve the problem. Central to his argument is the realization that 
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if the local groups are small enough, individuals in the larger society will belong 
to overlapping organizations. As they move in their daily lives from one small 
organization	to	another,	they	will	find	that	the	organizations	differ	and	they	will	
thus learn to agree to disagree. People will come to accept the incoherence that 
characterizes life in the larger sphere.
The totalitarian temptation
A key to Hayek’s account of the totalitarian lies in the difference between 
Vernon Smith’s “two rational worlds”: an organization and an order. Hayek sets 
out the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of 
goals (preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence. 
People have, he maintains, personal experience with organizations, small groups, 
but since they have none with the larger collection of organizations, orders, they 
are left to theorize about the collectivity. As they do so, as they attempt to turn 
their experience with orders into knowledge of organizations, they are tempted 
in Hayek’s account by totalitarianism. By this, Hayek means that they are 
tempted to imagine that the goals or preference ordering of the larger collective, 
the order, are coherent in the way that the goals of the small collective, the 
organization, might be. So, as people move from the small to the large group, a 
failing of the imagination occurs. People project their preference for a single 
preference ordering onto the group, and they desire the coherence that results. 
We note in what follows that, as long as the experience and consequent prefer-
ence orderings of the small groups vary, no such coherence results. More, the 
very desire for coherence on a social level is inconsistent with a liberal order 
characterized by a plurality of goals. Hayek is skeptical of any wide- scale solu-
tion to the temptation for imposing coherence, what we might call a totalitarian 
temptation, that results. The only possible solution is piecemeal institutional 
reform of one sort or another, for example, Hayek (1979), Hayek and Buchanan 
(1978).
 When Hayek wrote his Road to Serfdom, “totalitarianism” was an unfamiliar 
word. In his system, Hayek turned totalitarianism into a term with precise 
meaning.2 He distinguished between the theory of a collectivity and its manifes-
tation, totalitarianism. For Hayek, the totalitarian norm is a complete ordering of 
social states. Once we realize this, we can reformulate Hayek’s argument in 
terms of standard social choice theory. What Kenneth Arrow called a “dictator-
ship” is related to the requirements for Hayek’s “complete ethical code” of total-
itarianism.3 This totalitarian “ethical code” is characterized by a “unitary end” so 
that only one person’s goals are allowed to matter. Arrow’s impossibility 
theorem establishes that the goal of a complete ordering of social states is incon-
sistent with non- dictatorship as a formal matter.4 But Arrow leaves open the 
question of whether a collectivity might prefer coherence to non- dictatorship.5 In 
Hayek’s account, the projection motivates the temptation to choose coherence 
over non- dictatorship, so that people who are habituated to coherence in the 
small group might also prefer coherence to non- dictatorship in the large group. 
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This sheds new light on Hayek’s “slippery slope” argument, which might be 
reformulated as a recognition (and a warning against the recognition) that indi-
viduals might willingly cede freedom of choice to a dictator or a planner because 
that leaves them with the coherence that characterizes their other spheres of life.
 We shall emphasize Hayek’s treatment of the small group in writings after 
his 1960 Constitution of Liberty in which the small group is viewed as natural 
in some biological sense.6 The full measure of Hayek’s turn toward biological 
foundations is not very well understood. There is a completely non- biological 
account of the demand for coherence in his 1949 “Intellectuals and Socialism.” 
Here he distinguishes among three mutually exclusive groups – ordinary people, 
intellectuals, and specialists/scholars. Ordinary people have no use for system-
atic philosophy so they are little interested in imagining the world as coherent. 
Specialists/scholars are all too aware of the puzzles at the frontier of their dis-
cipline	 so	 they	 address	 themselves	 to	 making	 the	 pieces	 of	 their	 world	 fit	
together. Hayek’s characterization of intellectuals – “second- hand dealers in 
ideas” – although perhaps meant as an insult, makes the point quite nicely. To 
explain the world to non- specialists one is tempted to make it more coherent 
than it really is.
 Intellectual is an occupation. The imposition of coherence comes from the 
incentives of the position. Hayek’s account of the intellectuals’ demand for 
coherence	suggests	that	among	intellectuals	one	would	find	more	willingness	to	
trade democracy for coherence than in the other groups. This is certainly a testa-
ble implication. Hayek seems to have given up such incentive- based arguments 
when he started to write about small groups with unitary goals as natural. It is 
useful to note that if one distrusts such naturalistic accounts of the sort we shall 
explore next, there are incentive- based alternatives to which one might appeal.
Hayekian sympathy as correlated behavior
When we propose that Hayek works with “sympathetic” agency we need to 
clarify that his account is not necessarily the same as Adam Smith’s or, for that 
matter, pre- Smithian accounts. “Sympathy” is the transliteration of an ancient 
Greek technical term, meaning “co- affective” or “interactive.” The word was 
extensively employed by both Greek and Roman philosophers in the Stoic tradi-
tion who posited cosmic sympathy as the hidden force which moved all parts of 
the world.7 So, sympathetic explanations offered correlation without evidence of 
a causal mechanism. The correlated motion of the tides and the moon was a once 
widely used instance of how sympathy was said to play out in the physical 
world. To explain sympathetic principles of motion, the mathematical model of 
vibrating strings was developed. As sympathetic motion came to be idealized, 
“harmony” came to be understood not only as a musical term but also as an 
ethical goal (Levy and Peart 2008a).
 Adam Smith’s account of sympathy stands out as the transforming moment in 
the historical record. He took the notion of sympathy as a form of vibration that 
resulted from a physical connection and transformed it instead into an act of 
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imagination, a projection of one’s preferences to another in the same situation. 
The difference is important because, before Smith, people were said to sympa-
thize only with their equals; while Smith made the case that we can in fact sym-
pathize with those who are quite unlike ourselves. In such cases, we may initially 
make	 mistaken	 projections,	 but	 we	 come	 to	 refine	 our	 ability	 to	 sympathize.	
Affection is then nothing more than habituated sympathy (mediated by institu-
tions), and the act of sympathizing comes to equalize, to make us more alike. 
This is the key point that separated David Hume, who held that sympathy is a 
physical reaction, a form of empathy, and Smith, for whom sympathy is the pro-
jected act of imagination (Peart and Levy 2005).
 Hayek uses sympathy to explain widely observed imitative behavior.8 Imita-
tion generates correlated behavior which itself has a key methodological impli-
cation for Hayek: recognition of interpersonal dependence causes him to be 
deeply skeptical about using dependence- blind statistical methods in 
economics.9
 The correlated behavior that features most prominently in Hayek’s construc-
tion is reciprocity. In Hayek’s construction, the sense of reciprocity explains the 
movement from small groups to civilization. We quote a passage from his 
important 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. Here Hayek differentiates 
between “reciprocal but not common purposes.” He argues that the reciprocal 
behavior,	first	observed	in	a	small	tribe,	becomes	a	norm	for	“ever	wider	circles	
of undetermined persons”:10
29. The growth from the tribal organization, all of whose members served 
common purposes, to the spontaneous order of the Open Society in which 
people are allowed to pursue their own purposes in peace, may thus be said 
to	have	commenced	when	for	the	first	time	a	savage	placed	some	goods	on	
the boundary of his tribe in the hope that some member of another tribe 
would	find	 them	and	 leave	 in	 turn	behind	 some	other	goods	 to	 secure	 the	
repetition	of	the	offer.	From	the	first	establishment	of	such	a	practice	which	
served reciprocal but not common purposes, a process has been going on for 
millennia which, by making rules of conduct independent of particular pur-
poses of those concerned, made it possible to extend these rules to ever 
wider circles of undetermined persons and eventually might make possible a 
universal peaceful order of the world.
(Hayek 1966: 168)
The notion of even a small group with a common purpose might seem odd for an 
economist today, but Hayek’s appeal to what is now known as the “investment” 
or “trust” game shows just how far he is from the rational (independent) actor 
model of the 1960s. The trust game has a trivial solution, the wandering tribe 
which encounters a free lunch, picks it up and leaves nothing. The stationary 
tribe, in anticipation, leaves nothing. In point of fact, the Hayekian reciprocal 
outcome where each group leaves food for the other group(s) is borne out in 
experimental economics.11
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Hayek on projection
For Hayek, as noted above, sympathy generates imitative behavior. This is coher-
ent inside Hayek’s larger system in which he provides an alternative to accounts 
based on the assumption of independent agency. Such an alternative requires a 
theory of dependent agency. The central problem in Hayek’s theory of mind is 
classification	 or	 grouping.	The	 classification	 of	 objects	 into	 groups	 that	 are	 the	
“same” does not depend upon the objects “really” being the same. Instead, they 
are	(or	they	become)	the	“same”	because	they	are	classified	that	way.12 To move 
beyond the unconscious, Hayek depends upon projection. By an act of imagina-
tion, others become like us and so meaning becomes intersubjective.13
 We consider in order Hayek’s account of projection about other people who 
“really” are much like us and projection about those at a great distance from us. 
We will distinguish reliable from unreliable projection by appealing to the dis-
tance involved. We will return to the link between reliability and distance after 
we consider Hayek’s argument.
Reliable projection
Without distinguishing between the account in Hume and that in Smith, Hayek 
maintains that his approach is a return to the Scottish tradition.14 In either event, 
Hayek’s reformulation of the Scottish tradition rules out the “existence of isolated 
or self- contained individuals” and presupposes dependent human agency instead:
What,	then,	are	the	essential	characteristics	of	true	individualism?	The	first	
thing that should be said is that it is primarily a theory of society, an attempt 
to understand the forces which determine the social life of man, and only in 
the second instance a set of political maxims derived from this view of 
society.	This	 fact	 should	 by	 itself	 be	 sufficient	 to	 refute	 the	 silliest	 of	 the	
common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism postulates (or 
bases its arguments on the assumption of ) the existence of isolated or self- 
contained individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and 
character is determined by their existence in society.
(1946: 6)15
Hayek’s discussion of eighteenth- century conceptions of sympathy emphasizes 
that sympathy plays a role in how individuals come to understand the world 
around them. We quote at some length from his 1963 British Academy lecture. 
Here, Hayek explains how something like Smith’s imaginative projection allows 
us to classify, to connect activities as “wholes,” to say that some of my actions 
and some of your actions are the same thing, they have the same name, they are 
elements of a class:
We have yet to consider more closely the role which the perception of the 
meaning	of	other	people’s	actions	must	play	in	the	scientific	explanation	of	
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the interaction of men. The problem which arises here is known in the dis-
cussion of the methodology of the social sciences as that of Verstehen 
(understanding). We have seen that this understanding of the meaning of 
actions is the same kind as the understanding of communications (i.e., 
actions intended to be understood). It includes what the eighteenth- century 
authors described as sympathy and what has more recently been discussed 
under the heading of “empathy” (Einhühlung). Since we shall be concerned 
chiefly	with	 the	uses	of	 these	perceptions	as	data	 for	 the	 theoretical	social	
sciences, we shall concentrate on what is sometimes called rational under-
standing (or rational reconstruction), that is, on the instances where we 
recognize that the persons in whose actions we are interested base their 
decisions on the meaning of what they perceive. The theoretical social sci-
ences	 do	 not	 treat	 all	 of	 a	 person’s	 actions	 as	 an	 unspecifiable	 and	 unex-
plainable whole but, in their efforts to account for the unintended 
consequences of individual actions, endeavour to reconstruct the indi-
vidual’s reasoning from the data which to him are provided by the recogni-
tion of the actions of others as meaningful wholes.
(1963: 58–9)
The ability to classify offers a foundational account of how we understand unar-
ticulated rules: “We have seen that our capacity to recognize action as following 
rules and having meaning rests on ourselves already being equipped with these 
rules” (1963: 59). In the years before he published The Sensory Order, Hayek 
considered	 the	 classification	 of	 others’	 actions	 based	 on	 a	 type	 of	 projection,	
what “we know solely from knowledge of our mind.” In the “great majority of 
instances,” reasoning from such “analogies” is accurate:
If we consider for a moment the simplest kinds of actions where this 
problem arises, it becomes, of course rapidly obvious that, in discussing 
what we regard as other people’s conscious actions, we invariably interpret 
their action on the analogy of our own mind: that is, that we group their 
actions, and the objects of their actions, into classes or categories which we 
know solely from the knowledge of our mind. We assume that the idea of a 
purpose or a tool, a weapon or food, is common to them with us.
(1943: 63)
If	I	see	for	the	first	time	a	big	boulder	or	an	avalanche	coming	down	the	side	
of a mountain toward a man and see him run for his life, I know the meaning 
of this action because I know what I would or might have done in similar 
circumstances.
 There can be no doubt that we all constantly act on the assumption that 
we can in this way interpret other people’s actions on the analogy of our 
mind and that in the great majority of instances this procedure works. The 
trouble is that we can never be sure.
(1943: 64)
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Such is the nature of “anthropomorphic explanations” for Hayek, who wonders 
whether they constitute science, or not (1943: 65). Since economics is mathemati-
cally certain, Hayek concludes that they have no place in the pure logic of choice.16
Projection at great distance
Projection also enters into Hayek’s account of how individuals make the trans-
ition from small to larger groups. In this transition, projections create the key 
difficulty	of	the	modern	world.	Hayek	argues	that	people	project	from	what	they	
know,	their	experience	with	organizations	characterized	by	a	unified	goal,	to	that	
which they do not know, societies without a goal. In so doing, they are tempted 
by totalitarianism. To this we now turn.
 The foundation for the attack on social justice in the second volume of Law, 
Legislation and Liberty is laid in the 61 numbered, tightly argued paragraphs of 
Hayek’s 1966 address to the Mont Pèlerin Society. In this essay Hayek sets out 
the difference between an organization – a collective with a coherent set of goals 
(preference ordering) – and an order – a collective without this coherence of 
goals. We are tempted by totalitarianism, in Hayek’s account, when we attempt 
to turn an order into an organization.
	 The	 first	 two	 paragraphs	 of	 the	 address	 review	 Hayek’s	 1946	 distinction	
between British and Continental liberalism. The third paragraph distinguishes 
liberalism	 from	 democracy.	Hayek’s	 terminology	 sets	 liberalism	 definitionally	
opposed	to	 totalitarianism	and	democracy	definitionally	opposed	to	authoritari-
anism. The possibility of democratic totalitarianism and authoritarian liberalism 
are empirical issues (1966: 161). Those who attended the Mont Pèlerin Society 
in 1966 would not need to be told that totalitarianism is described in Road to 
Serfdom as the state of society in which only one hierarchy of goals, preference 
ordering, is allowed.17
 Paragraphs 6–13 discuss the relationship between liberalism and a spontane-
ous order. A spontaneous order emerges out of decisions made by individuals 
without common goals. As such, it serves as a natural environment for liberal-
ism. Hayek next confronts the confusion between an “order” and an “organiza-
tion.” While the order is characterized by reciprocity, it differs from the 
organization precisely because it lacks coherence, a single aim:
15. An economy in the strict sense of the word in which we can call a house-
hold,	 a	 farm,	an	enterprise	or	 even	 the	financial	 administration	of	govern-
ment an economy, is indeed an organization . . . in the service of a unitary 
order of purposes. It rests on a system of coherent decisions in which a 
single view of the relative importance of the different competing purposes 
determines the uses to be made of the different resources.
(1966: 164)
16. The spontaneous order of the market resulting from the interaction of 
many such economies is something so fundamentally different from an 
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economy proper that it must be regarded as a great misfortune that it has 
ever been called by the same name. . . . I propose that we call this 
spontaneous order of the market a catallaxy in analogy to the term 
“catallactics”, . . .
(1966: 164)
17. The chief point about a catallaxy is that, as a spontaneous order, its 
orderliness does not rest on its orientation on a single hierarchy of ends, and 
that, therefore, it will not secure that for it as a whole the more important 
comes before the less important.
(1966: 164)
The outcome in a spontaneous order cannot, strictly speaking, be described as 
“just” since this would required a single (unanimously agreed- upon) hierarchy of 
ends. But this is not how people see things. They project what they know onto 
what they do not know. What they know is coherent, the single hierarchy of ends 
in the organization, so they imagine that what they do not know, the order, 
should also be characterized by a single set of preferences. They impose the 
coherence of what they know on what do not know: “37. That the concept of 
justice is nevertheless so commonly and readily applied to the distribution of 
incomes is entirely the effect of an erroneous anthropomorphic interpretation of 
society as an organization rather than as a spontaneous order” (1966: 171). From 
this follows the temptation to totalitarianism: “38. All endeavours to secure a 
‘just’ distribution must thus be directed towards turning the spontaneous order of 
the market into an organization or, in other words, into a totalitarian order” 
(1966: 171).
 Let us reformulate Hayek’s argument in terms of the Arrow impossibility 
literature. The question Hayek is asking is, what condition guarantees that social 
decision procedures are transitive? The answer he is offering is dictatorship: 
where one agent’s preferences are the only ones that count. This is what Hayek 
calls totalitarianism.
 So, to combine the terminology from both Arrow and Hayek, society is faced 
with a trade- off between coherence and liberal democracy. Which will prevail? 
The formal properties of axiomatic systems give no guidance. Hayek’s 1949 
“Intellectuals and Socialism” argued that intellectuals, more than experts or the 
public, were most tempted by totalitarianism. The intellectuals’ desire for coher-
ence was at the root of this temptation.18 Hayek leaves unexplained the question 
of why intellectuals are more concerned with coherence relative to truth than 
experts or ordinary people – the other ideal types in his 1949 story. Perhaps 
Adam Smith’s connection between affection and habitual sympathy provides an 
answer. Those who are habituated to coherence, who spend the most time in 
coherent systems of thought will, other things being equal, be more likely to 
think social coherence worth the cost. Hayek’s claim might be correct but for an 
economic	account,	we	would	require	a	specification	of	the	goals	and	constraints	
of intellectual life. This Hayek does not provide.
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The tyranny of the minority
Hayek argues that there is a strong tendency for a well organized group to 
exploit a less organized group. Although people within small groups are con-
nected by bonds of sympathy and reciprocity, the groups themselves are con-
nected by neither personal ties nor considerations of reciprocity. Hayek’s 
technical criticism of interest- group democracy is sketched in 1960 in the 
context of corporate voting rights, a work that is apparently unknown even to 
scholars who have recently begun to explore the very same corporate pyramids 
that troubled Hayek.19 Since the problem of corporate pyramids highlights the 
importance of Hayek’s early concern, it provides a useful case to work out the 
logic of his argument. This also an instance of Hayek’s account of small- group 
action which does not have biological roots.
 In Hayek’s account, when corporate pyramids exist, the controlling stock-
holders	 in	 one	 company	 can	 run	 other	 corporation(s)	 for	 their	 benefit,	 leaving	
shareholders in the other corporation(s) with poor options:
where the shares of one corporation are owned by another corporation, . . . 
nobody seriously questions that any control thus exercised by the second 
corporation	 over	 the	 first	 can	 legitimately	 be	 employed	 to	 increase	 the	
profits	 of	 the	 second.	 In	 such	 a	 situation	 it	 is	 clearly	 possible,	 and	 not	
unlikely,	that	the	control	over	the	policy	of	the	first	corporation	will	be	used	
to channel the gains from its operations to the	 second,	 and	 that	 the	 first	
would be run, not in the interest of all its stockholders but only in the inter-
est of the controlling majority. When the other stockholders discover this it 
will be too late for them to apply any remedy. The only possibility they will 
have is to sell out – which may be just what the corporate stockholder 
wants.
(1960: 309)
How did this come about? An evolutionary failure? So it seems. The lack of 
deliberation and awareness created the failure:
I must admit that I have never quite understood the rationale or	justification	
of allowing corporations to have voting rights in other corporations of which 
they own shares. So far as I can discover, this was never deliberately 
decided upon in full awareness of all its applications, but came about simply 
as a result of the conception that, if legal personality was conferred upon the 
corporation, it was natural to confer upon it all powers which natural 
persons possessed. But this seems to me by no means a natural or obvious 
consequence. On the contrary, it turns the institution of property into some-
thing quite different from what it is normally supposed to be. The corpora-
tion thereby becomes, instead of an association of partners with a common 
interest,	an	association	of	groups	whose	interests	may	be	in	strong	conflict;	
and the possibility that a group which directly owns assets amounting only 
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to a small fraction of those of the corporation, may, through a pyramiding of 
holdings, acquire assets amounting to a multiple of what they own 
themselves.
(1960: 309)
The correction is to take away the connected corporation’s right to vote:
There seems to me to exist no reason why a corporation should not be 
allowed to own stock of another corporation purely as an investment. But it 
also seems to me that such a stock, so long as it is owned by another corpo-
ration, should cease to confer a right to vote.
(1960: 309)
So, corporate pyramiding turns governance from a matter of individuals with 
common	interests	to	groups	with	conflicting	interests.	Hayek’s	cure	is	to	abolish	
the link between investment and corporate democracy – the “one share one vote” 
principle	fails	to	reflect	the	interest	of	the	majority	of	assets,	so	Hayek	proposes	
a change in the voting rules.
 All of this, majorities controlling majorities resulting in the minority extortion 
of majorities, evolutionary failure and drastic revision of the right to vote, is to 
be found in Law, Legislation and Liberty. Here, Hayek makes the case that 
majority rule in the larger world has become something akin to the world of 
corporate pyramids, in which a group which is large enough to control interest 
groups	 extract	 transfers	 from	 the	 majority	 itself.	 Indeed,	 here	 we	 find	 Hayek	
defending the Athenian practice of election by lot!20 It is in the context of the 
tyranny of the minority that Hayek offered such drastic reforms.21 “Progress” has 
been reversed and Hayek worries about the dictator who will save society from 
themselves:
What I have been trying to sketch in these volumes (and the separate study 
of the role of money in a free society) has been a guide out of the process of 
degeneration of the existing form of government, and to construct an intel-
lectual emergency equipment which will be available when we have no 
choice	 but	 to	 replace	 the	 tottering	 structure	 by	 some	 better	 edifice	 rather	
than resort in despair to some sort of dictatorial regime.
(1979: 152)
Hayek’s despair is such that he concludes there is no path by means of a sponta-
neous order to take us out of the disorder. Evolution has failed.22 To solve this 
evolutionary failure, we need government and government requires purpose.
Factions and competition
Projection in the small, in our local environment, works far more smoothly in 
Hayek’s account than projection in the large.23 The difference between action in 
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the small and in the large is central to Hayek’s discussion of the information 
aggregation properties of markets which culminated in the 1945 “Use of Know-
ledge in Society.” Individuals with local knowledge act in such a way that prices 
reflect	the	aggregation	of	local	information.	To	preserve	these	information	aggre-
gation properties, individuals need to “submit” to prices and the price system.24
 Hayek’s argument about projection from the local organization to the social 
order depends, it seems, on the implicit assumption that there is only one local 
organization	(or,	if	there	are	many,	they	are	sufficiently	similar	in	preferences).	
But what if there are many? Hayek’s important concern about one faction 
exploiting the larger society is a general version of the problem of religious fac-
tions which Adam Smith encountered but did not solve in Theory of Moral Sen-
timents. In Wealth of Nations, Smith offered a possible solution to the problem 
(Levy and Peart 2009). What is important for the present argument is just how 
critical it is in Smith’s proposal that a person belongs not just to one but to many 
organizations.
 The consequence of competition in religion is to change the social distance. 
Hierarchy in a sect is replaced by equality across sects. We no longer have a 
world of leaders and followers, we have equals agreeing to disagree to avoid 
loneliness (Levy and Peart 2008a):
The teachers of each sect, seeing themselves surrounded on all sides with 
more adversaries than friends, would be obliged to learn that candour and 
moderation which is so seldom to be found among the teachers of those great 
sects whose tenets, being supported by the civil magistrate, are held in venera-
tion by almost all the inhabitants of extensive kingdoms and empires, and who 
therefore see nothing round them but followers, disciples, and humble admir-
ers.	The	teachers	of	each	little	sect,	finding	themselves	almost	alone,	would	be	
obliged to respect those of almost every other sect, and the concessions which 
they	would	mutually	 find	 it	 both	 convenient	 and	 agreeable	 to	make	 to	 one	
another, might in time probably reduce the doctrine of the greater part of them 
to that pure and rational religion, free from every mixture of absurdity, impos-
ture, or fanaticism, such as wise men have in all ages of the world wished to 
see established; but such as positive law has perhaps never yet established, 
and probably never will establish, in any country: because, with regard to reli-
gion, positive law always has been, and probably always will be, more or less 
influenced	by	popular	superstition	and	enthusiasm.
(Smith 1776: v.i.197)
It is important to notice Smith has implicitly appealed here to a notion of over-
lapping organizations.
Conclusion: how many organizations are in a person’s life?
In his Nobel Lecture discussed at the outset, Vernon Smith notes that genera-
tions of economists have ignored Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
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Indeed, the incoherence of Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments is 
known as Das Adam Smith Problem. Because Smith’s proposed solution to the 
problem of religious factions is precisely in the intersection of these two books 
(Levy 1978; Levy and Peart 2008a), it seems to have been overlooked by even 
the most careful scholars.
 Smith’s solution is important for Hayek’s argument because in Smith’s 
account competition ensures that religious groups become populated by people 
who belong to overlapping organizations. Perhaps a family will be co- 
religionists, but there is no reason to believe that the people with whom they 
work will belong to the same sect. In this society of competitive religions, a per-
son’s daily life weaves through different organizations, each of which may well 
have a coherent goal. But the goals will differ. Which goal is projected to the 
social order? Toleration of diversity is a plausible equilibrium if only because 
Adam Smith said so and because the experience of American religious toleration 
is consistent with this teaching.
 Competitive discussion and toleration of diversity are at the heart of John 
Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, in which adherents to each set of beliefs will present 
their goals. It seems to be the case that, for Hayek, an individual can be a 
member of only one organization. Whether membership in diverse organizations 
will turn an organization into an order remains an open question.
Notes
 1 Smith (2003: 466). Smith’s paper opens with a quotation from David Hume and then 
from Hayek on the two worlds in which people function.
“we must constantly adjust our lives, our thoughts and our emotions, in order to live 
simultaneously within different kinds of orders according to different rules. If we 
were	to	apply	the	unmodified,	uncurbed	rules	(of	caring	intervention	to	do	visible	
‘good’) of the . . . small band or troop, or . . . our families . . . to the (extended order of 
cooperation through markets), as our instincts and sentimental yearnings often make 
us wish to do, we would destroy it. Yet if we were to always apply the (competitive) 
rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, we would crush them” 
(Friedrich A. Hayek, 1988: 18; italics are his, parenthetical reductions are mine).
(Smith 2003: 465)
 Smith’s quotation omits the words “micro- cosmos” and “macro- cosmos” (Hayek 
1988: 18), which are signatures of the Stoic tradition. In the ancient texts, “micro- 
cosmos”	defined	a	person,	as	opposed	to	“the	small	band	or	troop,	or	of,	say,	our	fam-
ilies” (Hayek 1988: 18). The movement from the individual to the small group is 
important for this argument discussed below.
 2 Referring to the political consequences of collectivism, Hayek writes: “In short, they 
are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe 
the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call 
collectivism” (1944: 59). The Oxford English Dictionary	 gives	 the	 first	 usage	 of	
“totalitarianism” in 1926 in the context of Italian fascism. Ezra Pound is quoted from 
1937. Hayek knew of Pound and writes this about John Milton: “It is, perhaps, signi-
ficant	 that	 our	 generation	 has	 seen	 a	 host	 of	 American	 and	 English	 detractors	 of	
Milton	–	and	that	the	first	of	them,	Mr.	Ezra	Pound,	was	during	this	war	broadcasting	
from Italy!” (Hayek 1944: 220).
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 3 The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ between 
themselves in the nature of the goal towards which they want to direct the efforts 
of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to 
organise the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end, and in 
refusing to recognise autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are 
supreme. In short, they are totalitarian.
(Hayek 1944: 60)
Hayek argues against this and concludes the paragraph: “It presupposes, in short, the 
existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allot-
ted their due place.” He continues in the next paragraph: “The conception of a com-
plete ethical code is unfamiliar and it requires some effort of imagination to see what 
it involves. We are not in the habit of thinking of moral codes as more or less 
complete.”
 4 The connection between Hayek’s argument and Arrow’s impossibility theorem was 
seen earlier by Boettke and Leeson (2002) and reported as part of seminar commen-
tary by Caldwell (2007: 30). Neither lays out Hayek’s argument that this demand for 
coherence comes from a projection from a natural group with unitary goals to an 
order.
 5 Buchanan and Yoon (2006) discuss how unsettling the Arrow–Black result was. 
Buchanan (1954) stands out in retrospect as uniquely undisturbed by social incoher-
ence. Buchanan and Yoon (2006) offer a solution to the Arrow impossibility theorem 
by something akin to a rational expectations move: if Arrow’s agents know what 
Arrow knows, then their voting behavior may change.
 6 In Road to Serfdom the unitary group was explained by primitive rules and taboos.
From the primitive man, who was bound by an elaborate ritual in almost every 
one of his daily activities, who was limited by innumerable taboos, and who could 
scarce conceive of doing things in a way different from his fellows, morals have 
more and more tended to be merely limits.
(Hayek 1944: 101)
In his important 1966 “Principles of a Liberal Social Order,” the small group is 
“tribal” (Hayek 1966: 168).
 7 The disrepute into which sympathy fell can be gauged by the simple fact that “occult” 
is Latin for hidden. Indeed, the connection between sympathy and magic is a com-
monplace among specialists (Levy and Peart 2008a).
 8 Hayek (1963: 46–7):
The	main	difficulty	which	has	to	be	overcome	in	accounting	for	these	phenomena	
is most clearly seen in connection with the phenomenon of imitation. The atten-
tion	 paid	 to	 this	 by	 psychologists	 has	 fluctuated	 greatly	 and	 after	 a	 period	 of	
neglect it seems again to have become respectable. The aspect which concerns us 
here probably has not again been stated more clearly since it was pointed out at 
the end of the eighteenth century by Dugald Stewart [Hayek cites Dugald Stewart, 
Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, chapter on “Sympathetic 
Imitation”].
 9 Hayek (1945: 83):
The comparative stability of the aggregates cannot, however, be accounted for – 
as the statisticians occasionally seem to be inclined to do – by the “law of large 
numbers”	or	the	mutual	compensation	of	random	changes.	.	.	.	The	continuous	flow	
of goods and services is maintained by constant deliberate adjustments, by new 
dispositions made every day in the light of circumstances not known the day 
before, by B stepping in at once when A fails to deliver.
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Hayek (1964: 29):
Statistics, however, deals with the problem of large numbers essentially by elim-
inating complexity and deliberately treating the individual elements which it 
counts as if they were not systematically connected . . . it deliberately disregards 
the fact that the relative position of the different elements in a structure may 
matter.
The importance of this aspect of Hayek’s argument is emphasized in Khan (2008).
10 One wonders how many in the audience caught the Stoic image of moral obligation?
Each one of us is as it were entirely encompassed by many circles, some smaller, 
others larger, the latter enclosing the former on the basis of their different and 
unequal	dispositions	relative	to	each	other.	The	first	and	closest	circle	is	the	one	
which a person has drawn as though around a centre, his own mind. This circle 
encloses the body and anything taken for the sake of the body. For it is virtually 
the smallest circle, and almost touches the centre itself. Next, the second one 
further removed from the centre . . . contains parents, siblings, wife, and children. 
The third one has in it uncles and aunts, grandparents, nephews, nieces, and 
cousins. The next circle includes the other relatives, and this is followed by the 
circle of local residents, then the circle of fellow- tribesman, next that of fellow- 
citizens, and then in the same way the circle of people from the neighbouring 
towns, and the circle of fellow- countrymen. The outermost and largest circle, 
which encompasses all the rest, is that of the whole human race. Once these have 
been all surveyed, it is the task of a well tempered man, in his proper treatment of 
each group, to draw the circles together somehow towards the centre, and to keep 
zealously transferring those from the enclosing circles into the enclosed ones.
(Hierocles in Long and Sedley 1987: 349)
11 Berg et al. (1995), cited in Smith (2003). A JSTOR search on “Hayek” and “Dick-
haut” turns up only two papers, Smith (1994) and (2003), which discuss the work of 
both authors.
12 Thus, Hayek imagines a machine which puts balls into a receptacle:
any grouping of different balls by the machine which places them in the same 
receptacle will create a class which is based exclusively on the action of the 
machine and not on any similarity which those balls possess apart from the action 
of the machine.
(Hayek 1952: 49)
13 Hayek (1952: 134):
There appears to exist three prima facie differences between such unconscious 
and conscious behavior which we may provisionally describe by saying that in 
conscious behavior a person will, (a) be able to “give an account” of what he is or 
has being doing.
Hayek (1952: 135):
When we say that a person is able to “give an account” of his mental processes we 
mean by this that he is able to communicate them to other people by means of 
“symbols”, that is by actions, which when perceived by other people, will occupy 
in their mental order a position analogous to that which they occupy in his own; 
and which, in consequence, will have for those other persons a meaning similar to 
that which it possesses for him.
14	 Hayek	stresses	the	common	elements	in	Mandeville,	Hume	and	Smith.	The	identifica-
tion	of	Mandeville	and	Smith	was	challenged	by	Harrod	(1946).	The	identification	of	
Mandeville with laissez- faire – in the sense that Adam Smith’s position can be so 
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described – is debated by specialists, Viner (1953) and Rosenberg (1963), with Hayek 
siding with Rosenberg (Hayek 1967a.) Viner’s correspondence with both Rosenberg 
and Hayek is discussed in Irwin (1991).
15 Recall Hayek’s distinction in The Road to Serfdom, discussed above, between “col-
lectivism” as a theory and “totalitarianism” as a norm.
16 A foundational difference between Hayek and classical political economy, as 
explained by Charles Babbage, is that political economy depends upon median expec-
tation (Peart and Levy 2005). An inference that “works” as well as Hayek stipulates 
here would pass the Babbage test.
17 Hayek (1944: 162) quotes Nietzsche as “entirely in the spirit of collectivism”:
A thousand goals have there been so far, for there have been a thousand peoples. 
Only the yoke for the thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is lacking. 
Humanity still has no goal. But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a goal 
– is humanity itself not still lacking too? Thus spoke Zarathustra.
(Nietszche 1954: 170)
18 Hayek (1949: 184–5):
It is perhaps the most characteristic feature of the intellectual that he judges new 
ideas	 not	 by	 their	 specific	 merits	 but	 by	 the	 readiness	 which	 they	 fit	 into	 his	
general conceptions, into the picture of the world which he regards as modern or 
advanced.
19 Morck and Steier (2005) cite Constitution of Liberty but none of the authors in the 
conference volume edited by Morck discusses Hayek’s concern or his proposal for 
reform.
20 Hayek (1979: 32):
Democracy, so far as the term is not used simply as a synonym for egalitarianism, 
is increasingly becoming the name for the very process of vote- buying, for placat-
ing and remunerating those special interests which in more naive times were 
described as the “sinister interests.” . . . I believe in fact that we should get a more 
representative sample of the true opinion of the people at large if we picked out by 
drawing	lots	some	five	hundred	mature	adults	and	let	them	for	twenty	years	devote	
themselves to the task of improving the law, guided only by their conscience and 
the desire to be respected, than by the present system of auction.
21 Hayek (1979: xiii):
When the present volume leads up to a proposal of basic alteration of the structure 
of democratic government, which at this time most people will regard as wholly 
impractical, this is meant to provide a sort of intellectual stand- by equipment for 
the time, which may not be far away, when the breakdown of the existing institu-
tions becomes unmistakable and when I hope it may show a way out. It should 
enable us to preserve what is truly valuable in democracy and at the same time 
free us of its objectionable features which most people still accept only because 
the regard them as inevitable.
22 Hayek (1973: 88):
Why grown law requires correction by legislation The fact that all law arising out 
of the endeavour to articulate rules of conduct will of necessity possess some 
desirable properties not necessarily possessed by the commands of a legislator 
does not mean that in other respects such law may not develop in very undesirable 
directions, and that when this happens correction by deliberate legislation may not 
be the only practicable way out. For a variety of reasons the spontaneous process 
of growth may lead into an impasse from which it cannot extricate itself by its 
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own forces or which it will at least not correct quickly enough. The development 
of case- law is in some respects a sort of one- way street: when it has already 
moved a considerable distance in one direction, it often cannot retrace its steps 
when some implications of earlier decisions are seen to be clearly undesirable. 
The fact that law that has evolved in this way has certain desirable properties does 
not prove that it will always be good law or even that some of its rules may not be 
very bad. It therefore does not mean that we can altogether dispense with 
legislation.
 There are several other reasons for this. One is that the process of judicial 
development of law is of necessity gradual and may prove too slow to bring about 
the desirable rapid adaptation of the law to wholly new circumstances. Perhaps 
the	most	important,	however,	is	that	it	is	not	only	difficult	but	also	undesirable	for	
judicial decisions to reverse a development, which has already taken place and is 
then seen to have undesirable consequences or to be downright wrong. The judge 
is not performing his function if he disappoints reasonable expectations created by 
earlier decisions. Although the judge can develop the law by deciding issues 
which are genuinely doubtful, he cannot really alter it, or can do so at most only 
very	 gradually	 where	 a	 rule	 has	 become	 firmly	 established;	 although	 he	 may	
clearly recognize that another rule would be better.
This passage is stressed by Whitman (1998: 48).
23 Hayek (1943: 65–6):
What I mean by a “friendly face” does not depend upon the physical properties of 
different concrete instances, which may conceivably have nothing in common. 
Yet I learn to recognize them as members of the same class – and what makes 
them members of the same class is not any of their physical properties but an 
imputed meaning.
 The importance of this distinction grows as we move outside the familiar sur-
roundings. As long as I move among my own kind of people, it is probably the 
physical properties of a bank note or a revolver from which I conclude they are 
money or a weapon the person is holding. When I see a savage holding cowrie 
shells or a long, thin tube, the physical properties of the thing will probably tell 
me nothing. But the observations which suggest to me that the cowrie shells are 
money to him and the blowpipe a weapon will throw much light on the object – 
much more light than those same observations could possibly give if I were not 
familiar with the conception of money or a weapon. In recognizing the things as 
such,	I	begin	to	understand	the	people’s	behavior.	I	am	able	to	fit	into	a	scheme	of	
actions which “make sense” just because I have come to regard it not as a thing 
with	certain	physical	properties	but	as	the	kind	of	thing	which	fits	into	the	pattern	
of my own purposive action.
24	 Kahn	(2005)	stresses	the	significance	of	Hayek’s	choice	of	word,	“submission.”
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3 Discussion and the evolution of 
institutions in a liberal democracy
Frank Knight joins the debate
Ross Emmett
A government is free to the people under it . . . where the laws rule and the people 
are a party to the laws.
William Penn
Friedrich A. Hayek’s admiration for, and strong criticism of, John Stuart Mill 
are well known. While acknowledging Mill as a leader in the liberal tradition, 
Hayek portrays him, first in “Individualism: True and False” (Hayek 1948 
[1945]) and throughout later writings, as the betrayer of the classical liberal tra-
dition, whose utilitarianism introduced the constructivist- rationalist elements 
(“false” individualism) which opened the path to welfare liberalism.
My interest in J. S. Mill was from the beginning the suspicion, later amply 
justified, that it was he more than any other teacher who persuaded the 
English speaking people, and ultimately through them the world, of that 
constructivist- rationalist view which in a democracy produces socialism. . . . 
I ultimately came heartily to dislike that figure whom like everybody else I 
had regarded as the great hero of liberalism.
(Hayek, quoted in Peart 2006)
Recently, several scholars have begun to re- examine Hayek’s criticism of Mill, 
both to see if it accurately represents Mill (for examples, see Peart 2006; Légé 
2006; Su 2006) and to relate it to the contemporary debate between Hayekians 
and the contructivists in the constitutional political economy tradition, such as 
James Buchanan (Peart and Levy 2008). Sandra Peart and David Levy close the 
triangle by pointing out that both Buchanan and Mill share an understanding of 
liberal democracy that allows a role for discussion that Hayek’s institutional 
Darwinism does not appear to allow. Because Peart and Levy also link Mill’s 
emphasis on discussion to Adam Smith’s understanding of the relation between 
sympathy and justice, their argument can be taken to imply that Hayek gave 
insufficient attention to the role of sympathy and justice in his efforts to revive 
classical liberalism in the post- war era (Peart 2006). The question raised by this 
analysis is whether a theory of the evolution of spontaneous order needs to be 
supplemented by an account of public deliberation and discussion – understood 
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not only as the quest for rules that will adjudicate among competing claims, but 
also the construction of a better form of liberalism.
 Although Peart and Levy’s analysis of the Hayek–Mill–Buchanan relation-
ship may be arguable (see, for examples, Backhaus 2006), I am going to accept 
their accounts of those debates here, and ask the question of how another scholar 
who is often mentioned in connection with Hayek and Buchanan – Frank H. 
Knight – fits into this debate over discussion, construction, and evolution in a 
liberal democracy. After identifying why we might want to examine Knight’s 
participation, the chapter turns to Knight’s work, examining his understanding of 
human nature, freedom, cultural evolution, and the role of discussion in a liberal 
society before returning to his direct criticisms of Hayek. Throughout the 
chapter, the tension between opposing themes will be pursued: novelty and 
order, making and breaking the law, intelligent discussion and mere talk, science 
and morality, freedom and justice. My central argument is that the roots of 
Knight’s criticism of Hayek lie in his insistence on a pluralistic defense of free 
society. For Knight, a defense of free society requires an understanding of evo-
lutionary change in human society based on more than just a theory of the evolu-
tion of institutions. In a free society, change occurs through the discussion 
among free individuals of their social problems, which ultimately is a discussion 
about how they can construct a society closer to their ethical ideals.
Why Knight?
Knight’s criticisms of Hayek are often ignored, perhaps because he is generally 
viewed as being on Hayek’s side in the post- war era debate over socialism and 
capitalism and hence their similarities are taken to outweigh their differences. 
But the differences are significant, especially as we consider their respective 
places in the liberal tradition. In 1949, Knight wrote a short response to Hayek’s 
essay “The Intellectuals and Socialism,” in which Hayek attempted to account 
for the intellectuals’ tendency to accept socialism (Hayek 1949). Knight was less 
sanguine than Hayek as to whether the tendency was really an intellectual move, 
or just intellectuals following the masses, which led him into a rehearsal of his 
common defense of, and complaints about, liberal society (Knight 1949). Several 
years after the publication of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty (1960), Knight 
wrote a response (Knight 1967).1 Although brief, Knight’s responses to Hayek 
bear directly on the contemporary debate over constructivism, discussion, and 
the evolution of the institutions of liberal democracy. Furthermore, the themes 
developed in Knight’s responses to Hayek are ones that are central to Knight’s 
work in the last 30 years of his life. A little introduction to Knight and his rela-
tionship to Hayek, then, is in order.
 Between 1928 and the 1960s, Knight was a fixture in, and the intellectual fig-
urehead of, the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. Genera-
tions of Chicago economics students took price theory and/or history of 
economic thought with Knight, and his books and articles were part of the intel-
lectual canon that students were expected to know. Chicago School economists 
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speak of the School’s origin in the circle that gathered around Knight in the early 
1930s, which included Henry Simons, Aaron Director, and Lloyd Mints. The 
School’s earliest Nobel Laureates – Milton Friedman and George Stigler – were 
his students, as was James Buchanan. Yet, as others have pointed out, F. A. 
Hayek was perhaps closer in philosophical outlook to the post- war Chicago 
School economists than Knight was, and today Hayek, not Knight, is frequently 
identified as the philosopher of the revival of classical liberalism in the late 
twentieth century.
 Because they were contemporaries, and both economists qua philosophers, 
Knight and Hayek form an interesting comparison in intellectual development. 
Their paths crossed long before Hayek arrived at the University of Chicago in 
1950 as a professor in the Committee on Social Thought. They may have first 
met when Knight visited Vienna in 1930. Hayek was director of the Austrian 
Institute for Business Cycle Research at the time and Knight’s visit was arranged 
by Oskar Morgenstern, an associate of the Institute who replaced Hayek as direc-
tor a year later when Hayek moved to the London School of Economics. Cer-
tainly, Hayek was familiar with Knight’s book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit 
(Knight 1933 [1921]), because he and Lionel Robbins taught price theory from it 
at the LSE in the early 1930s; Hayek spoke favorably of the book’s impact on 
his intellectual development throughout his life. Friendly controversy between 
Knight and Hayek began almost immediately, however, because in the early 
1930s they were both rewriting the theory of capital. Knight sparked a debate 
with Hayek and other supporters of an Austrian theory of capital by declaring 
the “period of production” a meaningless, and hence analytically useless, 
concept (Knight 1933a). In the course of the debate, Knight realized that Hayek, 
among all the Austrian economists, came the closest to accepting his argument. 
Their correspondence during the capital debate reveals their personal respect for 
each other, the closeness of their views, and their willingness to attempt to span 
the remaining distance between them. But Hayek perhaps never understood the 
connection Knight made between the two men’s inability to close that remaining 
distance and the potential for the dissolution of democracy. At the mid- point of 
their debate, Knight closed a letter with the comment:
It is not so much the particular issue [capital theory] that bothers me, but I 
am getting terribly discouraged about economics in general. If all we can do 
is quarrel over words, I can feel little inclination to protest against some 
political clique not merely paying no attention to us but presently shutting 
our mouths and putting us to doing something useful for the state!
(Letter from F. H. Knight to F. A. Hayek, May 9, 1934, Box 60, Folder 10, 
Frank Knight Papers, University of Chicago Archives)
One month later Hayek published his statement of Austrian capital theory 
(Hayek 1934), which largely ignored criticisms of the theory raised by Knight, 
except for a brief statement that the article could be read as an “implicit reply” to 
the Marshallians, including Knight (Hayek 1934: 208, n. 2). In the last letter of 
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their correspondence from this period, written a couple of months before he pub-
lished his response to Hayek, Knight highlights a difference between the two 
men that will emerge again in their respective positions on the nature of liberal-
ism – the role of discussion:
In the large, I think I understand what the drift of [your response] is, and it 
serves to emphasize the fundamental problem in my mind these days, which 
is the question whether there is any profit in the discussion of fundamental 
issues in economics. . . . In this connection, I recall the observation in your 
letter, that systematic exposition rather than the meeting of specific ques-
tions is the way to “advance knowledge.” I am strongly convinced of the 
opposite.
(F. H. Knight to F. A. Hayek, December 1934, quoted in Emmett 2009: 78)
Because Knight believed the ideal of a free society to be the search for agree-
ment by discussion, advancing our quest for the truth by response to “specific 
questions” rather than “systematic exposition,” he was particularly bothered by 
Hayek’s approach to their intellectual differences. Even if the issue at hand was 
only capital theory, when two individuals who shared both a commitment to free 
society and the commonality of a professional discipline could not themselves 
agree on either content or method, Knight feared that the future of liberalism 
was bleak.2
 In the early 1940s, both Knight and Hayek turned the greater part of their 
attention to broader concerns about social science, liberalism, and social philo-
sophy. This philosophic turn, even more than their anti- Keynesianism, made 
both of them outsiders to the mainstream of the economics discipline, which in 
all its manifestations (including Chicago) became more empirically oriented, and 
in most cases also more mathematical and formalistic. But here, too, their differ-
ences are as important to our interests as their commonalities. Hayek’s “abuse of 
reason” project took him into psychology and from there back to political 
economy through a combination of evolution and legal theory. Knight’s interest 
in law and evolution followed from his return to the study of ethics and the intel-
lectual history of liberalism. The two men couldn’t find common ground in 
social philosophy any more than they could in capital theory. What appear to an 
outside observer to be, once again, small differences were, to Knight anyway, 
major obstacles. Although Hayek appears to have been oblivious to their differ-
ences, Knight’s attention to them played an important role in his work through-
out the final 20 years of his life. As a consequence, Knight co- operated with 
Hayek’s formation of the Mont Pèlerin Society, but offered less than enthusiastic 
support for the University of Chicago Press’s publication of The Road to 
Serfdom (Hayek 2007)3 and encouraged his appointment to the Committee on 
Social Thought at Chicago rather than the economics department. However, 
once Hayek was a professor at Chicago, Knight participated in his regular 
Wednesday evening seminars, especially when it focused on “The Liberal Tradi-
tion.” Our investigation of Knight’s responses to the issues raised by Hayek’s 
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systematic exposition of the evolution of the rule of law in a liberal society, 
therefore, will also assist us with understanding the relationship of Hayek and 
Knight as contemporaries in the revival of classical liberalism in the post- war 
period.
 There is one other reason why Knight matters for the debate over discussion 
and the evolution of the institutions of democratic liberalism. If we take Bucha-
nan (the constructivist) and Hayek (the evolutionist) as the key intellectual rep-
resentatives of the two sides to the contemporary form of the debate, Knight 
becomes important not only for his own concerns about Hayek’s views, but also 
for the role he played in shaping Buchanan’s views. As already mentioned, 
Knight was Buchanan’s mentor, “converting” him, as it were, from soft social-
ism to classical liberalism during a six- week price theory course at the Univer-
sity of Chicago in 1946 (Buchanan 1990, 2005: 59, 63, 101). The two remained 
friends throughout the remainder of Knight’s life, and Buchanan invited Knight 
to the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy at the Univer-
sity of Virginia a couple of times. The first occasion, in 1958, was the lecture 
series that became Knight’s final book (Knight 1960); the second was for a series 
of lectures on “Ethics and Economics” (see Emmett 1999, for details), and also a 
separate lecture on “Economic Man and Human Being” (Knight 1963), one of 
the lectures he gave in which he worked out his own theory of cultural evolution. 
The conclusions of this chapter suggest that Knight would concur with Bucha-
nan’s recent criticism of Hayek: “The classical liberal must . . . remain a con-
structivist, at least in some limited sense” (Buchanan 2005).
Knight on Hayek (or why Knight’s criticism of Hayek 
doesn’t talk much about Hayek)
Shortly after reading The Constitution of Liberty (Hayek 1960), Frank Knight 
wrote:
On close reading, the book disappoints as a treatment of Freedom. [I] find 
no serious effort even to state clearly the practical problems of personal 
freedom or free society. It “straddles” on the philosophical problem of 
freedom versus universal causality. “Of course” human acts are caused, 
“largely,” but as certainly, not completely. How far does not matter, since 
animal behavior is based on release of potential energy, in which there is 
almost no quantitative relation between cause and effect, and “trigger 
action” may multiply an effect indefinitely. Further, it seems rather pointless 
to discuss personal freedom apart from control of means of acting, oppor-
tunity to act, and an interest in action, as is done here. More serious – man is 
a social being, and freedom in society rests on agreement on forms and 
terms of association, i.e. free agreement on the laws, i.e. “government by 
discussion.” . . . The book . . . is propaganda for “government by law,” but 
against law “making”; – law should be left, or “almost,” to spontaneous 
change in tradition. (Like language; which is barely mentioned . . ., but not 
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developed or the analogy pressed.) Of course a large and basic element in 
law – its premises, the mores – does have that character and so is beyond 
the reach of social action, (except by vague reflex influence of “jural law”).
 In a recent lecture at the University of Chicago . . . Hayek attacked the 
idea of social economic justice. He held that we are committed to the enter-
prise organization and must take what it brings, working without political 
interference. The substance of this is absurd, but it is right to reject the ideal 
of social justice. It is hopelessly undefinable, meaningless; and there is some 
prospect of agreement on concrete injustices, and on procedures to lessen 
them.
(Knight 1967: 788, n. 5)
Despite the specific comments about Hayek’s argument made in this quick 
summary, Knight did not formulate a summary of the Hayekian position to which 
he was responding. Indeed, in this regard he treated Hayek like he did most of his 
other intellectual opponents: he first defined the issue at hand (in this case liberal-
ism and cultural evolution) in his own terms, and then proceeded to criticize his 
opponent (in this case, Hayek) for not understanding the issue (liberalism) in the 
same way Knight did. Because Knight’s understanding of most issues proceeded 
in terms of an analysis of the tension between competing principles, while the 
work of other scholars of his generation usually proceeded in terms of the identifi-
cation of a set of core principles upon which an intellectual argument was then 
built, Knight generally found ample fodder for criticism. Hayek is no exception. 
The earlier comment about “systematic exposition” vs. responding to “specific 
problems” is indicative of the difference between the two men.
 But it is clear from the above summary and Knight’s response that he 
believed the central issue at stake in Hayek’s argument to be the question of the 
evolution of institutions by spontaneous order rather than rational design. Hayek 
argues, Knight tells us, that liberalism has two traditions: “one empirical and 
unsystematic, the other speculative and rationalistic – the first based on tradi-
tions and institutions which had spontaneously grown up and were imperfectly 
understood, the second aiming at the construction of an utopia” (quoting from 
Hayek, Knight 1967: 789). The liberalism that is “empirical and unsystematic,” 
Hayek tells us:
arose from unintentionally conforming to certain traditional and largely 
moral practices, many of which men tend to dislike, whose significance they 
usually fail to understand, whose validity they cannot prove, and which have 
nonetheless fairly rapidly spread by means of an evolutionary selection – 
the comparative increase of population and wealth – of those groups that 
happened to follow them.
(Hayek 1988: 6, emphasis in original)
As we will see, Knight rejects Hayek’s perspective on the liberal tradition, and 
argues that Hayek’s position implies that spontaneous order emerges without 
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intelligent discussion, indeed, without any discussion. And, as the quoted 
summary at the beginning of this section indicates, it will be “discussion” that 
will be central to Knight’s critique. In order to understand that critique, then, we 
need to follow Knight’s lead and begin by outlining his understanding of cultural 
evolution and the role of discussion in liberal democracy.
Knight on human nature and cultural evolution
Knight’s philosophical turn in the 1940s was also a historical turn, in large part 
because he wanted to explain the emergence of modern liberal society, espe-
cially in relation to religion and morality (see Knight and Merriam 1945: 13–126 
for a long version of what was often told in shorter compass in various articles 
and essays). The central message of Knight’s history was relatively simple: lib-
eralism was won against all odds, and is constantly in danger of being sup-
pressed again by those who seek the power of social control in the name of either 
morality or science. In his historical writings, then, Knight portrays liberal 
society as a desired but not necessarily natural state of humanity. If history 
teaches us anything, it would be that freedom from arbitrary authority and the 
right of self- determination must constantly be fought for, and that they face 
powerful opposition.
The danger now, in the world and in the West, is that freedom will be 
thrown away, for a promise or hope of justice but with an actual result of 
neither justice nor freedom, and very likely the suicide of civilization in war 
without rules. The world could be heading toward a new age of essentially 
religious wars, ideological wars. Historically this would be nothing new, 
except for its scale and for the destructiveness of modern military techno-
logy. Otherwise, Europe is reverting to form. For as I have said, Commun-
ism, in its social program or pretensions, is largely a revival of 
historical- ecclesiastical Christianity, with the church more effectively 
merged in one all- powerful state.
(Knight 1999 [1951]: 386)
Knight’s historical accounts of the emergence, and probable passing, of liberal-
ism is inextricably linked with his belief that human nature “is a manifold 
paradox”: “The essential fact would be that human nature as we know it – the 
nature of man sufficiently advanced or civilized to think and talk about his own 
nature – is a tissue of paradox” (Knight 1982 [1944]: 358–9). In contradistinc-
tion to accounts of human nature which focus on a small set of common ele-
ments, Knight sees almost every aspect of human nature to come in paradoxical 
combinations: we need order, but crave novelty; we love justice, except when 
we get our own just deserts; equality exists, but less in fact than in our ideals; 
more than any other creature we require co- operation to subsist, but want others 
to co- operate more with us than we do with them; the inhumane is as common to 
human experience as the humane; we turn everything serious into play.4 Because 
64  R. Emmett
we, as both individuals and societies, are the product of the specific choices we 
have made in resolving these paradoxes, our history is essential to our nature. 
Knight often quoted Ortega y Gassett: “Man has no nature, what he has is . . . 
history.”
 To explain the changes that occur within the history of humans and their soci-
eties, Knight focused on “emergent novelty” (Knight 1961a). “What to my mind 
is most important in the long sweep of change is the recurring emergence of 
novelty, with the new generally not replacing the old but superimposed upon it, 
giving rise to ever- increasing complexity” (Knight 1999 [1956]: 401). Novelty 
and complexity in human experience require us to approach the explanation of 
human activity from a pluralistic and non- reductionist perspective. Knight’s 
pluralism does not deny the scientific authority of physical, biological, and 
anthropological accounts of human activity, but does deny that they provide a 
complete account of that activity. Human activity is more complex than animal 
activity because our cultural evolution has produced another layer of novelty: 
the social association of individuals who make deliberative choices in pursuit of 
purposes which are known to them.
. . . man must be described in terms of at least five fundamental kinds of 
entity or being. He is (a) a physical mechanism; (b) a biological organism, 
with characteristics extending from those of the lowest plant to the highest 
animal in the biological scale; (c) a social animal in the traditional- 
institutional sense; (d) a consciously, deliberatively purposive individual; 
and concomitantly, (e) a social being in the unique sense of an association 
of such individuals. . . .
 It is evident that at least the first three of these types of existence can 
each be the subject matter of a distinct positive science or group of such sci-
ences. . . . It is also evident that all these sciences must in a sense take 
account of the social nature of man. Yet they are not social sciences. . . . The 
study of actual or possible society must involve a large congeries of special 
positive sciences, more or less effectively interrelated, co- ordinated, and 
unified, according to the actual possibilities of such an achievement. . . . But 
such study must also involve other sciences not of the positive sort, or only 
partly so. . . . It must involve social science in a distinctive sense, the nature 
of which must be considered in the light of the nature of the human indi-
vidual as the real unit.
(Knight 1956 [1941]: 125–6 passim)
Paradox, complexity, and emergence are themes common to evolutionary theo-
ries that do not depend solely upon Darwin’s theory of natural selection over the 
past 30 years, but Knight’s use of them in the 1950s and 1960s pre- dates their 
rediscovery in science and philosophy by at least a decade. But emergentism, at 
least, pre- dates Darwinian evolutionary theory; indeed, while there is no explicit 
acknowledge of the debt, Knight’s formulation harkens back to that of J. S. Mill 
more than 100 years earlier:
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All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing 
inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic 
state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those 
parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would 
be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere 
physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of 
the properties of the several ingredients of a living body to be extended and 
perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of 
those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself.
(Mill 1872 [1843]: Bk.III, Ch.6, §1)
The unique path of human evolution begins, Knight argues, with the emergence 
of “culture.” Biological and physical processes controlled some of the stages 
which brought about the introduction of the human species, but once humans 
were able to “think and talk about [their] own nature,” human evolution pro-
ceeded on different terms (Knight 1963: 11, 1961b: 13–14).
The essence of the emergent view is that “stages” of evolution introduced 
categorical novelties, somehow (usually) superposed upon what existed pre-
viously (rather than a replacement) but not to be accounted for in terms of 
the same concepts. A brief sketch may ignore the earlier breaks, even the 
appearance of organic life; but it must note the supreme discontinuity, the 
emergence of consciousness. This clearly cannot be explained in “physical” 
terms, nor in those of the main accepted theory of organic evolution – the 
chance occurrence of “mutations” and natural selection of those highly 
exceptional ones which happen to be favorable for the survival and increase 
of a species. Thus new strains arose, sometimes becoming distinct varieties, 
and occasionally new species. In the human species, when it was estab-
lished, this had not occurred. There is much prejudice to the contrary, but 
truth- seeking students are dropping the conception of races of man, since no 
one can list them, or name any one that will be generally accepted as valid. 
The next emergent to be stress is “culture” (in the anthropological meaning).
(Knight 1962: 550–1)
Rejecting the view that the human species is differentiated biologically via 
natural selection,5 Knight argues that human diversity is the product of culture, 
which as we have just seen, is itself the emergent property of our biological and 
physical attributes. Since culture, for Knight, is a “complex of social institu-
tions” (Knight 1999 [1944]: 233), it might be easy to see his theory of cultural 
evolution as similar to Hayek’s, with “natural selection” across institutional 
forms as the mechanism by which human society evolves. But Knight rejects 
both biological and institutional theories of natural selection as the primary 
mechanism of adaptation because human society is not explainable solely in 
terms of the evolution of institutions: human society is also an association of 
purposive, deliberating individuals. While all humans are alike at the levels of 
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biology, physiology, and even consciousness, we cannot account for their actions 
without considering their history as individuals and associations of individuals.
 The “essential fact” about individuals “is freedom, or creative activity” 
(Knight 1982 [1944]: 363), but it is also the case that human freedom itself is 
never free. Our freedom finds itself socially located in a complex of institutions 
– our culture, which is as much a fact of our nature as our freedom. Freedom is 
always limited by that institutional complex, which arranges the choices avail-
able to us, the expectations we strive to fulfill, the hopes we seek to satisfy. For 
Knight, the socially constructed nature of human nature means that evolution 
among humans is no longer biological, but cultural. The terms on which novel 
actions are taken, and novel institutions are created, are set by the culture from 
which they emerge.6 Cultural evolution is the process by which novel institu-
tional forms emerge from the deliberation of, and discussion among, purposive 
individuals within specific cultural contexts. Thus, for Knight, in human society, 
emergent novelty is in constant tension with rules, laws, and institutions. Rules 
and institutions create the order that is essential to the perpetuation of social 
organization, but they also constrain the emergence of new laws and institutions. 
Cultural evolution is generated by the tension between the creative activity of 
individuals and the order provided by the existing institutional complex.
The supreme paradox of man, in our civilization, is that he is an individual 
– unique, creative, and dynamic – yet is the creature of institutions which 
must be accounted for in terms of historical processes. Nothing could be 
more false historically than the notion that men are naturally free and equal, 
or even that they naturally have a right to freedom. In the light of history as 
a whole, the natural state of man is to live imbedded in a “crust of custom,” 
in which most of his activities, thoughts, and feelings are determined by 
established patterns. These are, or were, enforced upon him and also 
ingrained in his being, so that he hardly thought of departure from them and 
hence had little feeling of unfreedom. The existence of man as a free indi-
vidual is a function of free society, which is the product of biological evolu-
tion and human culture history.
(Knight 1982 [1944]: 363)
About 200 to 300 years ago, liberalism as a specific institutional complex of 
institutions emerged from the tension between novelty and law as experienced in 
Western culture. In Knight’s view, liberalism is the emergent property of certain 
social and intellectual preconditions, which may or may not be replicated else-
where (Knight 1962). The institutions of a liberal democratic society were built 
upon the possibilities created by the association of purposive individuals. The 
emergent novelty that liberalism adds to previous institutional forms is “discus-
sion,” creating a vastly more complex form of social organization – democracy. 
Liberal democracy, for Knight, is government by discussion, in Viscount James 
Bryce’s memorable turn of phrase.7 However, democracy as discussion displays 
both sides of the evolutionary process – novelty and law. Without rules, 
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discussion is just shouting. Without novelty, discussion is just talk. At its core, 
then, liberalism requires a discussion about the rules of discussion. Hence, liber-
alism brings law- making inside the evolutionary process. Cultural evolution (or 
history) becomes the process of humans making, and breaking, law.
Government by discussion, not law
In his speech on the occasion of the twenty- fifth anniversary of the Social 
Science Research Building at the University of Chicago, Knight identified the 
disjunction that occurred with the coming of liberalism:
The essence of democracy is the freedom of the people to change the laws 
at will, by equal participation, and to have them enforced by agents held 
responsible in the same way. . . . The coming of freedom to change, of 
course, ended the sanctity of law.
(Knight 1999 [1956]: 406)
For Knight, prior to the “Liberal Revolution”8 law had been exogenous to human 
discussion and action: whether the law was divinely ordained or arbitrarily dic-
tated did not matter much for most people, because “sanctity of law” was 
enforced by coercion. Harking back to the quotation from William Penn that 
heads this chapter, one could say that, in such societies, people lived in a world 
defined by laws to which they were not a party.
 The Liberal Revolution changed all that. Collective choices were no longer 
the action of an individual or the dictate of a higher power; they emerged from 
the consensus of those who would be governed by the chosen laws. That deliber-
ative discussion among free individuals was an emergent novelty that added 
layers of complexity to human social organization can be seen by the variety of 
forms of discussion required in a free society. Knight argued that the first goal of 
discussion in a democracy had to be a decision, itself made by discussion, 
regarding what the social ideal will be.
The broad crucial task of free society is to reach agreement by discussion of 
the kind of civilization it is to create for the future; hence it must agree on 
the meaning of progress.
(Knight 1999 [1956]: 407)
As directive of social action, discussion has for its objective the solution of 
(i.e., the truth about) ethical problems, the establishment of agreement upon 
ethical ideals or values, for the reconciliation of conflicting interests. Ethical 
ideals have for their content right or ideal relations between given indi-
viduals and also, and more fundamentally, ideal individuals, to be created 
by ideal social institutions, which form the immediate objective of social 
action.
(Knight 1956 [1941]: 133)9
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Second, social discussion requires agreement on the rules for organizing the dis-
cussion. Knight generally accepts unanimity as the ideal of discussion within an 
association of free individuals, but assumes representative democracy using 
majority voting to be an acceptable proxy. Third, discussion is required regard-
ing the possible options for individuals in society who disagree with its final 
decision. How tolerant will society be of disagreement, of exit, and of the right 
to form new groups? Fourth, society has to decide, again via discussion, what 
can and what cannot be done to make progress toward the ideals that it, at least 
for the moment, holds as relatively absolute.10 Naturally, the latter discussion 
includes discussion of the limitations of various mechanisms to make progress: 
the market, the state, and other forms of social co- operation. Finally, discussion 
is required of specific proposals for change, within a given definition of the 
social ideals, the existing rules for organization of discussion, and the chosen 
mechanisms for social organization. To put it simply, one might say that Knight 
sees the need for decisions, via discussion, of (a) social ideals; (b) the rules for 
organizing discussion; (c) the scope of individual freedom vs. social coercion; 
(d) the potential for change; and (e) policy- making.
 Several implications of this understanding of “government by discussion” 
follow, although Knight recognized that the history of institutional change took 
time to catch up with the logic of liberal democracy. The first implication is that 
liberal democracy “could be defined as the socialization of the problem of law, 
and it is only democracy which confronts social problems, properly speaking” 
(Knight 1999 [1956]: 394). Only when the members of a society confront their 
common problems through discussion can we properly speak of “social prob-
lems.” Liberal democracy is, therefore, the first, and perhaps the only, institu-
tional setting which actually has social problems. “Social action, in the essential 
and proper sense, is group self- determination. The content or process is rational 
discussion. . . . Discussion is social problem- solving, and all problem- solving 
includes (social) discussion” (Knight 1956 [1941]: 133).
 Second, a key difficulty with talking about discussion, for Knight, is that we 
cannot know the outcome of the substance of the discussion ahead of time. That 
is, talking about discussion cannot reveal what discussion itself will conclude. 
Commitment to a free society is commitment to government by discussion; but 
commitment to government by discussion cannot guarantee that the outcomes of 
collective action will not restrict individual freedom. Why? Because discussion 
is always centered on the solution of a particular problem; and solving that 
problem may involve the social decision to use coercive action. Knight con-
cludes his review of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty by saying: “The most one 
can say for freedom is that there is a presumption in its favor unless there is 
sufficient ground to believe that coercive action will yield a better result in a 
particular situation” (Knight 1967: 795).
 Finally, Knight recognized that there is an inevitable tendency in liberalism 
for it to be undermined through recourse by those within the society to “authori-
ties” that lie outside the discussion among equals which defines democracy. In 
his own day, he identified two versions of this tendency at work – the appeal to 
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absolutist ethics (moralism) and the appeal to science (scientism) – and his 
opposition to both versions became a central part of his later work:
Since the essence of liberalism is the reliance on rational agreement or mutual 
consent for the determination of policy, and since the amount of agreement 
attainable seems very meager in relation to the needs for action felt in a large- 
scale, rapidly changing society, it is easy to understand psychologically, 
though not to approve, the tendency to fly to one or the other of the two posi-
tions mentioned . . . under the names of moralism and scientism. There is 
much truth in both these positions; the error is in accepting either as true to the 
exclusion of the other (and still others), i.e., in the romantic disposition to 
oversimplify the problem. On the one hand, human nature is undoubtedly 
“sinful,” and, on the other, the mind makes mistakes in the choice of means to 
achieve given ends. It is easy and attractive to generalize from either fact, and 
make it explain everything, and particularly attractive to account for the ills of 
society in terms of either the sins or the errors of other people.
(Knight 1999 [1946]: 311)
Knight’s response to Jacques Maritain’s moralistic approach is illustrative of his 
refusal to grant authority for the purposes of social discussion to any authority 
outside the discussion itself:
Nothing properly called absolute truth is possible for any principle or pro-
position, or even the simplest fact. The highest certainty, beyond the direct 
awareness that thinking is a free activity, is that it takes place in social 
beings living in a social milieu, i.e., in connection with discussion, and that 
discussion recognizes problems which are discussable.
(Knight 1999 [1944]: 237)
But while Knight’s critique of moralism is often repeated in academic circles as 
part of the defense of academic freedom and an extension of the separation of 
church and state, his parallel argument against scientism often raises concerns. The 
central mistake of scientism, Knight argues, is identical to the central mistake of 
moralism: the substitution of a commitment to a single (absolute) ideal, rather than 
a commitment to free discussion of what our ideals could be. A free society 
commits to a form of social organization – discussion – which does not commit to 
organizing society around a single ideal. Dedicating oneself to serving the truth, 
while noble, is still, from a societal perspective, dedication to a single value. When 
the argument is made, as it is in scientism, that those who serve the truth are best 
equipped to tell society what to do, liberal democracy has been abandoned. To put 
it differently, scientism accepts the outcome of free discussion within the scientific 
community as a substitute for the free discussion within society. Social discussion 
is always about resolving the conflict of values and ideals within the context of 
particular problems. Science, and morality, play a role in such discussions, but 
cannot be substituted for that discussion (Knight 1999 [1949]).
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Knight on Hayek redux
We are now ready to return to Knight’s direct criticism of Hayek. The short 
précis quoted earlier identified three issues which Knight found problematic in 
The Constitution of Liberty. The longer review picked up each of these, develop-
ing them in the context of Knight’s own thinking on the issues. The first was the 
practical aspects of the problem of personal freedom of action, regarding which 
Knight thought Hayek disappointing. The second issue was Hayek’s tendency to 
talk about “government by law,” rather than “government by discussion,” as 
Knight was wont to do. The final issue is Hayek’s attack on the notion of “social 
justice.” We will not dwell on the first issue here, but will point out two aspects 
of Knight’s criticism of Hayek regarding discussion that highlight what we have 
already seen about Knight’s treatment of the subject, and then briefly identify 
how Knight’s conception of discussion in a free society naturally takes him into 
a consideration of justice which differs significantly from Hayek’s. The latter 
issue will cement the connection between Knight and Mill.
 We have already seen that Knight understood liberal democracy to be a new 
form of culture – understood as a complex of institutions – that placed discussion 
among purposive individuals at the center of social organization. Knight draws 
upon two arguments identified earlier in his criticism of Hayek. The first argument 
is expressed well in the maxim of William Penn that heads this chapter, which 
Knight quotes with approval in his review of Hayek (Knight 1967: 789). Liberal 
democracy is “liberal” not only in its dependence upon the rule of law as a means 
of minimizing the potential for arbitrary state use of coercive power, but primarily 
in its vesting of “the people” with the power to change the law. Hayek, he claims, 
does not recognize the importance of the “Liberal Revolution” which established 
free society and a political order based on discussion.
Surely the crux of political democracy was and is vesting of sovereign 
power in “the people,” to be exercised through enforcing and making laws 
by representatives; these are chosen freely – as freely as possible – by 
majority vote (sometimes plurality) where public opinion (or will) is seri-
ously divided. It is “rule of law” indeed, but where direct force of public 
attitudes does not suffice, by men authorized to interpret and enforce exist-
ing formal law and moral tradition, making legislation necessary. The law- 
makers are chosen through free discussion and voting, and so held 
“responsible to public opinion,” in the only possible way.
(Knight 1967: 789)
Hayek is “scornful of politically organized freedom,” which in Knight’s estimation 
makes his work “a calumny on democracy.” Hayek, we are told, is essentially an 
anarchist, although Knight suggests that it is “hard to be consistently absurd,” and 
Hayek at points defends policies that “humane liberals, common- sense ‘pragma-
tists’ and even popular clamor would have government do” (Knight 1967: 789–90 
passim).
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 The second argument which Knight uses in his critique of Hayek is the prag-
matic focus of human discussion. Society, Knight argues, is best served by dis-
cussion that takes place in the context of the search for agreement on specific 
problems, because that is where the conflict among principles and values must 
be reconciled. Abstract treatises may provide systematic exposition of an intel-
lectual position, but they are prone to finely worded principles which don’t have 
to meet the cold, hard reality of policy discussion, with its competing principles, 
interests, and claims. The reader may recall the maxim Knight proclaimed most 
vividly in his presidential address to the American Economic Association: for 
every principle, there is an anti- principle that is equally true. It is in the discus-
sion of real- world situations and problems that we weigh the relevance of com-
peting principles, interests, and claims in order to find solutions. Theory clarifies 
the principles and their consequences, but cannot dictate ahead of time what 
choices society will make for particular problems (Knight 1999 [1951]). Liberal-
ism is not the rule of law determined by the historical evolution of human 
culture, but the making of law by humans engaged in the process of solving par-
ticular social problems.
 The pragmatic and open- ended nature of discussion in a liberal democracy 
creates, as was pointed out earlier, a problem for the defender of free society: the 
outcome of the process of discussion cannot be known or determined ahead of 
time. For Knight, this means one has to choose between defending the process of 
democracy – discussion – or a particular set of institutional arrangements. Where 
Hayek defends the institutional arrangements of democratic capitalism, Knight 
chooses to defend discussion:
The problem is not laissez faire versus political planning and control in 
general, but comparison of the result of market freedom with that of pos-
sible action by democratic procedure on specific problems. The citizen must 
understand the general principles of the two systems but not draw practical 
conclusions from an abstract analysis of either. The basic principles are facts 
about human nature; and the major difficulty is that this is a tissue of 
paradox.
(Knight 1967: 794–5)
Both of these issues are familiar to those who have read Knight in the way sug-
gested by the earlier two sections of the chapter. But Knight’s third critique of 
Hayek opens ground that is new for this chapter. The final criticism identified in 
the précis of the argument is aimed at Hayek’s views on equality and inequality 
– and his attack on “social justice” as a pretext for seeking equality in a free 
society. Knight begins by returning to discussion, which implies a fundamental 
equality among the members of society (Knight 1962: 561–2). Knight is not 
enough of an idealist to think that people are, in fact, equal in any society – 
“nothing could be more false historically than the notion that men are naturally 
free and equal” (Knight 1982 [1944]: 363), but liberalism links equality to the 
ideal of freedom because significant inequality among individuals and the groups 
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to which they belong will bring power imbalances that will lead to the oppres-
sion of minorities by the majority, and the reduction of freedom:
The exchange of equal values between excessively unequal individuals may 
result in fundamental injustice in the distributive sense, in contrast with com-
mutative justice, which alone is recognized in laisser- faire individualism. And 
it may reduce effective freedom to the vanishing- point. Of course, nineteenth- 
century political liberalism progressively recognized this fact and attempted to 
work toward distributive justice also and to maintain effective freedom, using 
such measures as progressive taxation and relief and the provision of public 
services, especially free education for the children of the poor.
(Knight 1982 [1942]: 265)
But Knight is enough of an idealist that he thought it necessary, as we saw 
earlier, that society have some conception of equality as part of its social ideal. 
The tension between his pragmatism and idealism is seen most vividly in the 
comments he makes about Hayek on equality and justice. Labelling as “notably 
absurd” Hayek’s views on equality generally, Knight says that “the error is in 
the extremism, absolutism” – Hayek says that the desirability of redistribution is 
insufficient justification for the use of coercion, but then accepts equality before 
the law as if it were easily obtained, without coercion. And then, in Knight’s 
estimation, Hayek reaches the “supreme absurdity” (but wait, there is more 
absurdity to come!) by ignoring equality of opportunity (Knight 1967: 790). 
While it is true that freedom cannot be closely identified with power, Knight 
says,
It is absurd [there’s that word again] for Hayek to ignore the close connec-
tion between the two. Freedom, correctly conceived, implies opportunity, 
unobstructed opportunity, to use power, which must be possessed, to give 
content to freedom, or make it effective. . . . Nor does Hayek recognize that 
unequal power over things confers power over persons, or that the main 
general problem of freedom is unequal power, practically covering signific-
ant human inequality.
(Knight 1967: 790)
Knight then rehearses an argument that he held throughout his life, despite the 
best attempts of George Stigler and Milton Friedman to dissuade him of it: 
market exchange and the right of property inheritance necessarily generates 
greater economic inequality within a society over time. Knight criticizes Hayek 
for not recognizing that encroaching inequality has required “preventive or off-
setting social action on a vast scale” (Knight 1967: 791) in the modern world.
 But it is in the context of redistributive theory and the use of taxation that 
Knight claimed Hayek reaches “the peak of fallacy” (absurdity now converted to 
fallacy!). Hayek, Knight argues, is led by the rejection of interpersonal utility 
comparisons to the “absurd” (ah, back on familiar ground) conclusion that a $1 
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increment in the income of both a rich and a poor person are equally important 
to the two individuals. Knight clearly disagrees, and goes on to defend progres-
sive taxation – which Hayek attacks. Knight concludes:
It seems that all human sense of right and wrong – the latter more real – is 
also “illusion.” Hayek expressly repudiates “social justice”. . . . For him, 
justice is still defined, once and for all, by laws, and those are produced by 
spontaneous historical growth, not “made” by either men or God.
(Knight 1967: 794)
For Knight, justice – in both its commutative and distributive senses – is one of 
the ideals that human societies are constantly trying to realize, even as they 
economize and balance their allegiance to other social ideals as well. While it 
may be absurd (I’m playing with you now), as Hayek claims, to argue that an 
entity called “society” has some conception of justice apart from the values 
accepted by the individuals in the society, Knight still holds out hope that the 
individuals in society will, through discussion, come to a common conception – 
held relatively absolute for now – of what justice means for their society, in the 
context of the particular problems they face at this time. To deny that justice 
can mean something more than adherence to the law – or, what amounts to the 
same thing, to equate liberalism with “government by law” rather than “govern-
ment by discussion” – means, for Knight, that one denies the reality of human 
nature.
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Notes
 1 The 1967 essay also included comments on Henry Hazlitt’s Foundations of morality, 
but because Knight had previously written a review of Hazlitt’s work (Knight 1966), 
it focused primarily on Hayek.
 2 Of course, the mid- 1930s were a bleak time for liberalism, understood as Knight and 
Hayek did, anyway, and Knight had been ruminating on the future of liberalism for a 
couple of years already. Thus, his comments to Hayek fit the context of his thinking 
in this period and are not restricted to his interaction with Hayek alone; but they do 
illustrate how fragile he thought liberalism was.
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 3 While Knight’s publisher’s report begins by saying that The Road to Serfdom “is a 
masterly performance of the job it undertakes,” it concludes with
In sum, the book is an able piece of work, but limited in scope and somewhat one- 
sided in treatment. I doubt whether it would have a very wide market in this 
country, or would change the position of many readers.
(included in Hayek 2007: 249–50)
 4 While the paradoxes of human nature are discussed throughout Knight’s work, the 
litany provided on pp. 359–61 of Knight (1982 [1944]) is perhaps the longest.
 5 Knight argues that biological evolution produced a “practically uniform human 
species” (Knight 1961b: 4).
 6 Knight’s emergentist view of cultural evolution is similar to the soft version of the 
Sapir–Whorf hypothesis regarding language. The friendship between the anthro-
pologist Edward Sapir and Knight dated from the 1930s, when Sapir was at 
Chicago. Knight invited Michael Sapir, Edward’s son, to undertake his graduate 
study in economics at Chicago because of the close friendship. Michael remarked 
to his father’s biographer that Knight understood language to be the “purest most 
autonomous form of human institution” (Michael Sapir to Regna Darnell, quoted in 
Darnell 1990: 203). One sees the soft Sapir–Whorf hypothesis in remarks by 
Knight like:
Speech always means the use of some particular language, which has been created 
by a particular culture and learned in and through that milieu. The learning and 
use of language is inseparable from the acquisition of the content, also cultural, 
whether intellectual and emotional or merely trivial, which speech is used to 
express to others or to mediate to the individual in his thinking, and from the 
various ends which expression is used to promote. There is practically no sense in 
speculating as to what any man would approve or disapprove, in conduct, belief, 
or taste, apart from the context of some cultural background, some complex of 
social institutions.
(Knight 1999 [1944]: 233)
 7 Knight uses “government by discussion” in almost every essay he writes about liber-
alism from the 1930s on. He acknowledges Viscount James Bryce as the expression’s 
source. Bryce is the author of that “other” famous nineteenth- century account of 
democracy in America by a non- American, The American Commonwealth (Bryce 
1959 [1888]).
 8 The term “liberal revolution” appears throughout Knight’s work after the mid- 1930s. 
In his writings related to Hayek’s work, the term is ubiquitous (Knight 1999 [1956], 
1962, and Knight 1967, from which the capitalized usage here is adopted).
 9 The reader might wonder why Knight appears to ignore market exchange in his dis-
cussion of “discussion” within liberal society. But the first function of an economic 
system, according to Knight’s earliest writings on the subject, is “the fixing of stand-
ards,” described as follows:
In a world where organizations were absent, where each individual carried on 
his life activities in isolation and independence of all others, the matter of stand-
ards would be simply a matter of individual choice. But when the production of 
wealth is socialized, there has to be a social decision as to the relative impor-
tance of different uses of productive power, as to which wants are to be satisfied 
and which left unsatisfied or to what extent any one is to be satisfied at the 
expense of any other. In the case of an individual, choice need be made only 
among his own wants; but in a social system, the wants of different individuals 
also come into conflict. As far as this is a quantitative question merely, of how 
far the wants of one are to be gratified at the expense of the wants of another, or 
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left ungratified in favor of another, the problem is one of distribution, and will 
be noticed under another heading (the third function). But to a large and increas-
ing extent, society finds it necessary or advisable further to regulate the indi-
vidual’s regulation of his own want- satisfaction, to enforce a community 
standard of living. As a matter of fact, these two problems are closely interlaced, 
the question of whose wants and that of which wants are to be given preference, 
and in what measure. It is important to observe that they are largely the same 
question.
(Knight 1933b: 6–7)
Reducing Knight’s notion that society makes a choice via discussion to use exchange 
as the means by which the social decision regarding these questions is made to “the 
first function of an economy is to determine what is produced” is one of the ironies of 
Knight’s role in the construction of the modern economics textbook.
10 This statement might seem incongruent with Knight’s opposition to the acceptance of 
ethical absolutes. However, he recognized that liberal society, in order to move 
forward on the solution of social problems at hand, had to say, in effect, that it would 
suspend its discussion of social ideals and adopt a particular formulation as “relatively 
absolute.” A “relative absolute” remains debatable, but will be used for the purpose of 
solving social problems until a new formulation of the relation among our social 
ideals is created (Knight 1999 [1944]: 238–40).
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Part II
Pushing the boundaries of 
the liberal tradition?

4 A renovated social fabric
Mill, Hayek, and the problem of 
institutional change?
Andrew Farrant
[Mill] was perhaps the fairest economist who ever lived: He treated other 
people’s theories at least as respectfully as his own, a mistake no other economist 
has repeated.
(Stigler 1987: 99)
The emancipation of women, & co- operative production, are, I fully believe, the 
two great changes that will regenerate society.
(Mill 1972 [1869]: 1535)
Introduction
Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek have a markedly negative view of J. S. Mill. 
For Mises, Mill is “the great advocate of socialism” (Mises 1985 [1927]: 195): 
Mill supposedly making a greater contribution to the popularity of socialist ideas 
than all the “hate- inspired and frequently contradictory arguments of socialist 
agitators” (Mises 1981 [1922]: 155). For decades, Mill’s ideas supposedly pro-
vided “one of the main props of the socialist idea” (Mises 1981 [1922]: 154–5).1 
Hayek’s assessment is similarly negative: Mill allegedly advocating a “rational-
istic individualism” that ultimately tended toward full- blown “socialism or col-
lectivism” (Hayek 1948: 4). Elsewhere, Hayek suggests that Mill’s ideas provide 
the “roots of the self- destructive character of a rationalist or constructivistic view 
of how civilization could be organized” (Hayek 1983: 93). All in all, Mises sim-
ilarly considers Mill to have originated the supposedly:
thoughtless confounding of liberal and socialist ideas that led to the decline 
of English liberalism and to the undermining of the living standards of the 
English people . . . All the arguments that could be advanced in favor of 
socialism are elaborated by him with loving care. In comparison with Mill 
all other socialist writers – even Marx, Engels, and Lassalle – are scarcely 
of any importance.
(Mises 1985 [1927]: 195; emphasis added)
This chapter will try to demonstrate that much of what Mises and Hayek have 
attributed to Mill – Mill’s alleged advocacy of socialism included – is wide of 
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the mark.2 For instance, Hayek charges Mill with revealing a “complete incom-
prehension of the central problem of economic theory, namely, what determines 
which things are produced and how” (Hayek 1983: 91; emphasis added). In par-
ticular, Hayek points to Mill’s well- known distinction between the immutable 
laws of production (e.g., allegedly having the character of “physical truths”) and 
the supposedly malleable laws of distribution (Mill 1965: 199–201): taking 
much umbrage at Mill’s argument that the laws of distribution are a “matter of 
human institutions solely” – “The things once there, mankind . . . can do with 
them as they like” (Mill 1965: 199; emphasis added) – Hayek interprets Mill as 
arguing that production and distribution are wholly unrelated (Hayek 1983: 92). 
As Hayek puts it, Mill – purportedly denying that “[w]hat there is to share 
depends on the principle by which production is organized” – allegedly treats 
the “size of the product as a purely technological problem . . . [one] independent 
of its distribution” (Hayek 1988: 93).
 Yet, and as Samuel Hollander has rightly noted, Mill is much preoccupied 
with the “impact on productivity of the joint- stock arrangement, of different 
systems of land tenure, of laws relating to inheritance and poor relief, of civil 
protection” (Hollander 1985: 218–19). For example, Mill – apparently belying 
Hayek’s reading of Mill’s ostensibly sharp distinction between the laws govern-
ing production (e.g., the law of diminishing returns in agriculture) and the “mal-
leable” laws of distribution – pointedly argues against Members of Parliament 
who attributed Irish poverty to small landholding per se rather than to the mark-
edly perverse incentive structure supposedly inherent to cottier tenure. As Mill 
aptly puts it:
[A]ll modes of holding land are in their opinion alike. The difference 
between holding it as cottiers and as proprietors – between the very worst 
tenure, morally, socially, and industrially, on the surface of the earth (slave 
countries alone excepted), and the very best – is in their estimation not 
worth considering.
(Mill 1986 [1847]: 1059)
Moreover, and as Lionel Robbins has aptly noted, Mill’s sympathies with social-
ism lay with “duodecimo syndicalism rather than socialism in the modern sense” 
(Robbins 1957: 256). As Robbins explains, Mill, advocating “workmen’s co- 
operatives – self- governing corporations foreshadowed as he thought, by the 
experiments of LeClaire and others in Paris” (Robbins 1967: xl) – thought the 
“desirable future for the labouring classes lay more in a syndicalist . . . than a col-
lectivist direction” (Robbins 1965: 159).3 Accordingly, Mill’s alleged “social-
ism” bears scant resemblance to “modern collectivism” (Robbins 1979: 89–90).4
 Similarly, Samuel Hollander (1985: 781) rightly views Mises’s suggestion 
that Mill was the “great advocate of socialism” as “a grotesque overstatement 
indeed.” Importantly, Mill points to two varieties of socialism in the posthu-
mously published “Chapters on Socialism.”5 First, Mill, and with much sym-
pathy, notes the “systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and 
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philosophic Socialists generally” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 737).6 Though sympathetic 
to philosophic socialist plans to renovate the social fabric (ibid.: 708), Mill is 
sharply critical toward a second variety of socialism – “more a product of the 
Continent than of Great Britain” (ibid.: 737) – “revolutionary” Socialism (ibid.: 
737).7 This latter variety of socialism would supposedly have society “plunge 
without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying 
on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power 
which has always hitherto worked the social machinery” (ibid.: 737; emphasis 
added). As Mill makes clear, the “very idea of conducting the whole industry of 
a country by direction from a single centre is so obviously chimerical, that 
nobody ventures to propose any mode in which it should be done” (ibid.: 748; 
emphasis added).
 Throughout his writings on socialism Mill maintains that “actual trial” pro-
vides the only adequate test of “the practicability or beneficial operation of 
Socialist arrangements” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 736).8 Initially, any experiment on 
the “scale of Mr. Owen’s or M. Fourier’s villages” (ibid.: 738) could supposedly 
be “tried . . . on a select population and extended to others as their education and 
cultivation permit” (ibid.: 737). Accordingly, philosophic socialism, supposedly 
having the singular “advantage” that it could be “brought into operation progres-
sively and can prove its capabilities by trial” (ibid.: 737; emphasis added), 
would not prove “an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of 
being also a means of reconstruction” (ibid.: 737; emphasis added). As Mill 
notes, the workability of revolutionary socialism – the “ambitious plan which 
aims at taking possession of the whole land and capital of the country, and 
beginning at once to administer it on the public account” (ibid.: 748; emphasis 
added) – was “as yet” wholly lacking in “experimental verification” (ibid.: 737) 
and could supposedly “have no effect but disastrous failure . . . its apostles . . . 
[having] only the consolation that the order of society as it now exists would 
have perished” (ibid.: 749; emphasis added).9
 Though maintaining that philosophic socialist experiments have a ready “case 
for a trial” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 748), Mill repeatedly argues that any such scheme 
(e.g., Owenite socialism) is initially “workable only by the elite of mankind” 
(ibid.: 748; emphasis added).10 Markedly similar reservations are readily appar-
ent in the preface to the third edition of the Principles of Political Economy 
(1852): “[M]ankind in general” and “the labouring classes in particular” are sup-
posedly ill- prepared “for any order of things, which would make any considera-
ble demand on either their intellect or their virtue” (Mill 1965 [1852]: xciii).11 
Mill’s “Chapters on Socialism” reveal no change of mind: any plan “for the 
regeneration of society must consider average human beings, and not only them 
but the large residuum of persons greatly below the average in the personal and 
social virtues” (1967 [1879]: 744; emphasis added).12 Indeed, Mill notes that the 
vast majority of humanity are simply ill- equipped for the stringent moral require-
ments that socialist schemes would necessarily demand of them.
 As Lionel Robbins has wisely counseled, Mill’s various writings on socialism 
should not be read independently of Mill’s other essays:
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The discussion of socialism in the chapter on property is not to be judged in 
isolation. It must be evaluated in conjunction with the chapter “On the Prob-
able Futurity of the Labouring Classes,” a chapter to which we know Mill 
attached particular importance.
(Robbins 1967: xl; emphasis added)
Importantly, Mill sharply juxtaposes two “conflicting theories, respecting the 
social position desirable for manual labourers. The one may be called the theory 
of dependence and protection, the other that of self- dependence” (Mill 1965: 
759; emphasis added): the theory of dependence supposedly contends that the 
“lot of the poor . . . should be regulated for them, not by them” (ibid.: 759).13 Yet, 
and as Mill explains, to “be under the power of some one, instead of being as 
formerly the sole condition of safety, is now . . . the only situation which exposes 
to grievous wrong” (ibid.: 761; emphasis added).14
 Much the same theme provides the analytical core of Mill’s earlier essay on 
the “Claims of Labour” (1967 [1845]: 365–89). In particular, Mill makes clear 
his advocacy of worker co- operatives and profit- sharing writ large as a viable 
alternative to “dependence” and hierarchy (e.g., the relationship between 
employer and employed under capitalism):
[A]lmost every thinker has his Utopia . . . [if] we might be permitted to have 
ours . . . it would be that of raising the labourer from a receiver of hire – a 
mere brought instrument in the work of production, having no residuary 
interest in the work itself – to the position of being, in some sort, a partner 
in it.
(Mill 1967 [1845]: 382; emphasis added)15
Accordingly, Mill advocated wide- reaching institutional change which, supposing 
“mankind continue to improve” (1965: 775), would ultimately recast the social 
fabric anew: ideally, the exercise of “voice” (democratic self- governance) would 
replace meek obedience to the diktat of a “capitalist as chief ” (ibid.: 775) in the 
industrial realm. The relationship between employer and employed under capital-
ism would, Mill hoped, spontaneously give way – “and in perhaps a less remote 
future than may be supposed” (ibid.: 793) – to the “association of . . . labourers 
themselves on terms of equality” (ibid.: 775; emphasis added). As Mill puts it, only 
the widespread adoption of the co- operative model – “both sexes” necessarily par-
ticipating “equally in the rights and in the government of the association” (ibid.: 
794; emphasis added) – would allow for the realization in the industrial sphere of 
the very “best aspirations of the democratic spirit” (ibid.: 793).16
Socialism and slavery?
A variety of utopian socialist experiments – “duodecimo editions of the New 
Jerusalem” as Marx famously and rather contemptuously put it – litter the nine-
teenth century:
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While one can indeed point to episodes of socialism in the nineteenth 
century – the Oneida community and the Shaker stand out in the historical 
record – these episodes were attempts to model a new society. They were 
not societies on the scale of Britain or America.
(Levy 2001: 181; emphasis added)
Hence, and as Mill was readily aware: “The real existing alternative to market 
capitalism was racial slavery” (ibid.).
 F. A. Hayek famously equated socialism and slavery in The Road to Serfdom 
(Hayek 1994 [1944]). In particular, Hayek makes a highly intriguing reference 
to the nineteenth- century controversy over whether socialism would prove 
incentive- compatible without pervasive recourse to compulsory labor and the 
lash: as Hayek explains, “we had been warned by some of the greatest political 
thinkers of the nineteenth century, by De Tocqueville and Lord Acton, that 
socialism means slavery” (Hayek 1994 [1944]: 16; emphasis added). Although 
mentioning Tocqueville and Acton, Hayek could have similarly invoked Nassau 
Senior.17 In particular, Senior wrote much on the alleged similarities between 
slavery and socialism; indeed, the incentive to labor under socialism would sup-
posedly be provided by regular application of the lash. As Senior explains, 
socialism would supposedly
enact that industry shall not be rewarded by wages nor abstinence by profit 
. . . those who shall toil shall toil for others . . . If this system should ever be 
attempted to be adopted . . . the socialist nation, unless it is to starve, must 
be divided into slaves and slavedrivers.
(Senior quoted in Robbins 1965: 141; emphasis added)
Similarly, Hayek himself notes that “the first of modern planners, Saint Simon 
. . . predicted that those who did not obey his proposed planning boards would be 
‘treated as cattle’ ” (Hayek 1994 [1944]: 28; emphasis added). As Hayek 
explains, “Saint- Simon has no qualms about the means that will be employed to 
enforce the instructions of his central planning body: ‘Anybody who does not 
obey the orders will be treated by the others as a quadruped’ ” (Hayek 1979 
[1952]: 221–2). As we shall see, Senior repeatedly argued that universal poor 
relief, supposedly equivalent to socialism, had reduced the English laboring 
classes to de facto slavery (e.g., Senior 1865 [1841]: 15).
 Though having misgivings about a system of private property and exchange – 
yielding to no one in his “wish that ‘cash payment’ should be no longer ‘the uni-
versal nexus between man and man’ ” (Mill 1967 [1845]: 379) – Mill hated 
anything akin to slavery with a vengeance.18 As noted earlier, the crux of Mill’s 
important distinction between the theories of dependence and self- dependence 
had initially appeared in “The Claims of Labour”: in particular, Mill takes well- 
meaning philanthropists to task for supposedly looking “back with fondness to 
times when the poor had no notion of any other social state than to give obedi-
ence to the nearest great landholder” (ibid.: 371; emphasis added). As Mill 
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would later explain, the idea that the wealthy “should be in loco parentis to the 
poor” provided a yearned- for “ideal . . . in the minds of those whose dissatisfac-
tion with the present assumes the form of affection and regret towards the past” 
(1965: 759). Although self- professedly sensitive to whatever proved “seductive 
in the picture of society which this theory presents” (ibid.: 760), Mill maintained 
that the “facts of it have no prototype in the past.” Accordingly, the “theory of 
dependence” – having “never been historically realized” (ibid.: 760) – was 
merely an “idealization, grounded on the conduct and character of here and there 
an individual” (ibid.: 760). As Mill tartly puts it, the higher “classes of this or 
any other country” have never in reality performed anything close to “a part . . . 
resembling the one assigned to them in this theory” (ibid.). Instead, privileged 
“and powerful classes . . . [invariably use] their power in the interest of their own 
selfishness . . . [indulging] their self- importance in despising, and not in lovingly 
caring for, those . . . [who are] under the necessity of working for their benefit” 
(ibid.). To illustrate his point, Mill, in “The Claims of Labour,” notes the “happy 
labouring classes” “fortunate” enough to enjoy the purported “blessings” imag-
ined by the advocates of the theory of dependence: the markedly unfortunate 
“Russian boors . . . [and the] slaves on a West Indian estate” (1967 [1845]: 
373–4).19 Accordingly, as Mill readily explains, philanthropists who favor the 
theory of dependence per se are simply “looking in the wrong quarter for what 
they seek . . . Feudality, in whatever manner we may conceive it modified, is not 
the type on which institutions or habits can now be moulded” (ibid.: 379–80): As 
Mill would later note, the “well- being and well- doing of the laboring people 
must henceforth rest” on a foundation other than meek and unqualified obedi-
ence to their supposed “protectors” and “superiors” (Mill 1965: 763).
 Peart and Levy have rightly argued that much of Mill’s analytical machinery 
is designed to address “the problem of self- motivated human development in the 
context of institutional change” (2005: xiii). Indeed, the “problem of how people 
make themselves into competent optimizers” (ibid.: 14; emphasis added) is – 
with a vitally important caveat to be noted below – readily apparent throughout 
Mill’s writings on institutional change (e.g., the transition from slavery to free 
labor in the West Indies and the replacement of cottier tenure in Ireland with a 
regime of peasant proprietorship). As Mill himself puts it, the well- being of the 
laboring classes depends on the “degree in which they can be made rational 
beings” (Mill 1965: 763). Indeed, Mill, invoking the logic of Malthusian popula-
tion theory, notes that all- too-many ostensibly “promising [reform] schemes end 
only in having a more numerous, but not a happier people” (ibid.: 159; emphasis 
added): as Mill explains, nothing “permanent can be done” to improve the 
unhappy lot of the laboring classes unless they can be “taught to make a better 
use of favourable circumstances” (ibid.). In particular, Mill maintains that the 
“habits” of the laboring classes – for example, the degree to which they practice 
voluntary restraint in marriage – need to “be altered for the better” (ibid.: 361).20
 In Mill’s view, the laboring classes are habituated to a particular standard of 
living. This habitual standard of comfort is equivalent to the “lowest” rate of 
wages on which the laboring classes “can” (1965: 361) or, more importantly, 
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will gladly “consent to live” (ibid.: 360; emphasis added). Accordingly, any 
change in circumstances which would prima facie appear disadvantageous to the 
laboring populace (e.g., a decrease in their real wages induced by an increase in 
the price of food) may, other things equal, induce a concomitant reduction in 
their habitual standard of comfort. Alternatively, the laboring classes may main-
tain their habitual living standards by adopting a greater degree of voluntary 
restraint in marriage. Though Mill thought that any decrease in the birth rate sup-
posedly induced by greater prudential restraint in marriage would suffice to 
maintain the particular standard of comfort to which the laboring populace were 
habituated, he maintained that their “habits” were such that a decrease in their 
permanent living standards – a new and lower habitual standard of comfort – 
would prove the more likely consequence of any disadvantageous changes in 
their circumstances; indeed, Mill rejected any suggestion that a supposedly oper-
ative “self- repairing quality” would suffice to undo any disadvantageous changes 
befalling the laboring classes (ibid.: 341).
 Similarly, Mill argues that any change in circumstances which would seem-
ingly appear advantageous to the laboring populace (e.g., an increase in real 
wages) might, other things equal, lead to a permanent increase in the standard of 
comfort to which they were habituated. Alternatively, any increase in real wages 
might simply induce a marked increase in the birth rate; accordingly, any rise in 
living standards would merely prove transitory. The laboring classes would 
respond to the increase in real wages by having larger families: as Mill explains, 
the laboring classes may simply “people down” to the standard of comfort to 
which they had initially been habituated (1965: 361).
 Accordingly, Mill views with “comparative indifference . . . any scheme of 
improvement which begins and ends with increase of food” per se (Mill 1986 
[1846]: 912; emphasis added): Hence, Mill’s desideratum is a “guarantee that 
increase of food shall have some better permanent consequence than increase of 
mouths” (ibid.: 912; emphasis added). Ultimately, the people required “some-
thing operating upon . . . [their] minds . . . [rather than] merely upon their stom-
achs” (ibid.: 912; emphasis added). As Mill explains, the lot of the poor can be 
permanently improved only by inducing a much greater degree of voluntary 
restraint in marriage than they habitually practiced; accordingly, the laboring 
populace requires “something . . . which shall make new men of them” (ibid.: 
912; emphasis added).21 As Mill had similarly argued in the “Claims of Labour,” 
without “change in [the laboring classes] themselves, there can be no lasting 
improvement in their outward condition” (Mill 1967 [1845]: 375).22
Selfishness and sympathy?
As Peart and Levy rightly note, Mill recognizes that one can induce greater 
“competent optimizer” status by encouraging “material desires” (2005: 14).23 As 
Mill puts it, “self- dependence” (Mill 1965: 282), greater rationality per se, is 
markedly preferable to the child- like servility which is the “approved condition 
of the labouring classes according to the prevailing philanthropy” (ibid.: 281). 
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As Mill explains, the “virtue” of self- dependence “is one of the first conditions 
of excellence in the human character” (ibid.: 282): the “stock on which if the 
other virtues are not grafted, they have seldom any firm root” (ibid.). As Peart 
and Levy note, however, greater rationality per se – “farsighted concern for . . . 
[one’s] own interest[s]” (2005: 14) – is not necessarily synonymous with 
“concern for others” (ibid.): in Mill’s view, “[m]aterialism” per se – immersion 
in one’s own material desires – “is only a step” (ibid.) toward the greater sym-
pathy and benevolence which is deemed a vitally necessary prerequisite, and 
vital undergirding, for any wholesale reconfiguration of the social fabric (Mill 
1967 [1879]: 708). Accordingly, Malthusian population theory and the tenets of 
associationist psychology are intimately conjoined in Mill’s writings on institu-
tional change.24
 For Mill, the improvement of human character and the ever- greater extension 
of sympathy toward other creatures necessarily go hand in hand.25 Moral educa-
tion – repeated exposure to “good” trains of association per se – could induce 
greater sympathy: As James Mill put it in 1829,
A very general idea, such as that of Mankind, is an indistinct idea; and no 
strong association is formed with it, except by means of Education. In the 
common run of men, the narrow sympathies, alone, act with any considerable 
force. Such men can sympathize with . . . their own Family, or their own class 
. . . [T]o sympathize with mankind at large, or even with the body of the people 
in their own country, exceeds the bounds of their contracted affections.
(Mill 1829: 278; emphasis added)
Conversely, any human “being, almost constantly in pain, hardly visited by a 
single pleasure, and almost shut out from hope, loses by degrees all sympathy 
with his fellow creatures” (Mill 1992: 171–2; emphasis added). These considera-
tions play a vitally important role in Mill’s writings on institutional change: 
Mill’s advocacy of particular institutional arrangements (e.g., worker co- 
operatives) – and his scathing condemnation of others (e.g., cottier tenure in 
Ireland) – places heavy weight on whether or not such arrangements are deemed 
conducive to the further intellectual and moral advance of the mass of the popu-
lace. For example, Mill argues that the spread of worker co- operatives would 
facilitate a mighty “change . . . [combining] the freedom and independence of the 
individual, with the moral, intellectual, and economical advantages of aggregate 
production” (Mill 1965: 793; emphasis added).26 Ultimately, the spread of co- 
operative associations would, Mill thought, engineer an “end to the division of 
society into the industrious and the idle . . . effacing all social distinctions but 
those fairly earned by personal services and exertions” (ibid.; emphasis added).27 
Moreover, co- operative associations – industrial partnership writ large – would 
provide much “stimulus” to the “productive energies” of the laboring classes 
(ibid.: 792): This, however, is viewed “as nothing compared with the moral 
revolution in society that would accompany it” (ibid.; emphasis added). As Mill 
explains, the spread of worker co- operatives would transform the “conflict of 
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classes struggling for opposite interests” into a “friendly rivalry in the pursuit of 
a good common to all” (ibid.); similarly, the “standing feud between capital and 
labour” would supposedly be greatly healed, with the laboring classes enjoying a 
wholly “new sense of security and independence” (ibid.). More importantly: 
each “human being’s daily occupation” would be converted into a “school of the 
social sympathies and the practical intelligence” (ibid.; emphasis added).
 Importantly, James Mill held that “nature herself forbids” that a “wise and 
virtuous” populace can be made out of a “starving one” (1992: 172). Indeed, he 
viewed a “good diet . . . a necessary part of a good education . . . [In] the great 
body of the people all education is impotent without it” (ibid.: 173). Similarly, 
James Mill had argued that severe labor – ostensibly operating upon the mind in 
much the same supposedly negative way as “habitual deficiency of food” (ibid.) 
– “obliterated sympathy” (ibid.). As we shall see, the tenets of associationist psy-
chology are similarly apparent in J. S. Mill’s scathing condemnation of cottier 
tenure in Ireland. In particular, Mill argued that the cottier regime – the baneful 
way in which “things are . . . arranged” (1965: 319) in Ireland – greatly encour-
ages indolence and insouciance on the part of the peasantry: as Mill explains, the 
peasantry, primarily living upon potatoes, “derive no advantage” whatsoever 
“from forethought or exertion” (ibid.). Accordingly, trains of association per se 
induce and shape “character”: “Whatever helps to shape the human being; to 
make the individual what he is, or hinder him from being what he is not – is part 
of his education” (Mill 1984 [1867]: 217).
Poor relief and slavery: Senior’s conjecture?
As noted earlier, Nassau Senior argued that slavery and socialism had much in 
common. Similarly, Senior, in an 1841 article appearing in the Edinburgh 
Review, had scathingly argued that the perverse incentives allegedly inherent to 
the English Poor Laws (e.g., the provision of outdoor relief to ostensibly indi-
gent but able- bodied laborers) had done much to reduce “able- bodied paupers” 
to de facto slavery (Senior 1865 [1841]: 45–115); as Senior puts it, the poor laws 
had supposedly attempted to provide the able- bodied laborer with:
[A] security incompatible with his freedom; to provide for him and his 
family a comfortable subsistence at his own home [outdoor relief], whatever 
were his conduct, and whatever were the value of his labour . . . [This] 
attempt succeeded in what have been called the pauperized districts, and 
placed the labourer in the condition, physically and morally, of a slave; – 
confined to his parish, maintained according to his wants, not to the value of 
his services, restrained from misconduct by no fear of loss, and therefore 
stimulated to action and industry by no hope of reward.
(Senior 1865 [1841]: 115; emphasis added)28
Accordingly, outdoor relief had supposedly occasioned various incentive- 
incompatibilities – supposedly “fatally relaxing the springs of industry and the 
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restraints of prudence” (Mill 1965: 360) – prior to 1834.29 Accordingly, while 
the desirability of poor law reform was supposedly apparent to all and sundry, 
the “Commissioners of Inquiry had reported that it was not expedient, or even 
practicable . . . [to] exclude from relief the able- bodied labourer who professed 
to be unable to earn wages adequate to the support of his family” (Senior 1865 
[1841]: 91; emphasis added).30 Consequently, an incentive- compatible poor law 
would supposedly guarantee that only the truly indigent received able- bodied 
relief. As Senior notes, incentive- compatible poor relief would automatically 
“test . . . the truth of . . . [the able- bodied applicant’s] representations” (ibid.; 
emphasis added). The test favored by Senior was relatively simple: make the 
receipt of poor relief markedly “less eligible than independent labour” per se 
(ibid.); as Senior explains, this was easily done by conjoining the receipt of poor 
relief to a “condition which no man not in real want would accept, or would 
submit to when that want had ceased” (ibid.: 93; emphasis added). Consequently, 
the 1834 New Poor Law stipulated that any applicant for able- bodied relief
enter a workhouse . . . supported there by a diet ample indeed in quantity, 
but from which the stimulants which habit had endeared to him were 
excluded – should be subjected to habits of cleanliness and order – should 
be separated from his former associates, and should be debarred from his 
former amusements.
(ibid.: 93)31
Accordingly, indoor relief – the workhouse test per se – was allegedly incentive- 
compatible: only the truly indigent would voluntarily accept workhouse discip-
line. As Senior explained, whenever any able- bodied, and self- professedly, 
indigent laborer readily “accepted these terms, that acceptance [automatically] 
tested the reality of his wants” (ibid.: 91; emphasis added).
 As Mill, readily subscribing to Senior’s logic, later explained, the wholly 
“pauperized districts . . . have been dispauperized by adopting strict rules of poor 
law administration” (Mill 1965: 961; emphasis added).
Mill, Ireland, and outdoor relief: slavery in all but name?
As is well- known, Mill’s view of the 1834 New Poor Law was highly favorable: 
“no Malthusian now condemns poor laws when so administered as not to take 
away the inducement to self- support” (Mill 1967 [1851]: 449).32 By late 1846, and 
with conditions in Ireland rapidly worsening, many influential parties (e.g., the 
Times newspaper) were arguing that large- scale “out- door relief to the able- 
bodied” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 881; emphasis added) would greatly alleviate the grave 
distress caused by the potato famine.33 Consequently, Mill – having no objection 
whatsoever to any expenditures that would permanently improve “the condition” 
of the Irish peasantry (ibid.: 886) – provided much vigorous opposition to the sup-
posedly incentive- incompatible outdoor relief and public employment schemes 
advocated by the Times and its allies.34 As Mill explained in disgust:
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A poor- law . . . this is the sum of what our wisdom can devise to make an 
indolent people industrious, to gift an improvident people with prudence and 
forethought. That which has pauperized nearly the whole agricultural popu-
lation of England is the expedient recommended for raising to comfort and 
independence the peasantry of Ireland! . . . It is the one thing which would 
set the seal to Irish misery, the thing which would take away even the possi-
bility of improvement. The Legislature which could deliberately adopt it 
must be nothing less than insane.
(ibid.: 881–2; emphasis added)
As Mill explains, the Times – maintaining that “lavish . . . outdoor relief ” (ibid.: 
885) would “be given [not] in alms, but in exchange for work” (ibid.: 888) – had 
scant understanding of incentive- compatibility:
As if experience had not done justice to all such projects. As if England had 
forgotten the once familiar scenes of pauper labour on the roads and in the 
gravel- pits . . . [T]he very ideas of industry and compulsory payment . . . 
shriek at finding themselves together.
(ibid.: 888)
As Mill explains, outdoor relief – supposedly rendered incentive- compatible 
only by recourse to the lash – would reduce the unfortunate Irish peasantry to de 
facto slavery:
While men are what they are, they can be induced to habitual labour by only 
two motives – reward and punishment. The reward of the Irish, and even of 
the English peasant, is a sufficiently wretched one – a bare subsistence. But 
if even that is annihilated as a reward by being severed from the industry 
which is to earn it, there is no other incentive remaining but punishment; the 
labour must be compulsory, the labourer must be a slave. Those whom you 
are forced to feed must be forced to work; and there is not, there never has 
been, any permanent means by which human beings can be forced to labour 
all their lives for other people, but the lash.
(ibid.: 888; emphasis added)
Similarly, Mill (writing to Auguste Comte) – noting the apparently pervasive phil-
anthropic zeal for governing the poor “in paternal fashion” (what he would later 
refer to as the theory of dependence) and alluding to the expected legislative exten-
sion of the Irish poor law (the introduction of outdoor relief ) – pointedly notes:
We shall have a great experimental proof of this truth: one cannot treat 
workingmen as one does cattle . . . [to make] them work for others in 
exchange for good food and housing . . . was [in the past] possible only when 
the whip was added . . . we cannot make the old system work while stripping 
it . . . of its means of action.
(Mill 1995 [1847]: 384; emphasis added)35
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As Mill had explained, “experience” readily taught the
sort of work to be expected from recipients of public charity. When the pay 
is not given for the sake of the work, but the work found for the sake of the 
pay, inefficiency is a matter of certainty: to extract real work from day- 
labourers without the power of dismissal, is only practicable by the power 
of the lash.
(Mill 1965: 357)36
As noted earlier, Mill takes much the same stance when assessing the merits of 
the New Poor Law. As Mill, readily agreeing with Senior’s logic, explains, 
whenever public charity
is given in such a manner that the condition of the person helped is as desir-
able as that of the person who succeeds in doing the same thing without help, 
the assistance, if capable of being previously calculated on, is mischievous: 
but if, while available to everybody, it leaves to every one a strong motive to 
do without it if he can, it is then for the most part beneficial. This principle, 
applied to a system of public charity, is that of the Poor Law of 1834.
(ibid.: 961)
Though highly sympathetic to the “desire that the conditions of relief should be 
made less onerous to those who wish to maintain themselves, but cannot, than to 
those who can, but will not,” Mill, at least “in regard to the able- bodied,” saw no 
way to render poor relief incentive- compatible “except by making the conditions 
such that no one will accept relief who can possibly do without it” (1991 [1848]: 
75; emphasis added). As Mill, alluding to the incentive- compatibility supposedly 
intrinsic to indoor relief, explains, “I can see at present no [other] means of 
sifting the one class [the truly indigent] from the other . . . I suspect that the 
present poor law is the best possible, as a mere poor law” (ibid.). Accordingly, 
universal poor relief (devoid by assumption of anything equivalent to the less- 
eligibility principle) and slavery had much in common. As Mill pointedly 
explained elsewhere: whenever the
condition of a person receiving relief is made as eligible as that of the 
labourer who supports himself by his own exertions, the system strikes at 
the root of all individual industry and self- government; and if fully acted up 
to, would require as its supplement an organized system of compulsion, for 
governing and setting to work like cattle, those who had been removed from 
the influence of the motives that act on human beings.
(Mill 1965: 961; emphasis added)37
As we shall see, Mill (1986 [1846]: 1005) – vehemently objecting to G. P. 
Scrope’s suggested palliative for Irish poverty (Scrope urged Parliament to 
guarantee “food and employment” to the peasantry) – deemed his counsel 
A renovated social fabric  93
particularly applicable in the Irish context: Theory and experience alike judged 
Scrope’s plan signally wanting:
No measure calculated to be of use to Ireland has a chance of effect unless 
the exertions of the people are called forth with considerable intensity to co- 
operate with it. With their present habits, the only motive which is found 
sufficient to produce any real exertion . . . is the fear of destitution. From that 
fear it is proposed permanently to relieve them. What other motive is to be 
provided? It must be force; for reason and experience are equally against 
the wild idea that even a much more industrious people than the Irish will 
work with any efficacy for employers who are not permitted to dismiss 
them, unless it be like slaves, under compulsion.
(ibid.: 1006; emphasis added)38
In Mill’s view, cottier tenure – the system governing land tenure in Ireland – was 
the “worst economical system that afflicts any country not cursed with actual 
slavery” (ibid.: 896). As Mill explained, “[n]either the economical nor the moral 
evils” afflicting Ireland would “admit of any considerable alleviation while that 
baneful system continues” (ibid.: 889; emphasis added). Accordingly, any 
scheme for “Irish regeneration . . . [that was] not the merest mockery of Irish 
evils” would wholly extirpate (ibid.: 892) the “radically diseased” (ibid.: 920) 
cottier regime. Mill maintains that any institutional change of the type finding 
favor with the Times and its parliamentary allies has the “smallest chance of 
being efficacious” (1965: 366): Outdoor relief and public employment schemes 
operate in markedly perverse fashion on “the minds and habits of the people” 
(ibid.). Adoption of such schemes would ultimately reduce the Irish peasantry to 
de facto slavery.
 Importantly, Mill identifies three basic proposals for supposedly solving the 
problems of Ireland. First, Mill points to a variety of schemes advocating the 
introduction of large- scale agriculture on the English model. Mill argued that the 
adoption of such proposals would generate a terrible non- convexity (1986 
[1846]: 895): Though Ireland “may in time” (ibid.: 894; emphasis added) be able 
to adequately maintain a larger population, the short- run consequences were hor-
rific.39 The scheme “must begin by ejecting the peasantry of a tract of country 
from the land they occupy” (ibid.). Hence, “[f]or a time, its sole tendency is to 
aggravate the evil which it is expected to cure” (ibid.; emphasis added): as Mill 
explains, large- scale “clearance of estates . . . is synonymous with turning out the 
population to starve” (ibid.: 900). As Mill, writing to Comte, similarly notes, 
adoption of the English model would “eliminate almost half the working popula-
tion of our day” (1995 [1847]: 384). Second, Mill points to various schemes for 
inducing extensive emigration: Mill pointedly notes that options one and two 
“are schemes for getting rid of the people” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 898). Finally, Mill 
notes various schemes for providing outdoor relief to the peasantry: as Mill 
explains, his favored solution – reclamation of the wastelands by the peasantry 
themselves – is not only less costly in monetary terms than options two and 
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three, but – and in stark contrast to option three (let alone the terrible non- 
convexity inherent to option one) – would permanently improve the condition of 
the Irish peasantry. Accordingly, Mill, objecting to lavish outdoor relief and 
cottier tenure alike, favored wholesale change in the system governing land 
tenure.
Institutional change in Ireland: cottier tenure and peasant 
proprietorship?
As ever, Malthusian and moral concerns are intimately conjoined in Mill’s scath-
ing condemnation of cottier tenure.40 Mill argues that only a mighty change in 
the “incentive” structure (broadly understood) will adequately induce any salu-
tary, and permanent, improvement in the material and moral condition of the 
Irish peasantry: the replacement of cottier tenure by a system of peasant proprie-
torship would, via the workings of the laws of association, greatly attenuate Irish 
poverty and make “new men” of the cottiers.41 Mill’s pointed condemnation of 
cottier tenancy primarily lay in his recognition that the prevailing incentive 
structure had reduced the private marginal cost of larger family size to zero. 
Accordingly, any incentive to practice prudential restraint in marriage had 
vanished.
 Mill explains the logic supposedly inherent to a cottier regime thusly: in any 
country where “the labouring population have no property, their condition 
depends upon the intensity of the competition for employment” (1986 [1846]: 
889). Consequently, population growth in England would, other things equal, 
necessarily reduce wages. Under any cottier regime, however, “overpopulation” 
would supposedly produce “its effect by . . . raising rent” (ibid.).42 In particular, 
the Irish peasantry, rather than starve, would supposedly “undertake to pay more 
than it is possible they should pay, and when they have paid almost all they can, 
more almost always remains due” (Mill 1965: 317): The vigorous competition 
“for land . . . forces up rent to the highest point consistent with keeping the popu-
lace alive” (ibid.: 314; emphasis added).43 Hence, any incentive to practice pru-
dential restraint in marriage is markedly attenuated: voluntary restraint in 
marriage, rather than improving the miserable lot of the cottier family, would 
merely leave more for the landlord to take (ibid.: 318). Accordingly, it is imma-
terial whether the cottier has two or “twenty children” (ibid.): They “would still 
be fed first, and the landlord could only take what was left” (ibid.).44 Moreover, 
the perverse and “radically diseased” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 920) incentive structure 
had baneful consequences for whatever inducement the hapless cottier tenant 
might otherwise have to increase productivity or improve the land: the cottier 
neither gaining “by any amount of industry or prudence,” nor losing “by any 
recklessness” whatsoever (1965: 318). Any increase in productivity would 
merely result in higher rents.45 Accordingly, the abject moral and material degra-
dation of the “largest portion of the Irish peasantry” (ibid.: 317) was mutually 
reinforcing: the peasantry repeatedly revolving in a markedly “wretched round 
of poverty and recklessness, recklessness and poverty” (1986 [1846]: 1005). 
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Similarly, the habitual standard of comfort “enjoyed” by the cottier peasantry is 
at a minimum; their habitual standard of comfort would not bear any reduction 
per se (Mill 1965: 317). As Mill explains, cottier tenure is undeniably the 
“GRAND ECONOMICAL EVIL OF IRELAND” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 889).46
 Mill’s favored institutional remedy for Irish poverty was peasant proprietor-
ship.47 In particular, Mill argued that peasant proprietorship provided much 
inducement to practice prudential restraint in marriage: “against over- population 
. . . [peasant proprietorship] is the best preservative yet known” (1965: 327).48 
Similarly, acquisition of a “permanent interest in the soil” (ibid.) – perpetuity of 
tenure – would provide the peasantry with adequate incentives to themselves 
improve their otherwise miserable lot. Indeed, peasant proprietorship would not 
merely induce a mighty improvement in the material well- being of the Irish 
peasantry: fixity of tenure – “a permanent interest in the land” (1986 [1846]: 
909) – would induce a salutary improvement in their moral character. As Mill 
notes, the moral and material well- being of the peasantry
are inseparable; both must be provided for by any plan of improvement 
deserving the name. Without the moral change, the greatest economical 
improvement will last no longer than a prodigal’s bounty; without the eco-
nomical change, the moral improvement will not be attained at all.
(ibid.: 907; emphasis added)49
As Mill, alluding to the manifestly low standard of comfort to which the unfor-
tunate Irish peasantry had become habituated, and clearly rejecting any sugges-
tion that regular wage labor per se would suffice to generate any salutary 
improvement in the moral and material well- being of the Irish peasantry, had 
explained:
The status of a day- labourer has no charm for infusing forethought, frugal-
ity, or self- restraint, into a people devoid of them. If the Irish peasantry 
could be universally changed into receivers of wages, the old habits and 
mental characteristics of the people remaining, we should merely see four 
or five millions of people living as day- labourers in the same wretched 
manner in which as cottiers they lived before . . . Far other would be the 
effect of making them peasant proprietors.
(Mill 1965: 326; emphasis added)50
Moreover, and in accordance with the tenets of associationist psychology (edu-
cation, broadly understood, shapes character), peasant proprietorship would 
supposedly
surround the peasant with a new moral atmosphere . . . [and] would bring a 
set of motives to operate upon him which he has never . . . experienced, 
tending in the strongest manner to correct everything in his national charac-
ter which needs correction. Without a change in the people, the most 
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beneficent change in their mere outward circumstances would not last a 
generation. You will never change the people unless you make themselves 
the instruments, by opening to them an opportunity to work out for them-
selves all the other changes. You will never change the people but by 
changing the external motives which act on them and shape their way of life 
from the cradle to the grave. . . . The real effective education of a people is 
given them by the circumstances by which they are surrounded. . . . What 
shapes the character is not what is purposely taught, so much as the unin-
tentional teaching of institutions and social relations. . . . Make it his interest 
to be industrious and prudent . . . And if you have inveterate habits of the 
contrary description to overcome, there is the more need of presenting the 
motives which tend to correct those habits in the shape in which they will be 
most intense and palpable.
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 955; emphasis added)
Mill – as in the later 1849–50 exchange with Thomas Carlyle over Negro slavery 
– vehemently rejected any suggestion that the Irish peasantry (or former slaves 
in the West Indies) were inherently, and supposedly immutably, indolent (a 
particularly popular explanation for Irish poverty during the 1840s).51 For Mill, 
the character and conduct of the Irish peasantry was induced and shaped by the 
prevailing incentive structure – molded by “institutions and social relations” 
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 955) – rather than attributable to race or nature per se.52 Con-
sequently, to improve the lot of the Irish peasantry one necessarily had to change 
the broad incentive structure: hence, fixity of tenure – the peasant could no 
longer be ejected at will by a rapacious landlord – would transform the once 
hapless cottier into a peasant proprietor. The peasantry would now “work and 
save for themselves alone. Their industry would be their own profit; their idle-
ness would be their own loss” (ibid.: 897). Moreover, the incentive structure 
would, by equating the marginal private and social costs associated with larger 
family size, induce prudential restraint: if the peasantry “multiplied imprudently, 
it would be at their own expense, no longer at the expense of the landlords.” 
Fixity of tenure would supposedly convert the once “indolent and reckless” 
peasantry “into a laborious, provident, and careful people” (ibid.).
 Though manifestly urging the introduction of peasant proprietorship in a 
“backward state of industrial improvement” (1965: 768), for example, Ireland, 
Mill did not consider peasant proprietorship per se – “a wide diffusion of prop-
erty in land” (ibid.: 767) – a global optimum or ideal.53 Mill’s advocacy of 
peasant proprietorship per se – “greatly preferable, in its . . . effects on human 
happiness, to hired labour [let alone cottier tenure] in any form in which it exists 
at present” (ibid.) – is sharply qualified. In particular, Mill argues that any popu-
lace already enjoying the signal advantages of large- scale production (a mani-
festly inapplicable consideration in the case of the hapless cottier peasantry), 
whether “in manufactures, or in agriculture,” “are not likely to recede from it” 
(ibid.: 768). Moral considerations take primacy: the “goal of industrial improve-
ment” should be something “better than to disperse mankind over the earth in 
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single families, each ruled internally . . . by a patriarchal despot . . . having 
scarcely any community of interest . . . with other human beings” (ibid.; emphasis 
added). Accordingly, peasant proprietorship – supposedly greatly inducing “pru-
dential foresight and self- government” – is inadequately conducive to the growth 
of “public spirit, generous sentiments . . . [and] true justice and equality” (ibid.). 
As Mill explains, “association, not isolation of interests is the school in which 
these excellences are nurtured” (ibid.; emphasis added). Accordingly, Mill’s ulti-
mate desideratum is a state of society where human beings are not placed in “a 
condition in which they will be able to do without one another” (ibid.). As Mill 
explains, he favors an industrial system – a system of worker co- operatives – 
where individuals “work with or for one another in relations not involving 
dependence” (ibid.; emphasis added): an industrial system retaining the signal 
advantages – “efficiency and economy” (ibid.: 769) – of large- scale production 
while not simultaneously dividing “the producers into two parties with hostile 
interests and feelings” (ibid.). As Mill rather pointedly notes elsewhere: the 
“only school of genuine moral sentiment is society between equals” (1984 
[1869]: 293). Ultimately, Mill places greater import on the behavioral and moral 
propensities supposedly induced by the trains of association allegedly inherent to 
any particular “social machinery” – for example, their tendency to induce greater 
selfishness or to otherwise retard and narrow the growth of sympathy (1965: 
210) – than on whatever material advantages are supposedly inherent to any par-
ticular social “machinery” per se.
 As we shall see, many of the themes appearing in Mill’s analysis of cottier 
tenure and peasant proprietorship reappear in his analysis of socialism. For 
instance, Mill – judging G. P. Scrope’s suggested plan for facilitating the recla-
mation of the Irish wastelands to be wanting (Scrope supposedly would have the 
“State . . . undertake the whole improvement of the land” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 912; 
emphasis added) – argues that the peasantry “themselves should do all the work 
of improvement” (e.g., erecting “houses and farm buildings”) aside from what 
simply “cannot be effectually done otherwise than by combined labour” (e.g., 
larger- scale drainage schemes): as Mill explains, by leaving the peasantry them-
selves to carry out much of the task of reclaiming the wastelands one would 
readily “sift the more energetic portion of the population from the rest, and dis-
criminate those in whose hands the experiment is most likely to thrive” (ibid.: 
913; emphasis added).
Systems of equality: universal poor relief writ large?
Mill’s analysis of socialism and communism – see, for example, the chapter “Of 
Property” (1965: 199–214) – is justly famous. Accordingly, this section will 
draw attention to some hitherto seemingly neglected aspects of Mill’s writings 
on socialism. In particular, the tenets of associationist psychology implicitly and 
repeatedly rear their head throughout Mill’s writings on socialism. That Mill 
argued that the choice between “individual agency in its best form” and “Social-
ism in its best form” would ultimately “depend mainly on one consideration . . . 
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which of the two systems is consistent with the greatest amount of human liberty 
and spontaneity” (ibid.: 208) is well- known. In particular, Mill worried whether 
“any asylum . . . for individuality of character” would remain under socialism, 
arguing that no society where “eccentricity is a matter of reproach, can be in a 
wholesome state” (ibid.: 209). Mill’s clear concern that communism might ulti-
mately prove inconsistent with that “multiform development of human nature, 
those manifold un- likenesses, that diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of 
intellectual points of view, which . . . are the mainspring of mental and moral 
progression” (ibid.), however, is largely the consequence of his adherence to the 
tenets of associationist psychology.
 Interestingly, Mill remarks that advocates of communism “usually find it 
necessary to provide that all should work by turns at every description of useful 
labour; an arrangement which, by putting an end to the division of employments, 
would sacrifice the principal advantage which co- operative production pos-
sesses” (1965 [1849]: 977). Mill’s attentions, however, are not primarily focused 
on the efficiency losses, important though they are, incurred by any wholesale 
rotation of labor: as per the tenets of associationist psychology, the wholesale 
rotation of labor would supposedly “impress” a uniformity of “character . . . on 
human nature” (ibid.: 978).54 Similarly, Mill – viewing heterogeneity (the diver-
sity of talents and character) rather more the child of circumstance (diversity is 
induced by the division of labor) than of nature per se – much regrets that under 
socialism any “identity of education and pursuits would tend to impress on all 
the same unvarying type of character; to the destruction of that multiform devel-
opment of human nature” (ibid.: 979).55 Indeed, the one signal advantage sup-
posedly enjoyed by the St. Simonian scheme is that it “does not propose that all 
should be occupied alike.” Therefore, “Society . . . would wear as diversified a 
face as it does now” (ibid.: 981; emphasis added). Intriguingly, Mill’s suggestion 
that the wholesale rotation of labor under socialism will induce uniformity of 
character only appears in the first (1848) and second (1849) editions of the Prin-
ciples. In later editions, however, Mill’s fear that public opinion (approbational 
incentives per se) might, as per the tenets of associationist doctrine, prove a 
markedly “tyrannical yoke” comes to the fore (1965: 209). Indeed, public 
opinion, while purportedly playing a vital role in attenuating opportunistic 
behavior under socialism, would mold and shape character: inducing a “tame 
uniformity of thoughts, feelings, and actions” (ibid.).56
 As we shall see, much of Mill’s analysis of socialism (and communism) in 
the various editions of the Principles focuses on what we might consider the 
“microeconomics” of socialism and communism. In particular, Mill wonders 
whether payment by vector (incentives under socialism) could adequately substi-
tute for payment by scalar (monetary incentives in a system of market 
exchange).57 Consequently, Mill analyzes the way in which approbational incen-
tives – praise and shame – and the greater extension of sympathy per se (suppos-
edly much induced by moral education and the institutional framework) might 
complement one another to adequately align incentives under socialism (e.g., 
inducing prudential restraint and high work effort).58 Accordingly, Mill reviews 
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the standard litany of objections – for example, low- powered work incentives 
and the supposed attenuation of any incentive to practice voluntary restraint in 
marriage – to “systems of equality” per se (socialism in the broad), prior to 
examining whether approbational incentives and public spirit might adequately 
substitute for the high- powered incentives allegedly inherent to private property 
and exchange. In particular, Mill argues that public opinion (approbational 
incentives) would play a greatly expanded role in attenuating opportunistic 
behavior (e.g., the alleged incentive to shirk under team production) under 
socialism.59 For instance, output is a common pool under communist arrange-
ments (1965: 203): hence, the private and social marginal costs associated with 
any increase in family size will supposedly more markedly diverge with 
increases in community size (see Levy 1992: 179). Consequently, the incentive 
structure would (other things equal) – and as per the standard Malthusian analy-
sis of systems of equality per se (e.g., Godwinian communism) – induce earlier 
marriage (or its equivalent) and thus supposedly induce greater population 
growth than would be the case under any otherwise equivalent private property 
regime (e.g., peasant proprietorship).
 As Mill – pointing to the singularly unhappy consequences following any 
marked divergence between the private and social costs associated with having a 
larger family – had explained in 1849:
There is enough and to spare for all who are born . . . there . . . cannot be 
enough for all who might be born . . . if every person born is to have an inde-
feasible claim to a subsistence from the common fund, there will presently 
be no more than a bare subsistence for anybody, and a little later there will 
not be even that.
(Mill 1985 [1849]: 349; emphasis added)
Hence,
although every one of the living brotherhood of humankind has a moral 
claim to a place at the table provided by the collective exertions of the race, 
no one of them has a right to invite additional strangers thither without the 
consent of the rest. If they do, what is consumed by these strangers should 
be subtracted from their own share.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
Accordingly, Mill deems the long- run viability of any communist scheme to 
necessitate that it adequately induce voluntary restraint in marriage. As Mill 
explains, public opinion could adequately align the private and social marginal 
costs of larger family size:
Another of the objections to Communism is similar to that, so often urged 
against poor- laws . . . prudential restraint on the multiplication of mankind 
would be at an end . . . But Communism is precisely the state of things in 
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which opinion might be expected to declare itself with greatest intensity 
against this kind of selfish intemperance.
(Mill 1965: 206; emphasis added)60
 Yet, and as Mill readily notes, communism per se has no particular advantage 
in grappling with the supposed Malthusian dilemma that cannot be similarly 
attained under a suitably reformed private property regime. Indeed, Mill takes 
pains to deny that Malthusian problems necessarily provided an insuperable 
obstacle to higher living standards under a system of market exchange: Mill – 
arguing that if any
prudent regulation of population be not reconcilable with the system of 
hired labour, the system is a nuisance and the grand object of economic 
statesmanship should be . . . to bring the labouring people under the influ-
ence of stronger and more obvious inducements to this kind of prudence, 
than the relation of workmen and employers can afford.
(Mill 1965: 373; emphasis added)
– is insistent that there is “no such incompatibility.” As Mill explains, the
causes of poverty are not so obvious at first sight to a population of hired 
labourers as they are to one of [peasant] proprietors, or as they would be to 
a socialist community. They are, however, in no way mysterious.
(Mill 1965: 373–4; emphasis added).
 As Mill recognizes, any supposed reputational solution to the Malthusian 
problem would – under a system of market exchange (truly a large- numbers col-
lective action problem relative to any socialist experiment on the scale of a 
village or small town) – confront a seemingly insuperable free- rider problem. As 
Mill explains:
We are often told that the most thorough perception of the dependence of 
wages on population will not influence the conduct of a labouring man, 
because it is not the children he himself can have that will produce any 
effect in generally depressing the labour market.
(Mill 1965: 371; emphasis added)
“True,” Mill remarks, and
it is also true, that one soldier’s running away will not lose the battle; accord-
ingly it is not that consideration which keeps each soldier in his rank: it is the 
disgrace which naturally and inevitably attends on conduct by any one indi-
vidual, which if pursued by a majority, everybody can see would be fatal. Men 
are seldom found to brave the general opinion of their class.
(ibid.: 371–2; emphasis added)
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Accordingly, we can readily infer why Mill – deeming socialism readily practi-
cable only on the “scale of Mr. Owen’s or M. Fourier’s villages” (1967 [1879]: 
738) – would consider public opinion to have much capacity to induce an ade-
quate degree of prudential restraint under socialism.
 Mill readily cedes that output, whether under socialism or full- blown com-
munism, is a common pool (markedly so under communism). As Mill, alluding 
to the particularly acute 1/n problem supposedly plaguing production under full- 
blown communism, explains:
The objection ordinarily made to a system of community of property and 
equal distribution of the produce, that each person would be incessantly 
occupied in evading his fair share of work, points, undoubtedly, to a real 
difficulty. But those who urge this objection, forget to how great an extent 
the same difficulty exists under the system on which nine- tenths of the busi-
ness of society is now conducted. The objection supposes, that honest and 
efficient labour is only to be had from those who are themselves individually 
to reap the benefit of their own exertions. But how small a part of all the 
labour performed in England, from the lowest- paid to the highest, is done 
by persons working for their own benefit. . . . A factory operative has less 
personal interest in his work than a member of a Communist association, 
since he is not, like him, working for a partnership of which he is himself a 
member.
(Mill 1965: 203–4; emphasis added)
Elsewhere, Mill similarly argued that while ordinary workers would, under Com-
munism, supposedly “have no interest . . . except their share of the general interest, 
in doing their work honestly and energetically . . . in this respect matters would be 
no worse than they now are in regard to the great majority of the producing 
classes” (1967 [1879]: 742; emphasis added). Again, however, whatever advan-
tages may be attained under communism are similarly attainable “by arrangements 
compatible with private property and individual competition” (ibid.: 743; emphasis 
added). For instance, Mill suggests that considerable improvement is “already 
obtained by piece- work, in the kinds of labour which admit of it” (ibid.); similarly, 
“industrial partnership” – profit- sharing (“a remedy far more complete than piece- 
work for the disadvantages of hired labour”) – would allegedly provide the labor-
ing classes with much inducement to “zealous exertion” (ibid.).61
 Mill consistently argues that socialist associations would have inadequate 
incentives to adopt new technologies and managerial techniques. For Mill, 
socialist associations would be overly risk- averse. Accordingly, individual 
owners, enjoying full residual- claimancy status, would supposedly prove “more 
likely [than any socialist association] to commence things previously untried” 
(Mill 1965: 793; emphasis added). Mill attached much significance to the 
advantages supposedly inherent to “[u]nity of authority” (ibid.: 792). Accord-
ingly, any private capitalist – largely “exempt from the control of a body” and 
having full residual- claimancy status – is supposedly much “more likely than . . . 
102  A. Farrant
any association [co- operative or socialist] to run judicious risks” (ibid.: 793).62 
Mill takes much the same stance in the “Chapters on Socialism” (Mill 1967 
[1879]: 739): any manager – the agent of the community (the principal) – 
wanting to adopt a new technology or introduce a new efficiency- enhancing 
organizational technique would have to adequately convince a “numerous” and 
overly risk- averse “body to make a change in their accustomed mode of 
working” (ibid.: 741). As Mill explains, any “risk” would appear rather “more 
obvious to their minds than . . . [any] advantage,” thus greatly intensifying any 
inherent “tendency to keep things in their accustomed track” (ibid.).63
 As Mill puts it, socialists generally “overlook the natural indolence of 
mankind; their tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to persist indef-
initely in a course once chosen” (Mill 1965: 795; emphasis added). Con-
sequently, Mill argues that even
confining ourselves to the industrial department, in which, more than in any 
other, the majority may be supposed to be competent judges of improve-
ments; it would be difficult to induce the general assembly of an association 
to submit to the trouble and inconvenience of altering their habits by adopt-
ing some new and promising invention.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
Accordingly, competition – while maybe not “the best conceivable stimulus” per 
se – is deemed “a necessary one . . . and no one can foresee the time when it will 
not be indispensable to progress” (ibid.; emphasis added).
 Ultimately, Mill places heavy weight on the part that public spiritedness per se – 
ideally much induced by envisaged improvements in moral education – would sup-
posedly play in complementing public opinion to render any socialist regime 
incentive- compatible. As Mill notes, the “motive powers in the economy of society” 
(1967 [1879]: 739) would be supposedly much strengthened by the “incentives of 
public spirit, of conscience, and of the honour and credit of the managers” (ibid.; 
emphasis added). Yet, and as Mill readily notes, the “force of these motives” mani-
festly varies “in different persons, and . . . [are] much greater for some purposes than 
for others” (ibid.). Hence, “experience” teaches that the motives “of conscience . . . 
credit and reputation” are more to “be depended on for preventing wrong, than for 
calling forth the fullest energies in the pursuit of ordinary occupations” (ibid.: 
739–40). As Mill notes, to suppose anything like “the contrary would be to imply 
that with men as they now are, duty and honour are more powerful principles of 
action than personal interest . . . which no one, I suppose, will affirm” (ibid.: 740). 
Accordingly, moral considerations come to the fore:
[U]nless we are operating upon a select portion of the population . . . per-
sonal interest will for a long time be a more effective stimulus to the most 
vigorous and careful conduct of the industrial business of society than 
motives of a higher character.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
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Ultimately, the practicability of socialist schemes supposedly requires a
high standard of both moral and intellectual education in all members of the 
community – moral, to qualify them for doing their part honestly and ener-
getically in the labour of life under no inducement but their share in the 
general interest of the association . . . intellectual, to make them capable of 
estimating distant interests and entering into complex considerations.
(ibid.: 746)
As Mill, placing much weight on the necessity to subject socialist experiments to 
adequate trial, concludes:
[O]ur review of the various difficulties of Socialism has led us to the con-
clusion . . . [that such institutions] are at present workable only by the elite 
of mankind, and have yet to prove their power of training mankind at large 
to the state of [moral] improvement which . . . [such institutions] 
presuppose.
(ibid.: 748)64
Accordingly, Mill’s ultimate conclusions regarding the purported advantages of 
socialism or communism are rather less than sanguine: “as far as concerns the 
motives to exertion in the general body, Communism has no advantage which 
may not be reached under private property, while as respects the managing 
heads it is at a considerable disadvantage” (ibid.: 743; emphasis added).
Training mankind: the long and difficult apprenticeship?
For Mill, “education” is never interpreted in a purely narrow sense (formal 
schooling per se). Rather, Mill invokes “education” to denote all the trains of 
association that operate to mold and shape human character. As Mill explained 
in 1845:
Whatever acts upon the minds of the labouring classes, is properly their edu-
cation . . . [T]heir minds . . . are acted upon by the whole of their social cir-
cumstances; and often the part of their education which is least efficacious 
as such, is that which goes by the name.
(Mill 1967 [1845]: 376; emphasis added)
As noted above, Mill – placing much hope on the way in which public opinion 
would supposedly induce prudential restraint under socialism – had noted that 
public opinion could similarly induce a marked homogeneity of character and 
outlook (1965: 208). Indeed, Mill considers it moot as to whether “ideal” public 
opinion and “actual” public opinion per se have much resemblance to one 
another. For example, Mill argues that “[r]eligion, morality, and statesmanship 
have [all] vied with one another” in providing “incitements . . . to the 
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multiplication of the species” (ibid.: 368), thus greatly exacerbating any Malthu-
sian dilemma; indeed, “over- indulgence” – lack of voluntary restraint in mar-
riage – is supposedly “as much caused by the stimulus of opinion as by the mere 
animal propensity” per se (ibid.: 371; emphasis added). To remove “this facti-
tious stimulus,” public opinion, supposedly heavily influenced for the better by 
improvements in moral education, must turn “itself into an adverse direction” 
(ibid.).
 Ideally, moral education would closely align praiseworthiness per se with the 
bestowal and receipt of actual praise. As James Mill had explained, “in minds 
happily trained, the love of Praiseworthiness, the dread of Blameworthiness, is a 
stronger feeling, than the love of actual Praise, the Dread of actual Blame” 
(1869: 298; emphasis added). As J. S. Mill himself (in editorial notes to an 1869 
edition of his father’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind) – placing 
much weight on his father’s distinction between love of “Praiseworthiness” per 
se and love of “actual Praise” – aptly puts it, moral education – “favourable cir-
cumstances” – would generate a powerful association “between deserving praise 
and obtaining it” (ibid.; emphasis added). Accordingly, moral education would 
ideally induce a strongly felt desire to merit “praiseworthiness” per se rather than 
mere “praise.” Indeed, the blandishments of pure “praise” per se may or may not 
provide adequate inducement for behavior that is congruent with the social inter-
est. Hence, moral education – and as per the laws of association – could poten-
tially provide an adequately countervailing weight to the “direct motive of 
obtaining praise where it is to be obtained by other means than desert” (ibid.: 
299; emphasis added). As James Mill had put it, in a mind “happily trained . . . 
the secondary feeling [desire to be praiseworthy per se] . . . [would become] more 
powerful than the primary [desire for praise per se]” (ibid.: 298).
 Yet, and as Mill notes, any requisite improvements in moral education are 
“necessarily very gradual . . . the future generation is educated by the present, 
and the imperfections of the teachers set an invincible limit to the degree in 
which they can train their pupils to be better than themselves” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 
740). As Mill, writing to Harriet Taylor in 1849, puts it:
I cannot persuade myself that you do not greatly overrate the ease of making 
people unselfish. Granting that in “ten years” the children of a community 
might by teaching be made “perfect” it seems to me that to do so there must 
be perfect people to teach them.
(Mill 1965: 1030)
Accordingly, the workability of any socialist schemes requires “qualities both 
moral and intellectual, which require to be tested in all, and to be created in 
most . . . this cannot be done by an Act of Parliament, but must be . . . a work of a 
considerable time” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 750; emphasis added). As Mill similarly 
remarked in 1845: any “change from wrong to right . . . is not so easy to make, as 
to wish for, and to talk about . . . Society . . . has a long and difficult apprentice-
ship yet to serve” (Mill 1967 [1845]: 366; emphasis added).
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 Mill, placing much weight on moral education per se, places similarly heavy 
weight on the lessons taught by experimental trial. As Mill would later note, co- 
operative experiments would provide the laboring classes with “a course of edu-
cation in those moral and active qualities by which alone success can be either 
deserved or attained” (1965: 793; emphasis added). Accordingly, every
theory of social improvement, the worth of which is capable of being 
brought to an experimental test, should be permitted, and even encouraged, 
to submit itself to that test. From such experiments the active portion of the 
working classes would derive lessons . . . [and obtain] the means of correct-
ing . . . whatever is now erroneous in their notions of the means of establish-
ing their independence; and of discovering the conditions, moral, 
intellectual, and industrial, which are indispensably necessary for effecting 
. . . the social regeneration they aspire to.
(ibid.: 903–4; emphasis added)
Thus, the “best interests of the human race imperatively require that all economi-
cal experiments, voluntarily undertaken, should have the fullest license” (ibid.: 
934).65 As Mill – viewing socialism as clearly impractical on anything other than 
a small scale – notes, the spread of worker owned and worker managed firms 
would provide “the nearest approach to social justice, and the most beneficial 
ordering of industrial affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at 
present to foresee” (ibid.: 794; emphasis added).
 Mill’s reference to social justice is guaranteed to rankle with any Hayekian 
(see, e.g., Hayek 1978: 63–4, 176). Yet, and as we shall see, Hayek and Mill 
have starkly incongruent views of social justice. For Hayek, social justice is a 
meaningless concept: it would only make sense if any supposed social or distrib-
utive injustice were an intended consequence of human will per se. Accordingly, 
inequalities of wealth or income are neither just nor unjust. As Samuel Hollander 
has rightly noted, Mill’s “overriding concern” was social justice (Hollander 
1985: 826). For Mill, social justice is interpreted as “equality of opportunity” 
writ large; institutions and laws ought to weight each individual’s happiness 
equally. Hayek seemingly considers Mill’s advocacy of social justice to imply 
that government has a supposedly binding obligation to attain a particular – and 
ostensibly lexicographically weighted – pattern of income distribution per se. 
Accordingly, Hayek considers social justice to imply full- blown command plan-
ning. As we shall see, the evidence provides much support for Hollander’s 
reading of Mill.66
Social justice and the difficulties of communism: dust in the 
balance?
Much of the reason why Hayek is less than enamored – to put it mildly – with 
Mill is the result of Hayek’s sharp objections to Mill’s views on the subject of 
social and distributive justice: for Hayek, “only situations which have been 
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created by human will can be called just or unjust . . . [hence] a spontaneous 
order [e.g., a market economy] cannot be just or unjust” (Hayek 1978: 33; 
emphasis added). For Hayek, justice (or injustice) is an attribute of human 
conduct and intentions per se (ibid.: 62). Consequently, Hayek – taking much 
umbrage at Mill’s allegedly spurious distinction between the laws supposedly 
governing production and the laws governing distribution – argues that Mill’s 
“amazing assertion that one can explain production without examining what 
determines its direction and method” (Hayek 1983: 92) led Mill to supposedly 
maintain that as any
product . . . [is] available irrespective of the guiding factor of prices . . . it 
would become a matter of [the] arbitrary will of the owners of the given 
product which just was there to decide to whom it ought to go . . . This . . . 
became a moral problem which still left open whose moral duty it was to 
arrange the distribution.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
Accordingly, Mill – “vaguely aware that the classical conception of distributive 
justice, like all moral rules, applied only to the actions of persons” (ibid.; empha-
sis added) – supposedly “invented and . . . gave currency to the new conception 
of social justice . . . [thus] implying that society . . . ought to decide how . . . 
[given] resources ought to be shared” (ibid.; emphasis added).
 Hayek argued that to impute “justice” per se (or “injustice”) to any emergent, 
or spontaneous order (e.g., a system of market exchange) would only have any 
genuine moral weight or meaning “in so far as we [could] hold someone respons-
ible for bringing it about” (Hayek 1978: 31; emphasis added). Thus, Hayek con-
siders it a serious “category mistake” (ibid.) to impute justice or injustice to any 
“circumstances other than human actions or the rules governing them” (ibid.; 
emphasis added). Hence, it is supposedly meaningless to impute the attribute of 
“justice” or “injustice” to any emergent, or spontaneously generated, pattern per 
se (e.g., a snowflake, or, and rather more pertinently, the pattern of income dis-
tribution in a market economy). For Hayek, the pattern of income distribution 
per se – the unintended consequence of myriad individual choices – can suppos-
edly be neither just nor unjust in any meaningful sense.
 Accordingly, Hayek (1978: 63) – noting Mill’s argument that
we should treat all equally well (when no higher duty forbids) who have 
deserved equally well of us, and that society should treat all equally well who 
have deserved equally well of it . . . This is the highest abstract standard of 
social and distributive justice; towards which all institutions, and the efforts 
of all virtuous citizens, should be made in the utmost degree to converge.
(Mill 1969 [1861]: 257; emphasis added)
– maintains that Mill is “wholly unaware” (Hayek 1978: 64) that “social” and 
“distributive” justice (ibid.: 63) could only really have any meaningful 
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applicability to an overall “factual state of affairs” – for example, a pattern of 
income distribution per se – that had “been brought about by deliberate human 
decision” (ibid.: 63–4; emphasis added). Thus, as Hayek explains, “social” or 
“distributive” justice (or injustice) could only have genuine meaning – and 
normative weight – when invoked to accord normative status to the pattern of 
income distribution in a wholly planned economy: an economy where the wage 
structure – along with all other prices and quantities – is manifestly the result of 
conscious human design. As Hayek puts it, “social justice” can “be given a 
meaning only in a . . . ‘command’ economy,” and “could be realized only in such 
a centrally directed system” (ibid.: 69; emphasis added).
 Accordingly, and as per Hayek’s reading of Mill’s supposedly sharp dichot-
omy between the laws governing production and the laws governing distribution 
– Hayek interpreting Mill to imply that the pattern of income distribution in any 
market economy is unjust per se – Hayek views Mill’s “conception of ‘social 
justice’ . . . [as inevitably leading] to full- fledged socialism” (1978: 64): As 
Hayek puts it, the attainment of social justice necessitates the wholesale “sup-
pression of individual freedom” (Hayek 1983: 93).67
 Hayek’s argument – whatever merits it may have per se (or lack of such) – 
and as implicitly suggested by Hollander (1985: 826), is inapplicable to Mill. 
For one thing, while Mill considered the laws of distribution manifestly pliable – 
“the manner in which wealth is distributed in any given society, depends on the 
statutes or usages therein obtaining” (Mill 1965: 21) – they could not be manipu-
lated and altered without changing incentives: as Mill explains, “governments . . . 
have the power of deciding what institutions shall exist . . . they cannot arbitrar-
ily determine how those institutions shall work” (ibid.; emphasis added).
 What of Mill’s view of social justice? As Hollander (1985: 826; emphasis 
added) rightly makes clear, “social justice . . . can be interpreted, as Mill came to 
interpret it, as the highest category of utility – and by which he understood 
respect for individuality to be satisfied by equality of opportunity.” Indeed, Mill 
– in the passage in Utilitarianism to which Hayek makes critical reference (1978: 
63) – makes abundantly clear that the “abstract standard of social and distribu-
tive justice” he had invoked is inextricably “involved in the very meaning of 
Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle . . . [Hence] one person’s happiness 
. . . is counted for exactly as much as another’s” (Mill 1969 [1861]: 257; empha-
sis added), Indeed, “[a]ll persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treat-
ment, except when some recognised social expediency requires the reverse” 
(ibid.: 258).
 As Mill tellingly notes, Bentham’s “dictum, ‘everybody to count for one, 
nobody for more than one’ . . . might be written under the principle of utility as 
an explanatory commentary” (Mill 1969 [1861]: 257). As Mill puts it elsewhere, 
abolition of cottier tenure would make the Irish “peasant [feel] . . . that he is 
somebody – that he counts for something on the earth – that he is also one of 
those for whose sake the institutions of society exist” (1986 [1846]: 913; empha-
sis added). Accordingly, anyone who sympathizes with the hapless cottier peas-
antry – “the people” per se – rather than merely with “great landlords” would 
108  A. Farrant
advocate peasant proprietorship: a “state of society in which . . . [the peasantry] 
count for something” (ibid.: 971; emphasis added). Mill’s essay “Endowments” 
(1967 [1869]: 615–29) is similarly telling:
Common justice requires . . . that in the employment of the endowments 
equal provision should be made for the education of both sexes . . . one girl 
ought to count for exactly as much as one boy . . . it is an essential part of a 
just scheme for the use of [endowments] . . . that the benefit of them should 
be given alike to girls and to boys, without preference or partiality.
(Mill 1967 [1869]: 628–9; emphasis added)
And as Mill, expanding on the particular passage in the essay on Utilitarianism 
to which Hayek took much exception (Hayek 1978: 63), explains:
The entire history of social improvement has been a series of transitions, 
by which one custom or institution after another, from being a supposed 
. . . necessity of social existence, has passed into the rank of an universally 
stigmatized injustice and tyranny. So it has been with the distinctions of 
slaves and freemen, nobles and serfs, patricians and plebeians; and so it 
will be, and in part already is, with the aristocracies of colour, race, and 
sex.
(Mill 1969 [1861]: 259; emphasis added)68
For Hayek, as already noted, a spontaneous order (e.g., a spontaneously gener-
ated path in the snow or a market economy) cannot be unjust: the overall pattern 
of income distribution is not the result of any individual’s intentions per se. As 
Hayek explains, it “is not the intended . . . result of somebody’s action that A 
should have much and B little . . . [hence] this cannot be called just or unjust” 
(Hayek 1978: 33; emphasis added). Mill takes a markedly opposite tack to 
Hayek: a spontaneous order – a private property regime where (to invoke 
Hayek’s notation) A has “much” and B has decidedly “little” (e.g., cottier tenure 
in Ireland) – can manifestly be deemed unjust. The supposed social injustice, 
however, is squarely rooted in the overall regime of grossly unfair rules and 
institutions (e.g., the laws governing land tenure in Ireland) that generate the 
baneful distributive outcome: the institutional regime (the governance structure 
broadly construed) manifestly places other than equivalent weight on the well- 
being of the cottier (B) and the well- being of the landlord (A). Indeed, Mill’s 
vehement disdain for “[t]hose who think that the land of a country exists for the 
sake of a few thousand landowners” rather than the majority of the populace 
(1965: 325; emphasis added) is readily apparent. As Mill acerbically notes, the 
generality of Irish landlords “do nothing for the land but drain it of its produce” 
(ibid.: 229).69
 Intriguingly, Mill – providing a moving eulogy for the late Harriet Taylor 
Mill (and tellingly pointing to the particular distributive ideal they jointly shared) 
– significantly notes in a letter to Louis Blanc:
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you, more than most men, can sympathize in the nobleness of her public 
objects, which never stopped short of perfect distributive justice as the final 
aim, implying therefore a state of society entirely communist in practice and 
spirit, whether also in institutions or not.
(Mill 1972 [1859]: 601; emphasis added)70
Yet, and as noted earlier, Mill considered industrial self- governance (worker co- 
operatives) to allow for as close an approach to social and distributive justice as 
could reasonably be attained within any private property regime. Industrial self- 
governance is deemed a readily attainable goal; as Mill rather appositely puts it 
in the posthumous “Chapters on Socialism”: the “best” aspects of “the old and 
the new . . . may be combined in a renovated social fabric” (1967 [1879]: 708).
 Importantly, Mill repeatedly alludes to the particular standard of distributive 
justice – the “proportioning of remuneration to labour” (1965: 210) – by which 
any private property regime is to be seemingly judged. Indeed, Mill, in a note-
worthy passage initially appearing in the 1852 edition of The Principles, argues 
that to ultimately judge
the institution of property, we must suppose everything rectified, which 
causes the institution to work in a manner opposed to that equitable prin-
ciple, of proportion between remuneration and exertion, on which in every 
vindication of it that will bear the light, it is assumed to be grounded.
(1965: 208; emphasis added)
As Mill – pointing to the way in which the “progress of society” (in a private 
property regime) allows non- improving landlords to “grow richer, as it were in 
their sleep, without working, risking, or economizing” (ibid.: 819; emphasis 
added) – sharply notes, “What claim have they, on the general principle of social 
justice, to this accession of riches?” (ibid.: 820; emphasis added).
 Accordingly, Mill judges particular institutional arrangements per se (e.g., cottier 
tenure in Ireland) unjust because the pattern of income distribution is too heavily 
influenced by mere accidents of birth – the manifestly unfair “chapter of accidents” 
(1965: 212) – than by individual industry and frugality per se. Similarly, in stating 
that the “very idea of distributive justice, or of any proportionality between success 
and merit, or between success and exertion, is in the present state of society so 
manifestly chimerical as to be relegated to the regions of romance” (1967 [1879]: 
714; emphasis added), Mill is locating the supposed distributive injustice in the 
overall framework of laws and institutions – the prevailing “social arrangements” 
(ibid.: 713) tend to generate an inequitable pattern of income distribution, idle and 
non- improving landlords per se are amply rewarded while the mass of the laboring 
populace receive markedly little. As Mill notes, a “few are born to great riches, and 
the many to a penury” (ibid.: 710; emphasis added). Accordingly, the majority are 
“debarred by the accident of birth . . . from the enjoyments . . . which others inherit 
without exertion and independently of desert . . . this is an evil equal to almost any 
of those against which mankind have hitherto struggled” (ibid.; emphasis added).71
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 Consequently, any “socially just” governance structure would patently not priv-
ilege any particular individual or group per se (e.g., Irish landlords) at the manifest 
expense of another group’s well- being and happiness (e.g., the moral and material 
well- being of the Irish cottier peasantry). Accordingly, it is unclear why Hayek 
would interpret Mill’s advocacy of social justice as implying that Mill supposedly 
thought that government could readily change the laws governing distribution with 
impunity: the government supposedly manipulating distributive shares without 
having any impact whatsoever on incentives. Indeed, Mill is insistent that the
consequences . . . of the rules according to which wealth may be distributed 
. . . are as little arbitrary . . . as the laws of production . . . Society can subject 
the distribution of wealth to whatever rules it thinks best: but what practical 
results will flow from the operation of those rules must be discovered . . . by 
observation and reasoning.
(Mill 1965: 200, italics added)
Similarly, Mill is highly critical of any scheme whereby a governing authority 
(e.g., the ruling body – supposedly “persons of genius and virtue” (ibid.: 211) – 
under St. Simonian socialism) would have absolute authority to adjust and 
apportion individual rewards in accordance with whatever particular distributive 
criteria may have been adopted. As Mill makes clear, any attempt to attain dis-
tributive justice by such means is neither practicable per se nor desirable. As 
Mill – pointedly arguing against the “non- communistic Socialism known as St. 
Simonism” (ibid.: 210) – puts it:
[To] suppose that one or a few human beings . . . could . . . by whatever 
machinery of subordinate agency, be qualified to adapt each person’s work 
to his capacity, and proportion each person’s remuneration to his merits – 
to be, in fact, the dispensers of distributive justice to every member of a 
community; or that any use which they could make of this power would give 
general satisfaction, or would be submitted to without the aid of force – is a 
supposition almost too chimerical to be reasoned against . . . that a handful 
of human beings should weigh everybody in the balance, and give more to 
one and less to another at their sole pleasure and judgment would not be 
borne, unless from persons believed to be more than men, and backed by 
supernatural terror.
(ibid.: 211; emphasis added)
Moreover, and as Mill readily notes, the scheme would in all probability prove 
“a complete failure” and “supposes an absolute” – and patently undesirable – 
“despotism in the heads of the association” (ibid.).
 Similarly, Mill maintains that any attempt by a central authority or body to reg-
ulate wages (or distributive shares more generally) – for example, an authority 
arbitrating a wage dispute in a private property regime (1967 [1879]: 744) or 
attempting to fully attain an ostensibly equalitarian standard of distributive justice 
A renovated social fabric  111
(ibid.: 744–5) – would be fraught with difficulty and generate great social discord. 
In particular, Mill points to the multiple (and incompatible) standards of distribu-
tive justice which the parties involved in any wage dispute (or distributive dispute 
under communism) would surely invoke to legitimate their favored distributive 
outcome (see, e.g., Mill 1969 [1861]: 244). Consequently, Mill views the “com-
petition of the market” – the “rough method of settling the labourer’s share of the 
produce” – as a “practical necessity” (1969 [1865]: 341). As he explains:
civilization has not hitherto been equal to organizing anything better than 
this first rude approach to an equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the 
present go less wrong by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it 
artificially in any mode which has yet been tried.
(ibid.)
As noted earlier, Hayek himself cedes that one can readily apply the terms “just” 
and “unjust” – imputing normative status per se – to the “rules governing” indi-
vidual action (Hayek 1978: 31; emphasis added). Indeed, Hayek accepts the 
necessity to reconfigure “accepted rules” whenever legal evolution has spontane-
ously generated patently unjust consequences (1973: 89). As Hayek rightly 
notes, the laws governing the “relations between master and servant . . . landlord 
and tenant . . . [and] creditor and debtor . . . have [historically] been shaped 
largely by the views of one of the parties” (ibid.). Moreover, Hayek pertinently 
notes that in his initial “two” examples, “one of the groups concerned . . . almost 
exclusively supplied the judges” (ibid.; emphasis added). Indeed, as Hayek, 
quoting W. S. Jevons, aptly notes: “The great lesson” seemingly provided by 
650 years of English parliamentary legislation “is that legislation with regard to 
labour has almost always been class- legislation . . . the effort of some dominant 
body to keep down a lower class” (Jevons quoted in Hayek 1973: 168; emphasis 
added). Mill would agree (see, e.g., 1965: 929).
Social justice and equality of opportunity: Mill’s theory of 
non- competing groups
As noted earlier, Mill often invokes a particular and supposedly “equitable prin-
ciple of compensation” (1965: 383; emphasis added) when imputing normative 
status – whether justness per se or otherwise – to a private property regime.72 
This supposedly “equitable principle” would, Mill suggests, fully hold sway 
when workers were paid by the piece, as he explains:
Piece- work is the perfection of contract; and contract, in all work, and in the 
most minute detail – the principle of so much pay for so much service, 
carried out to the utmost extremity – is the system . . . in the present state of 
society and degree of civilisation, most favorable to the worker; though 
most unfavorable to the non- worker who wishes to be paid for being idle.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
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Similarly, “dislike . . .[of] piece work [per se] . . . except under mistaken notions, 
must be dislike to justness . . . a desire to cheat, by not giving work in proportion 
to pay” (ibid.: 783; emphasis added). As Mill notes, the “equitable principle, of 
proportion between remuneration and exertion” (ibid.: 208) is nothing less than 
what Adam Smith had “erroneously represented . . . as the general law of the 
remuneration of labour” (ibid.: 383; emphasis added). Importantly, Mill maintains 
that Smith’s supposed “law” governing remuneration – positing the “proportion-
ing of remuneration to work done” per se – is ostensibly “really just . . . [only] in 
so far as the more or less of the work is a matter of choice” (ibid.: 210; emphasis 
added). Accordingly, the theory of non- competing groups – barriers to occupa-
tional mobility unfairly carry much weight in determining relative wages per se – 
carries much weight when Mill imputes normative status to a private property 
regime. As Hollander rightly notes, Mill interprets social justice in a private prop-
erty regime to imply genuine equality of opportunity: accordingly, any private 
property regime where the logic of non- competing groups seemingly holds much 
sway – and gross inequality of opportunity is the norm – is prima facie unjust.
 As Mill notes, Adam Smith – implicitly supposing that individuals were 
homogenous (see Levy 2001: 209–13) – had supposed that wages would neces-
sarily “vary with the ease or hardship, the cleanliness or dirtiness, the honoura-
bleness or dishonourableness of the employment” (Smith 1852: 42). 
Accordingly, a collier (having a markedly unpleasant job) would, as per Smith’s 
theory of compensating differentials, receive higher remuneration than an identi-
cal laborer working in more agreeable conditions. As Mill, in a passage initially 
appearing in the 1852 edition, notes, the “inequalities of remuneration . . . sup-
posed to compensate for the disagreeable circumstances of particular employ-
ments . . . would . . . be natural consequences of perfectly free competition” 
(1965: 383). And as Mill notes, “between employments of about the same grade, 
and filled by nearly the same description of people” – the inequalities of remu-
neration (compensating differentials) Smith had envisaged – are generally “real-
ized in practice” (ibid.; emphasis added). Yet, and as Mill notes, “it is altogether 
a false view of the . . . facts, to present this as the relationship which generally 
exists between agreeable and disagreeable employments” (ibid.; emphasis 
added). Indeed, as Mill, alluding to non- competing groups, readily makes clear:
inequalities of wages are generally in an opposite direction to the equitable 
principle of compensation erroneously represented by Adam Smith as the 
general law of the remuneration of labour. The hardships and the earnings, 
instead of being directly proportional, as in any just arrangement of society 
they should be, are generally in an inverse ratio to one another.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
As Mill explains, the
more revolting the occupation, the more certain it is to receive the minimum 
of remuneration, because it devolves on the most helpless and degraded, on 
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those who from squalid poverty, or from want of skill and education, are 
rejected from all other employments.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
Accordingly, and “independently” of various legal restrictions upon entry and 
“other artificial monopolies,” there is supposedly “a natural monopoly in favor 
of skilled labourers against the unskilled, which makes the difference of reward 
[between the two groups] exceed . . . what is sufficient merely to equalize their 
[net] advantages” (ibid.: 386; emphasis added). Hence, unskilled labor – wanting 
in “skill and education” – cannot compete with skilled labor and inequality of 
opportunity is the norm: the “fact that a course of instruction is required, of even 
a low degree of costliness . . . suffices everywhere to exclude the great body of 
the laboring people from the possibility of any such competition” (ibid.; empha-
sis added). As Mill puts it, “so strongly marked [is] the line of demarcation, 
between the different grades of labourers as to be almost equivalent to an hered-
itary distinction of caste; each employment being chiefly recruited from the chil-
dren of those already employed in it” (ibid.: 387; emphasis added). Indeed, 
“unskilled labourers . . . remain from father to son in their pristine condition” 
(ibid.: 388; emphasis added).73
 As noted earlier, Mill’s judgment that the established private property regime 
is manifestly unjust places heavy normative weight on the logic of the theory of 
non- competing groups. For instance, in the essay “Endowments,” Mill, alluding 
to the “distinction of caste” which is seemingly – as per the theory of non- 
competing groups – the inevitable lot of the unskilled laborer, notes that the
real hardship of social inequalities to the poor . . . is not that men are 
unequal, but that they are born so; not that those who are born poor do not 
obtain the great objects of human desire unearned, but that the circum-
stances of their birth preclude their earning them . . . the higher positions in 
life . . . can not only be obtained by the rich . . . but . . . none, as a rule, except 
the rich, have it in their power to make themselves qualified.
(Mill 1967 [1869]: 628)
Hence, the provision of free higher education to every qualified
child of poor parents . . . would . . . [open that] power to him [or her] . . . and 
the feelings which give rise to Socialism would be in a great measure dis-
armed, in as much of them as is unreasonable or exaggerated, by this just 
concession to that in them which is rational and legitimate.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
At this juncture, I note Hayek’s pertinent reference to an argument that is oft- 
invoked to supposedly demonstrate the “injustice of the . . . market order” (1978: 
91–2): the argument “that the most unpleasant jobs are commonly also the worst 
paid” (ibid.: 92). For Hayek:
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the only assumption on which it could be represented as just that the miner 
working underground . . . should be paid more highly than those engaged in 
more pleasant occupations, would . . . be that this was necessary to induce a 
sufficient number of persons to perform [this task] . . . or that [a central 
authority had] . . . deliberately assigned [them] to [this task].
(ibid.: 92–3; emphasis added)
And significantly, Hayek argues that while it may, in a market economy, “be a 
misfortune to have been born . . . in a village where for most the only chance of 
making a living is fishing . . . it does not make sense to describe this as unjust” 
(ibid.: 93; emphasis added). Mill would beg to differ: the mass of the Irish popu-
lace had scant choice other than the misery associated with cottier tenure. In the 
manifest absence of genuine equality of opportunity, the “great majority are 
what they were born to be” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 714). For Mill, this is clearly 
unjust. As noted earlier, however, any supposed injustice is the consequence of 
inequitable institutions per se: the laws of property unjustly privileging particu-
lar groups (e.g., landlords in Ireland and the already wealthy in England) while 
simultaneously reducing the moral and material well- being of the mass of the 
populace. As Mill puts it, the “laws of property . . . have not held the balance 
fairly between human beings, but have heaped impediments upon some, to give 
advantage to others; they have purposely fostered inequalities and prevented all 
from starting fair in the race” (1965: 207; emphasis added).74
 Any Hayekian – reading Mill’s statement that if a private property regime
necessarily carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of labour 
should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an inverse ratio to the 
labour . . . if this or Communism were the alternative, all the difficulties, 
great or small, of Communism would be as dust in the balance.
(ibid.: 207; emphasis added)
– might prematurely conclude that Mill is providing a blanket condemnation of 
private property per se.75 Indeed, alluding to the theory of non- competing groups, 
Mill notes that “[i]ndividuals need not be chained to an occupation” under com-
munism (ibid.: 209; emphasis added). Accordingly, the ostensible “restraints of 
Communism would be freedom in comparison with the present condition of the 
majority of the human race” (ibid.; emphasis added): As Mill explains, the “gen-
erality of labourers” per se have “as little choice of occupation . . . as they could 
. . . on any system short of actual slavery” (ibid.; emphasis added).76 Yet, and as 
Mill makes abundantly clear, “[it] is not by comparison with the present bad 
state of society that the claims of Communism can be estimated” (ibid.; empha-
sis added). Indeed, to “make the comparison applicable, we must compare Com-
munism at its best, with the regime of individual property, not as it is, but as it 
might be made” (ibid.: 207; emphasis added).
 Ultimately, Mill’s alleged “socialism” bears scant resemblance to the specter 
– “command planning” – haunting the imaginations of Mises and Hayek: as Mill 
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explains, “[t]he principle of private property has never yet had a fair trial in any 
country; and less so, perhaps, in this country than in some others” (Mill 1965: 
207). Consequently, the
object to be principally aimed at in the present stage of human improve-
ment, is not the subversion of the system of individual property, but the 
improvement of it, and the full participation of every member of the com-
munity in its benefits.
(ibid.: 214; emphasis added)77
As Mill puts it, “if all were done . . . by instruction and [by wise] legislation . . . [that 
would] diminish . . . inequality of opportunities . . . [any] differences of fortune 
arising from people’s own earnings could not justly give umbrage” (ibid.: 811; 
emphasis added). Accordingly, the “great end of social improvement” – one that is 
markedly congruent with co- operative associations and a private property regime – 
“should be to fit mankind by cultivation, for a state of society combining the great-
est personal freedom with that just distribution of the fruits of labour, which the 
present laws of property do not profess to aim at” (ibid.: xciii; emphasis added).
Conclusion
Lionel Robbins, generally a highly sympathetic and careful reader of Mill, notes 
an ostensibly serious (and potentially fatal) weakness in Mill’s analysis of social-
ism and worker co- operatives: as Robbins, alluding to the Hayekian knowledge 
problem, explains, Mill supposedly did not “discuss the mutual relations of these 
co- operative associations of the future . . . unless there is some solution of this 
problem the whole question of allocation of resources remains completely 
unsolved” (Robbins 1965: 159; emphasis added). As Mill, however, had readily 
explained in his otherwise sympathetic 1849 commentary on the Fourierist 
scheme, any “single Fourierist community” would merely be a “constituent” unit 
“of an organised whole . . . otherwise competition would [necessarily] rage as 
actively between individual communities as it now does between individual mer-
chants” (1965 [1849]: 985). Hence, and as Mill made abundantly clear, to totally 
do away with markets and competition would necessitate “nothing less . . . than 
the organisation from a single centre, of the whole industry of a nation, and even 
of the world” (ibid.; emphasis added). This is clearly impracticable. As Mill, 
viewing the Fourierist machinery as wholly “unmanageable” (ibid.: 984), 
explains:
we may, without attempting to limit the ultimate capabilities of human 
nature, affirm, that the political economist, for a considerable time to come, 
will be chiefly concerned with the conditions of existence and progress 
belonging to a society founded on private property and individual 
competition.
(ibid.: 985; emphasis added)78
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As Mill explains, “rude as is the manner in which” private property and competi-
tion adequately “apportion reward to exertion and to merit, they must form the 
basis of the principal improvements which can for the present be looked for in 
the economical condition of humanity” (ibid.: 985; emphasis added).79
 Intriguingly, Mill, in every edition of the Principles, consistently adheres to 
the following objection to full- blown communism (see, e.g., 1965: 206, 977):
[T]he perfect equality contemplated in the theory of the scheme could not 
be really attained. The produce might be divided equally, but how could the 
labour? There are many kinds of work, and by what standard are they to be 
measured against one another? Who is to judge how much cotton spinning, 
or distributing goods from the stores, or bricklaying, or chimney sweeping, 
is equivalent to so much ploughing? In the existing system of industry these 
things do adjust themselves with some, though but a distant approach to 
fairness.
(Mill 1965 [1849]: 977; emphasis added)80
Adam Smith famously argued that
[n]o society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the greater part 
of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity . . . that they who 
feed, clothe and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a 
share of the produce of their own labour as to be themselves tolerably well 
fed, clothed and lodged.
(Smith 1852: 33)
And as Samuel Hollander has rightly noted, Mill’s views have decidedly “much 
in common with Adam Smith’s celebrated formulation” (Hollander 1985: 826; 
emphasis added).
 Accordingly, private property and competition provided a largely “self- 
adjusting machinery” (Mill 1965 [1849]: 977; emphasis added). Moreover, that 
machinery – admittedly not touching “some of the grossest of the existing ine-
qualities of remuneration” (ibid.) – did, and in marked contrast to the “unman-
ageable nature of ” the Fourierist “machinery” (ibid.: 984), work in a fashion.81 
For Mill, social justice is to be attained by reforming the private property system 
– making it work in accordance with Smith’s “equitable principle of remunera-
tion” – rather than by outlawing it wholesale.
Notes
 1 “[Mill’s] ideas are to be encountered everywhere . . . they have become popular catch-
words. Everyone is familiar with them even if he is totally unacquainted with the 
author” (Mises 1981 [1922]: 154–5).
 2 As we shall see, Mill’s analysis of the incentive structure inherent to cottier tenancy – 
and in particular, its supposed impact on the private costs associated with larger 
family size – manifestly belies Hayek’s assertion that “Mill treated market values 
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[e.g., rents under the cottier system] exclusively as effects and not also as causes of 
human decisions” (1988: 93; emphasis added).
 3 As Hollander (1985: 813) aptly notes, syndicalism – when understood to imply (as 
per the Webbs’ usage) “the sewers for the sewage men”– is not a particularly accurate 
term for Mill’s favored co- operative associations.
 4 I have only found one occasion where Mill refers to “associations of workmen manu-
facturing on their own account” as an attempt “to carry Socialism into practical 
effect” (1965: 210).
 5 The chapters were written in 1869 and published after Mill’s death by his stepdaugh-
ter, “Helen Taylor, who can certainly be trusted not to have released anything which 
did not do justice to his most mature views” (Robbins 1967: xxxix).
 6 Mill’s “philosophic Socialists” advocated a “new order of society, in which private 
property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action 
substituted . . . and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such 
self- acting units” (1967 [1879]: 737).
 7 Mill argues that English socialists “are not likely to rush headlong into the reckless 
extremities of some of the foreign Socialists, who . . . proclaim themselves content to 
begin by simple subversion, leaving the subsequent reconstruction to take care of 
itself ” (1967 [1879]: 709).
 8 Elsewhere, Mill remarks that the
reasonable objections to socialism . . . [are] altogether practical, consisting in 
difficulties to be surmounted . . . their removal must be a work of thought and dis-
cussion, aided by progressive experiments, and by the general moral improvement 
of mankind, through good government and education.
(1967 [1851]: 444; emphasis added)
In the 1848 edition of the Principles, Mill remarks that
nothing tends more to the mental development of the working classes than that all 
the questions which Communism raises should be largely and freely discussed by 
them; nothing could be more instructive than that some should actually form com-
munities, and try practically what it is to live without the institution of property.
(1965: 764)
 9 “[I]f appearances can be trusted the animating principle of too many of the revolution-
ary Socialists is hate . . . which would vent itself by putting an end to the present system 
at all costs” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 749). Moreover, implementation of the revolutionary 
socialist scheme would necessitate the “management of the whole productive resources 
of the country by one central authority, the general government” (ibid.: 737).
10 A “mixed agricultural and manufacturing association of from two thousand to four thou-
sand inhabitants under any tolerable circumstances of soil and climate would be easier 
to manage than many a joint stock company” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 738–9).
11 Also see Mill’s letters to Adolf Soetbeer (Mill 1972 [1852]: 85) and Karl Rau (ibid.: 
87).
12 Mill argues that socialism places greater demands “than those of any other system 
upon the intelligence and morality of the individual citizen” (1967 [1879]: 745).
13 The theory of dependence contends that it is the
duty of every owner of land, not only to see that all who dwell and work thereon 
are fed, clothed, and housed, in a sufficient manner; but to be, in so full a sense, 
responsible for their good conduct, as to indemnify all other persons for any 
damage they do, or offence they may commit.
(Mill 1967 [1845]: 373)
Mill, in an 1847 letter to Auguste Comte, is highly critical of the tenets of the theory 
of dependence (1995 [1847]: 382–4).
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14 The so- called protectors are now the only persons against whom, in any ordinary 
circumstances, protection is needed . . . No man or woman who either possesses or 
is able to earn an independent livelihood, requires any other protection than that 
which the law could and ought to give.
(Mill 1965: 761)
15 This theme appears throughout Mill’s writings: he consistently adheres to the view 
that the “efficiency of industry may be expected to be great, in proportion as the fruits 
of industry are insured to the person exerting it” (Mill 1965: 114). As he notes,
Industry and frugality cannot exist, where there is not a preponderant probability 
that those who labour and spare will be permitted to enjoy. And the nearer this 
probability approaches to certainty, the more do industry and frugality become 
pervading qualities in a people.
(ibid.: 707)
16 Mill decries the undemocratic nature of the capitalist firm: “The many who do the 
work . . . [are] mere servants under the command of the one who supplies the funds” 
(1965: 769; emphasis added). Similarly, the “workpeople [are] . . . without a voice in 
the management” of the capitalist firm (ibid.: 775; emphasis added).
17 Tocqueville might be reporting what he picked up in correspondence with Senior over 
the supposed incentive- incompatibility of universal poor relief:
Through their Poor Laws, the English have immobilized a sixth of their popula-
tion. They have bound it to the earth like the medieval peasantry. Then, man was 
forced against his will to stay on the land where he was born.
(Tocqueville 1997 [1837]: 33; emphasis added)
18 Women employed in factories are the only women in the labouring rank of life 
whose position is not that of slaves and drudges; precisely because they cannot 
easily be compelled to work and earn wages in factories against their will.
(Mill 1965: 953)
19 The “would- be revivers of old times which they do not understand” inadequately 
recognize that any “guarantee of subsistence can only be practically kept up, when 
work is enforced and superfluous multiplication restrained by at least a moral compul-
sion” (Mill 1965: 762). Similarly, the “apostles of the new theory” do not understand 
that it is impossible to combine “the liberty of action of independent citizens, with the 
immunities of slaves” (Mill 1967 [1845]: 374).
20 As Levy pertinently notes, classical political economy presupposes that in “a world 
without effective mechanical contraception [or voluntary self- restraint] children will 
regularly follow marriage” (Levy 1992: 189). Families have an incentive to practice 
prudential restraint in marriage (whether by using mechanical contraception or by 
having sex less frequently) whenever the private and social costs of larger family size 
are approximately equal at the margin. The private costs associated with larger family 
size are simply the amount of parental consumption that is forgone when additional 
offspring are born. Institutional change can potentially induce greater divergence 
between the private and social costs associated with larger family size. Similarly, 
institutional change can potentially more closely align the two.
21 As Mill explains:
The complaint is, not that there is no improvement, but that there is not improve-
ment enough – that wages which, with greater restraint on population, might be as 
high as in America, are kept down by too rapid multiplication. Malthusians would 
deplore that the advancement constantly taking place in the arts of life, and the 
good which may be expected from improved social institutions, and a better distri-
bution of the fruits of labour, should be nullified for practical purposes, by serving, 
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as such things have always hitherto done, to increase the numbers of the labouring 
class much more than to improve their condition
(Mill 1967 [1851]: 449–50)
Similarly, “improved distribution, and a large remuneration of labour . . . [are] the two 
desiderata” (Mill 1965: 758).
22 To give profusely to the people, whether under the name of charity or of employ-
ment, without placing them under such influences that prudential motives shall act 
powerfully upon them, is to lavish the means of benefiting mankind, without 
attaining the object.
(Mill 1965: 359)
23 Mill wryly remarks that while “minds are coarse they require coarse stimuli, and let 
them have them” (1965: 754).
24 “Associationism was for Mill what he said Comte’s version of history was for the 
French thinker, ‘the key to [his] other generalizations . . . the backbone of his philo-
sophy’ . . . It was one of those ‘ultimate truths’ upon which other truths depend” (Car-
lisle 1991: 20). “The mind is a blank slate in which experiences are conjoined together 
to form pleasurable or painful associations” (Sheth 2004: 107). Mill explained that in
psychology, his [father’s] fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human 
character by circumstances, through the universal Principle of Association, and 
the consequent unlimited possibility of improving the moral and intellectual con-
dition of mankind by education. Of all his doctrines none was more important 
than this, or needs more to be insisted on.
(1989: 95–6; emphasis added)
25 As James Mill put it:
How few men seem to be at all concerned about their fellow- creatures! How com-
pletely are the lives of most men absorbed, in the pursuits of wealth and ambition! 
With how many men does the love of Family, of Friend, of Country, of Mankind, 
appear completely impotent, when opposed to their love of Wealth, or of Power! 
This is an effect of misguided association, which requires the greatest attention in 
Education, and Morals.
(1829: 173; emphasis added)
26 The “capacity of co- operation . . . like other faculties, tends to improve by practice, 
and becomes capable of assuming a constantly wider sphere of action” (Mill 1965: 
708).
27 Similarly, Mill notes in the Autobiography that he and his wife (Harriet)
looked forward to a time when society will no longer be divided into the idle and 
the industrious; when the rule that they who do not work shall not eat, will be 
applied not to paupers only, but impartially to all.
(1989: 175)
28 Similarly, Senior remarks that
during the forty years immediately preceding the Poor Law Amendment Act, a 
large portion of the labourers of England were treated not as freemen but as slaves 
or domestic animals, and received not strictly speaking wages . . . but rations pro-
portioned to their supposed wants.
(Senior quoted in Robbins 1965: 98)
29 Senior had argued that “relief of the able- bodied . . . [was] the grand abuse of the 
English Poor Laws . . . Such a provision must increase population by diminishing the 
responsibility of marriage; it must diminish industry by making subsistence 
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independent of exertion” (1970: 81). Our concern here is not to examine the accuracy 
or otherwise of Senior’s (or Mill’s) highly negative view of the old poor law per se. I 
highly recommend the analysis provided by Boyer (1990).
30 Boyer (1990) argues that the Commissioners of Inquiry vastly over- estimated the 
asymmetric information problem supposedly plaguing the old poor law.
31 In a letter to Tocqueville dated March 18, 1835, Senior writes of the Report of the 
Poor Law Commissioners:
The report, or at least three- fourths of it, was written by me, and all that was not 
written by me was re- written by me. The greater part of the Act, founded on it, 
was also written by me; and in fact I am responsible for the effects, good or evil 
(and they must be one or the other in an enormous degree), of the whole measure.
(1968 [1835]: 13)
32 Mill writes that he “cannot concur” with Harriet Martineau’s
unqualified condemnation of the principle of the poor- laws . . . she is decidedly 
behind the present state of the science; political economists having mostly aban-
doned this among other exaggerated conclusions to which naturally enough they 
had pushed the principle of population . . . The recent investigations of the poor- 
law commission . . . seem to us as conclusive in support of the principle of a poor- 
rate, as they are in condemnation of the existing practice.
(1967 [1834]: 227–8)
33 The Irish Poor Law (1838) only provided indoor relief (Mill 1986 [1846]: 881). The 
Irish peasantry, unlike their English counterparts, had no statutory right to indoor 
relief per se.
34 “Give as much as you will, but let it be for the permanent improvement of the condition 
of the people” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 886). Similarly, “we will not venture to say what sum 
of money we would not willingly give, and call on others to give, for so noble a 
purpose” (ibid.). Mill is justifiably acidic toward an Irish landlord who – calling for 
“sympathy and money from England” (ibid.: 980) – invoked the 20 million pounds that 
were spent as part of the compensation package associated with the ending of slavery in 
the West Indies. As Mill tartly puts it, England would happily pay
[a]s much and more . . . for the freedom and comfort of the . . . Irish cottier. But its 
gifts are not for the serf ’s master. It did not pay twenty millions to the slaveowner 
and leave the slaves no better than they were before.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
35 The Irish Poor Law Extension Act, granting outdoor relief, became legislation in June 
1847.
36 An important caveat is in order. Hollander (1985: 745–7) notes Mill’s rather favora-
ble (albeit, on Malthusian grounds, somewhat guarded) view of the “pledge of full 
employment” (ibid.: 745) provided by the French Provisional Government in Febru-
ary 1848. As Mill notes, the “droit au travail . . . would be a fatal gift . . . unless some 
new restraint were placed upon the capacity of increase, equivalent to that which 
would be taken away” (1985 [1849]: 349–50). I refer the reader to Hollander’s fine 
discussion for analysis of this point. Similarly, even if the
state [were to] . . . guarantee employment at ample wages to all who are born . . . [It 
would be] bound in self- protection . . . to provide that no person shall be born 
without its consent. If the ordinary and spontaneous motives to self- restraint are 
removed, others must be substituted.
(Mill 1965: 358–9; emphasis added)
Senior’s view, seemingly condemning the droit au travail per se, is sharply at variance 
with that of Mill (see, e.g., Robbins 1965: 134–41).
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37 Similar themes appear in Mill’s writings on Ireland:
So long as the poor- rate is available to him, he will accept of nothing which is 
only to be obtained by real work. When the vast number of paupers shall have 
consumed, or their disinclination to work shall have destroyed the fund from 
which the eleemosynary support is drawn, they will throw themselves upon 
England . . . [Ultimately] we shall be forced to begin treating the Irish people as 
moral agents, influenced by motives, and who must be acted on by a system of 
moral government, and not as creatures whom we can feed like pigs or turkeys, 
and prevent as easily from straying out of the bounds of the stye or poultry 
yard.
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 1072–3; emphasis added)
38 G. P. Scrope (a Member of Parliament and an inveterate pamphleteer to boot) 
advocated a scheme whereby the Irish peasantry would receive outdoor relief in 
exchange for labor on public works. Scrope had maintained that because the Irish 
peasantry were “already pauperized” (Mill 1986 [1846]: 1007) it was not possible 
to render indoor relief less attractive than self- support by independent labor per se: 
hence the logic allegedly inherent to the “less- eligibility” principle was singularly 
inoperative.
39 My discussion of non- convexity owes much to Levy (1992: 252–4).
40 Mill’s “Claims of Labour” closes with a scathing attack on the “Allotment System” 
(Mill 1967 [1845]: 387–9): “What is Ireland but the allotment system made univer-
sal?” (ibid.: 389). Importantly, the key point in Mill’s scathing attack on cottier tenure 
– a cottier regime supposedly reduces the private marginal cost of larger family size 
to zero – can be found in “The Claims of Labour” (ibid.).
41 Stigler’s remark that the “classical economists were at their best when it came to spe-
cific problems” (Stigler quoted in Levy 2001: 55) is particularly apposite when evalu-
ating Mill’s writings on Ireland. Hollander rightly notes that some “of Mill’s finest 
writing is reserved for a condemnation of the system [of cottier tenure] as it existed in 
Ireland” (1985: 243).
42 Whenever a population excessive in proportion to the productive power of its 
industry, depends for subsistence wholly upon the occupancy of land, their com-
petition drives them to offer for the land a rent merely nominal, a rent greater than 
the utmost . . . they can possibly pay.
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 889)
43 Mill argues that many landlords “preferred increase of power [per se] . . . to increase 
of income; and were not unwilling that their tenant should enter into engagements 
which they knew he could not fulfil” (1986 [1846]: 890). The tenant – invariably in 
debt to the landlord – was thus “in the landlord’s power, and could at all times, as far 
as law was concerned, be ejected at pleasure” (ibid.).
44 “Except . . . [for] the daily meal of potatoes, everything . . . [the cottier] raises from the 
soil belongs to the landlord” (1986 [1847]: 1060).
45 [The] cottier . . . has agreed to pay . . . a rent generally higher than it is possible he 
should really pay and continue to live . . . Everything the peasant proprietor can 
raise is his own. The proprietor, if he invests any labour in the soil, improves his 
own property; the cottier only the landlord’s. If the proprietor works hard, early 
and late, the gain is his; if the cottier were fool enough to do so, the whole benefit 
would be the landlord’s. If the proprietor has a larger family than can either be 
useful on the land, or find employment elsewhere, the burthen is his; if the cottier 
does so, it is the landlord’s. The landlord alone gains by the cottier’s industry, and 
alone loses by his indolence or misconduct.
(1986 [1847]: 1060)
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46 “Almost alone amongst mankind the cottier . . . can scarcely be either better or worse 
off by any act of his own . . . A situation more devoid of motives to either labour or 
self- command, imagination itself cannot conceive” (Mill 1965: 318–19).
47 I leave aside any adequately detailed examination of the suggested policy measures – 
changing with ever- changing circumstances – by which Mill hoped to engineer the 
transition from cottier tenure to peasant proprietorship in Ireland. I refer the reader to 
Hollander (1985: 847–55).
48 The salutary material and moral effects that Mill expects peasant proprietorship to 
provide resolve themselves, “like most questions respecting the condition of the labour-
ing classes, into one of population. Are small properties a stimulus to undue multiplica-
tion, or a check to it?” (1965: 277). Mill considers the available evidence to readily 
indicate that peasant proprietorship closely aligns the private and social costs associated 
with any increase in family size (ibid.: 259). The examples of Norway and Switzerland 
– “countries of small landed proprietors” (ibid.: 158) – are adduced to illustrate the 
beneficial consequences of “a great degree of voluntary prudence” (ibid.: 157).
49 Plans for fixity of tenure per se differ subtly – the “plan technically called fixity of 
tenure is not our plan” – from Mill’s favored scheme for encouraging peasant proprie-
torship in Ireland (Mill 1986 [1846]: 905): the “plan” for fixity of tenure per se – the 
landlord would be unable to evict the tenant unless rents were unpaid – held that the 
“present rent would be fixed for ever as a quit- rent” (ibid.: 896; emphasis added). Mill 
viewed this plan as unjust unless landlords were compensated for the present value of 
any foregone increases in expected future rents (ibid.: 897, 905–6). Mill’s favored 
engine for creating peasant proprietorship is the reclamation of the Irish wastelands 
(ibid.: 898–901, 910–13). Again, compensation (the “present value”) would be paid to 
the landowner: “The value of the bogs and mountains to their nominal owners is but a 
trifle” (ibid.: 910; emphasis added). In many ways, the fixity of tenure plan (strictly 
understood) is rather akin to a second- best land tenure policy for Mill. The key point 
for Mill is that any desirable scheme for effecting a permanent improvement in the 
material and moral well- being of the populace would provide the cultivator with a de 
facto “permanent interest in the soil” (ibid.: 907): perpetuity of tenure at a fixed rent.
50 [It] is not where a high standard of comfort has rooted itself in the habits of the 
labouring class, that we are ever called upon to consider the effects of a cottier 
system. That system is found only where the habitual requirements of the rural 
labourers are the lowest possible.
(Mill 1965: 317; emphasis added)
51 [The Irish] people have been for half a thousand years under such a regime [cottier 
tenure] as this, and men wonder at them for their indolence, and their want of 
enterprise, and their improvident marriages . . . to tell us in all gravity, that because 
they are all this, therefore they are so by nature and because of a difference of 
race, is a thing which might rouse the indignation even of persons not very quickly 
moved to such a sentiment.
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 891)
Mill wrote:
Is it not, then, a bitter satire on the mode in which opinions are formed on the 
most important problems of human nature and life, to find public instructors of the 
greatest pretension, imputing the backwardness of Irish industry, and the want of 
energy of the Irish people in improving their condition, to a peculiar indolence 
and insouciance in the Celtic race? Of all vulgar modes of escaping from the con-
sideration of the effect of social and moral influences on the human mind, the 
most vulgar is that of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to natural 
differences.
(Mill quoted in Peart and Levy 2005: 31)
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The particular public instructor Mill has in mind is Thomas Campbell Foster – the 
Times correspondent on the agricultural situation in Ireland (see Mill 1986 [1846]: 
887). Mill, writing to John Pringle Nichol, similarly takes Comte to task for his “reso-
lute” ignorance “of the laws of the formation of character . . . and . . . [Comte] assumes 
the differences which he sees between women and men, philosophers and men of 
action, rich people and proletarians . . . [are] ultimate, or at least necessary facts” (Mill 
1963 [1848]: 739).
52 Similar themes appear in the exchange with Carlyle, where Mill charges Carlyle with 
falling prey to the “vulgar error” of
imputing every difference which he finds among human beings to an original differ-
ence of nature. As well it might be said, that of two trees, sprung from the same 
stock, one cannot be taller than another but from greater vigour in the original seed-
ling. Is nothing to be attributed to soil, nothing to climate, nothing to difference of 
exposure – has no storm swept over the one and not the other, no lightning scathed 
it, no beast browsed on it . . . no passing stranger stript off its leaves or its bark?
(Mill 1850: 29; emphasis added)
53 Peasant proprietorship provided an immensely “powerful instrument for raising a 
population from semi- savage listlessness . . . to persevering industry and prudent cal-
culation” (Mill 1965: 768).
54 Associationist doctrine is again apparent: “[T]he individual is the sum of the impres-
sions that have been made on him . . . Character – the word that derives from the 
Greek root meaning an instrument for making an impress, a stamp – epitomizes the 
assumptions of this theory” (Carlisle 1991: 19). Adam Smith takes a similar stance:
The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we 
are aware of . . . the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of dif-
ferent professions . . . is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect 
of the division of labour.
(Smith 1852: 7)
Importantly, Smith suggests that if all had “the same duties to perform, and the same 
work to do . . . there could have been no such difference of employment as could alone 
give occasion to any great difference of talents” (ibid.: 29).
55 Mill notes that while “natural differences are something, habit is much more” (1965: 
127). Having noted that women generally display much “greater versatility than men” 
– women were seemingly more rather adept at rapidly turning their hand to various 
tasks – Mill is insistent that habit, “much more than nature, is the cause of the differ-
ence. The occupations of nine out of every ten men are special, those of nine out of 
ten women general, embracing a multitude of details” (ibid.: 127–8). Mill similarly 
remarks that of
all tillers of the soil, the cottier is the one who has the least to gain by any volun-
tary exertion; the small [peasant] proprietor has most . . . [This] is but the natural 
result of their circumstances. Put each in the situation of the other, and their char-
acters will be reversed.
(Mill 1986 [1846]: 958)
56 As Mill pointedly notes, a markedly similar homogeneity – and that notwithstanding 
the “greater diversity of education . . . than would exist in the Communistic regime” – 
is among the “glaring evils of the existing state of society” (1965: 209; emphasis 
added). The same sentiment is apparent in the “Chapters on Socialism” (Mill 1967 
[1879]: 746).
57 Mill, in the Principles, invokes communism whenever he is pointing to any system 
whereby the communal income is divided on a purely equalitarian basis: e.g., Blanc’s 
and Owen’s respective schemes for social regeneration (1965: 203). Mill designates 
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any scheme as socialist if it readily admits “inequality” in the division of output on 
the grounds “of justice or general expediency” (ibid.): e.g., the St. Simonian and Fou-
rierist plans to reconfigure the social fabric.
58 Stigler’s remarks about Mill’s fairness are aptly illustrated by the various editions of 
the Principles. Mill’s preface to the 1849 edition of the Principles states that the 
“objections therein [the chapter “Of Property”] stated to the specific schemes pro-
pounded by some Socialists, have been erroneously understood as a general condem-
nation of all that is commonly included under that name” (1965: xcii). Mill’s preface 
to the 1852 edition states that the “chapter on Property has been almost entirely re- 
written. I was far from intending that the statement which it contained . . . should be 
understood as a condemnation of Socialism” (ibid.: xciii).
59 Again, the logic underlying the tenets of associationist psychology is readily apparent. 
As James Mill had explained, “[w]hen Education is good, no point of morality will be 
reckoned of more importance than the distribution of Praise and Blame . . . They are 
the great instruments we possess for ensuring moral acts on the part of our Fellow- 
creatures” (1829: 251; emphasis added).
60 Any one who supposes . . . [public] opinion would not have a great effect on 
conduct, must be profoundly ignorant of human nature; can never have considered 
how large a portion of the motives which induce the generality of men to take care 
even of their own interest, is derived from regard for opinion – from the expecta-
tion of being disliked or despised for not doing it.
(Mill 1965: 371)
61 Mill argues that profit- sharing is eminently capable of “indefinite extension” and 
would, he expects, ultimately give way to a “state of purely co- operative associations” 
(1967 [1879]: 743). Co- operative schemes increase the “productiveness of labor” by 
providing a “vast stimulus . . . to productive energies,” placing the laborers “in a rela-
tion to their work which would make it their principle and their interest – at present it 
is neither – to do the utmost, instead of the least . . . in exchange for their remunera-
tion” (1965: 792).
62 “Communistic management would . . . [be] in all probability, less favourable than 
private management to . . . [the] striking out of new paths . . . which, though seldom 
unattended with risk, is generally indispensable to great improvements in the eco-
nomic condition of mankind” (Mill 1967 [1879]: 742).
63 Similarly, Mill maintains that co- operative associations would, like peasant proprie-
tors, only adopt “improvements after they have been tested for success” (1965: 793). 
Mill argues that peasant proprietors also display much reluctance to initiate 
innovations:
Peasant properties . . . are not adapted for originating scientific improvements . . . 
[thus] it is desirable that there should be . . . some cultivators of a wealthier class, 
who will take the risk of experiments, and whose example, if successful, the 
peasant proprietors may imitate.
(1986 [1847]: 951; emphasis added)
Also see Mill (1965: 147).
64 Mill remarks that “impatient reformers, thinking it easier and shorter to get possession 
of the government than of the intellects and dispositions of the public, are under a 
constant temptation to stretch the province of government beyond due bounds” (1965: 
799). Similarly, Mill argues that such considerations readily explain why French 
“associations of workmen manufacturing on their own account” (ibid.: 210) aban-
doned equality of pay in favor of payment by the piece:
[A]s a compromise with the selfish type of character formed by the present state 
of morality, and fostered by the existing social institutions, it is highly expedient; 
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and until education shall have been entirely regenerated . . . more likely to prove 
immediately successful, than an attempt at a higher ideal.
(ibid.; emphasis added)
Similarly – and though not considering fixity of tenure a global optimum per se – Mill 
maintains that it would provide “the very best [system] of which a country like Ireland 
is susceptible” (1986 [1846]: 986). As Mill notes, “whether [or not] . . . [large- scale agri-
culture on the English pattern] might be the far- distant future of humanity, it is certain 
that this system will not work in Ireland today” (1995 [1847]: 384; emphasis added).
65 With regard to . . . [Fourierism], as to all other varieties of Socialism, the thing to 
be desired, and to which they have a just claim, is opportunity of trial. They are 
all capable of being tried on a moderate scale, and at no risk, either personal or 
pecuniary, to any except those who try them. It is for experience to determine how 
far or how soon any one or more of the possible systems of community of prop-
erty will be fitted to substitute itself for the “organization of industry” based on 
private ownership of land and capital.
(Mill 1965: 213–14; emphasis added)
66 Hayek’s negative view of social justice is relatively easy to summarize. I refer the 
reader to Burczak (2006) for an in- depth analysis of Hayek’s views. Mill’s view of 
justice per se (see, e.g., Mill 1969 [1861]) is markedly less easy to summarize.
67 It was from Mill’s muddle (and the similar deceptions of Marx) and from the con-
fusion of those pretended defenders of liberty who proclaimed a new moral postu-
late [social justice] which required a complete suppression of individual freedom 
that the whole muddle of the middle derived.
(Hayek 1983: 93)
68 Similarly, Mill argues that the grossly unequal relationship between husband and wife 
is “contradictory to the first principles of social justice” (1984 [1869]: 325). “The 
moral regeneration of mankind will only really commence, when . . . [marriage] is 
placed under the rule of equal justice” (ibid.: 336).
69 Mill is adamant that “justice requires that the . . . [cottiers] become . . . proprietors of 
the soil which they cultivate” (1965: 326). As we have already seen, however, Mill 
would have the landowners receive compensation for the loss of “their” wastelands: 
“The power” the landlord would be “deprived of is not a proper subject of compensa-
tion . . . any complaint of personal injury in being deprived of it should be hooted out 
of court with ignominy” (1986 [1846]: 897). As Mill explains, whenever “property in 
land is not expedient,” then, as is manifestly the case under cottier tenure, it “ceases 
to be defensible” (1965: 230): It is not “the essence of the institution” (private prop-
erty) to guarantee anyone (e.g., a landlord) the “fruits of the labour of others, trans-
mitted to them without any merit or exertion of their own” (ibid.: 208). Consequently, 
the prevailing property regime in Ireland is deemed “unjust” (ibid.: 230).
70 Hayek’s reproduction of the above passage – omitting the final six words – in The 
Fatal Conceit (1988: 149) is similarly telling.
71 Hayek (1978: 176) negatively points to a markedly similar passage in Mill’s review 
of F. W. Newman’s Lectures on Political Economy. Again, however, Mill is merely 
stating that Newman would find it well- nigh impossible to defend existing institutions 
(particularly the institution of private property) on the grounds of equity. Mill is point-
ing out that existing institutions manifestly and unjustly privilege the wealthy and 
powerful (1967 [1851]: 444). Similarly, Mill (1965: 217) refers to “unjust systems or 
institutions.”
72 Mill makes clear that any private property regime where slavery is the norm is unjust: 
slavery “can have no place in any society even pretending to be founded on justice” 
(1965: 233).
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73 Stigler (1965: 297) notes that “Mill made the first major advance beyond . . . [Smith’s] 
theory [of wage determination] by his recognition of the barriers to mobility erected by 
the costs of education.” As David Levy (2001: 212) has rightly pointed out, Mountifort 
Longfield explained the logic of non- competing groups in 1834. Additionally, Longfield 
argues that Smith’s theory of compensating differentials would obtain even with non- 
competing groups. I leave aside any discussion of Longfield’s argument (or what I deem 
as Mill’s – albeit seemingly not addressed to Longfield per se – persuasive counter- 
arguments) and plan to adequately explore these issues elsewhere. Longfield’s work 
aside, however, I wonder if non- competing groups come to play a more central role in 
Mill’s thinking about social justice and equality of opportunity after 1849. For instance, 
in the 1849 edition Mill seemingly adheres to Smith’s theory of compensating differen-
tials per se: “If one kind of work is . . . more disagreeable than another . . . it is better 
paid” (1965: 977). At the same time, however, Mill maintains, as per the theory of non- 
competing groups, that employments requiring “technical education . . . have hitherto 
been the subject of a real monopoly as against the mass” (ibid.). This monopoly, more-
over, is said to be an “unjust advantage” (ibid.). As Hollander (1985) notes, Mill’s 
sharpest rejection of Smith’s theory of compensating differentials first appears in the 
1852 edition. Much of what Mill has to say in 1852 is quoted above (1965: 383). Levy 
(2001: 213) has conjectured (rightly, I think) that the 1849–50 exchange with Carlyle 
greatly sharpened Mill’s thinking on the issue of occupational choice.
74 Mill, writing to Comte, describes the cottier regime thus:
[a] small number of owners . . . take from the soil all it can give and exploit the 
peasants, not by brute force but by the untrammeled competition among these 
poor people, always ready to promise [in rent] more than the earth can produce.
(1995 [1847]: 383)
Mill’s letter to Arthur Helps is instructive:
I look upon inequality as in itself an evil . . . I do not agree with any one who 
would use the machinery of society for promoting it . . . I certainly see no neces-
sity for artificially adding to it . . . I see much for tempering it, impressing both on 
the laws & on the usages of mankind as far as possible the contrary tendency.
(1972 [1847]: 2002)
75 Mill similarly alludes to the theory of non- competing groups throughout the “Chapters 
on Socialism”: “reward, instead of being proportioned to the labour and abstinence of 
the individual, is almost in an inverse ratio to it: those who receive the least, labour 
and abstain the most” (1967 [1879]: 714).
76 As Mill, again invoking the theory of non- competing groups, notes, the “really 
exhausting and the really repulsive labours, instead of being better paid than others 
[as per Smith’s theory of compensating differentials], are almost invariably paid the 
worst of all, because performed by those who have no choice” (1965: 383; emphasis 
added). Similarly, Mill (1967 [1879]: 710; emphasis added) notes that while the poor 
are no “longer enslaved or made dependent by force of law, the great majority are so 
by force of poverty; they are still chained to a place, to an occupation.”
77 Again belying Hayek’s misconstrued interpretation of Mill’s distinction between the 
laws of production and the laws of distribution, Mill is insistent that defective “insti-
tutions impede the employment of the productive resources of a country to the best 
advantage” (1965: 114). For instance, Mill argues that Ireland is, under a cottier 
regime, well inside the production possibility frontier. As Mill explains to Auguste 
Comte: once cottier tenure is replaced by peasant proprietorship, “one should soon 
find three or four times the produce of today” (1995 [1847]: 384).
78 As Hollander, implicitly addressing Robbins’ designation of Mill’s favored system as 
syndicalism, notes, Mill seemingly “envisaged . . . [that each co- operative] association 
would be independent of, and in competition with, similar associations in the same 
industry” (1985: 813; emphasis added).
A renovated social fabric  127
79 Although the passages I quote above (Mill 1965 [1849]: 985) do not appear in the 
1852 edition of Mill’s Principles, Hollander (1985: 805) makes clear that Mill’s 
“position in 1852” – advocacy of a much reformed private property regime – was not 
“substantially” different from what it had been in 1849.
80 The non- italicized passage appears in every post- 1849 edition of Mill’s Principles 
(1965: 206). The italicized sentence does not appear in any edition after 1849. As Mill 
explains, any communist regime – ostensibly trying to attain a truly equalitarian dis-
tributive outcome – would face the very “real difficulty . . . of fairly apportioning the 
labour of the community among its members” (1965: 206). As Mill explains: “All 
persons are not equally fit for all labour” (ibid.). Consequently, any purely “nominal 
equality of labour would be so great a real inequality that the feeling of justice would 
revolt against its being enforced” (ibid.).
81 The sentences I quote in this paragraph do not appear in any post- 1849 edition of The 
Principles.
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5 A socialist spontaneous order
Theodore Burczak
Introduction
Hayek describes spontaneous orders as social institutions that are the result of an 
undirected, evolutionary process, rather than the product of human design.1 
Social order can emerge spontaneously when people stumble upon rules and 
institutions that create a common set of beliefs and expectations that guide indi-
viduals to act in a co- operative fashion. Spontaneous social orders crystallize out 
of the evolved regularities of human action and interaction, even though these 
actions may not be motivated by a desire to produce any kind of order. Thus, 
rule following need not be instrumental, since people can follow rules that 
induce social co- ordination without knowing that their actions will produce this 
or any other particular outcome. But the potential for the spontaneous emergence 
of social order does not imply that consciously designed public policy cannot 
successfully shape the contours of that order. Hayek argued that properly 
executed public policy can establish the conditions for spontaneous social orders 
to emerge, much as scientists can induce the formation of crystals by creating 
the proper environment (Hayek 1973: 39–40). He believed that the guiding prin-
ciple for public policy to follow in order to induce the emergence of a spontane-
ous market order is implementation of the rule of law.
 In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek argued that the pursuit of national economic 
planning to achieve socialist objectives would lead a country down a path to 
political tyranny and poverty. According to Hayek, advocates of economic plan-
ning did not recognize the benefits that flowed from a spontaneous market order 
and did not understand that the improvement of human well- being would be 
impaired by attempting to control economic outcomes. Hayek’s long- running 
attempt to rehabilitate classical liberalism against twentieth- century socialism 
had two components. First, he insisted that attempts to create rational plans for 
social orders were bound to fail, primarily because central planners cannot gain 
access to the necessarily dispersed, subjectively held knowledge of production 
possibilities and resource scarcities that exists in individual minds. Second, 
Hayek sought to update Adam Smith’s claim that the voluntary exchange of 
private property governed by the rule of law could spontaneously generate 
wealth without the need for conscious design.
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 Given Hayek’s understanding of the centrality of the rule of law to the 
formation of a spontaneous social order, is it possible to defend what might be 
called a socialist spontaneous order? Can there be socialism with the rule of 
law? Much would depend on what one understands the concept of socialism 
to entail. I will follow Marx and maintain that socialist society would have at 
least two fundamental characteristics. First, socialism would abolish the wages 
system, thereby ending the exploitation of labor (Marx 1965). Second, under 
socialism the distribution of the fruits of production would take place, to some 
extent, according to need and not just according to the vagaries of income dis-
tribution that result from market processes (Marx 1978). To achieve these 
objectives, a socialist economy has traditionally been understood to require 
large amounts of national economic planning and social ownership of produc-
tive property, particularly “the commanding heights.” National economic 
planning, though, concentrates political and economic power in such a manner 
that it is perhaps impossible for planners to follow the principles of neutrality 
and universality that the rule of law requires. The goal of this chapter is to 
show that socialist goals might be achievable, not through national economic 
planning or the conscious design of outcomes, but by adopting rules and 
policies consistent with the notion of the rule of law that underlies Hayek’s 
theory of spontaneous market order. The result will be something that could 
be called free market socialism, unplanned socialism, or a socialist spontaneous 
order.
Spontaneous order and the rule of law
Hayek makes a distinction derived from ancient Greek thought between two 
types of order: taxis and cosmos. A taxis is a constructed order, designed and 
directed to achieve particular goals. Hayek’s examples include families, corpora-
tions, and government (Hayek 1973: 46). A cosmos is an evolved, emergent, or 
“grown” order. A cosmos does not result from human design but materializes as 
the unintended consequence of regularities in the behavior of its elements 
(Hayek 1978: 74). According to Hayek, one of the fatal conceits of socialist 
thought is the tendency to treat the cosmos of human society as if it were a taxis, 
which leads to various projects of social engineering, whereby governments 
attempt to control economic activity for some specified ends. This is the running 
theme of The Road to Serfdom (Hayek 2007). Hayek argues that people overesti-
mate the power of human reason and underestimate the tacit, unarticulated 
knowledge that is embodied in evolved institutions when they think that it is 
appropriate for government to direct society according to some predefined goal 
or that social outcomes should follow a specified pattern. In his interpretation of 
history, social conflict and discontent generally occur when people believe that 
the cosmos of human society should be planned to yield a certain result or should 
be judged as legitimate only if its outcomes, like the distribution of income, 
wealth, and status, satisfy some supposedly objective standard, like equality, 
merit, or desert.2
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 For Hayek, governments should not engage in planning to achieve specific 
outcomes but should plan to promote the spontaneous emergence of social co- 
operation and self- organizing economic processes. In the Road to Serfdom, he 
called this “planning for competition” (Hayek 2007: 90). Hayek uses an agricul-
tural metaphor to make the point: good government is more like farming than 
designing bridges. The conduct of public policy should be similar to “the sense 
in which the farmer or gardener cultivates his plants, where he knows and can 
control only some of the determining circumstances” (Hayek 1967: 19). Govern-
ment needs “to cultivate rather than . . . control the forces of the social process” 
(1967: 19). It does this by discovering and enforcing rules that have demon-
strated their ability to promote social co- operation by their survival through a 
long evolutionary process. Hayek believes that the development of the English 
common law best exemplifies a socially advantageous evolution of legal conven-
tions. Importantly, he also asserts that democratic government can create new 
rules when the existing legal system can be shown to serve special interests 
rather than the general interest. Much, then, hinges on how we understand the 
general interest.
 Hayek maintains that the nature of the general interest is procedural: rules and 
institutions should not favor one person or group over another, and they should 
allow people to use their knowledge for their own purposes (Hayek 1973: 55–6). 
He argues that these characteristics are best satisfied if government constrains 
itself to enforcing rules and following policies consistent with the principle of 
the rule of law. The rule of law limits government action to the creation and 
enforcement of laws and policies that are universally applicable, general or end- 
independent, and well publicized (1960: 205–10). Laws and policy directives 
must apply equally to all persons, to the governed as well as the governors, and 
be impartially enforced, not favoring particular classes or groups. Policy actions 
must also be general in the sense that they are intended to apply to all similar 
situations in the future, and not just to achieve particular ends in a specific case. 
Finally, government enforcement of rules and policy actions should be predicta-
ble – no secret trials or clandestine support for special interests – so that people 
can form reliable expectations about the government’s deployment of power and 
the future legal rulings of courts. This is an especially important attribute of the 
rule of law for Hayek, because legal predictability and the certainty of govern-
ment (in)action enables individuals to have a good sense of what they are 
allowed to do and when the government enforcement apparatus will be called 
into play. Legal predictability also enables individuals to know the range of other 
people’s permissible actions. The ability to predict the actions of public officials 
and private citizens facilitates the formation of relatively accurate individual 
expectations in a manner that tends to produce overall social co- ordination and 
co- operation.
 Hayek argues that the rule of law helps promote the existence and stability of 
private property and the freedom of exchange. End- independent, universally 
applicable, impartially enforced, and predictable rules serve to carve out domains 
in which individuals bear the costs and reap the benefits of their actions. These 
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rules create a sphere where individuals are responsible for their actions and 
define acceptable characteristics of action within it (i.e., no fraud, deception, or 
use of violence). Hayek maintains that private property and its constituent laws 
of contract, tort, and acceptable use have survived because they yield security of 
possession and commonly accepted rules of exchange, i.e., stable markets. A 
system of market exchange harnesses individual initiative and the self- interested 
use of personal knowledge to benefit human society to a degree unprecedented 
in human history. The possibility of exchanging and accumulating private prop-
erty gives self- interested people the incentive to serve the public good, as if 
directed by an invisible hand.
 Hayek contends that the creation, protection, free exchange, and competitive 
market valuation of private property helps to co- ordinate individual action and 
generate wealth better than any other type of institutional structure that has yet 
appeared. The linchpin of his argument is human ignorance, the ignorance of 
each individual about most dimensions of day- to-day provisioning. To take a 
simple example, most people do not know how to use a plot of land to grow 
grain or how to build a stove to bake the grain into bread. We are all dependent 
upon an unfathomably vast network of specialized production and exchange in 
order to obtain our daily bread. Our ignorance necessitates reliance on others. 
The rule of law and the establishment of individual spheres of responsibility 
through property rights give guidelines and incentives for cognitively limited 
people to assist others voluntarily and usually unintentionally in the achievement 
of their goals. Hayek asserts that the rules of law and property enable “us con-
stantly to profit from knowledge which we individually do not possess” (Hayek 
1960: 25). The rules of law establishing private property create an institutional 
framework that provides “the maximum of opportunity for unknown individuals 
to learn of facts that we ourselves are yet unaware of and to make use of this 
knowledge in their actions” (Hayek 1960: 30). Markets translate one person’s 
gain- seeking plans (e.g., the baker’s quest for profit by selling bread) into the 
means for unknown others to achieve their ends (e.g., the nourishment of the 
community).
 Hayek’s defense of the rule of law is a type of rule utilitarianism (Yeager 
1985). A rule utilitarian believes that a legal framework based upon well- 
announced, general, universally applicable rules help to promote social co- 
operation and co- ordination. When individuals can form reliable expectations 
about how other people will be permitted to act, including government officials, 
this increases the security of their possessions and the ability to exchange them 
with others. They are thus encouraged to specialize in production and to engage 
in mutually beneficial trade to satisfy their respective needs and desires. This 
type of utilitarian position is reluctant to judge institutions and individuals’ 
actions according to their ability to promote individual or aggregate well- being 
in particular cases. The pervasiveness of human ignorance renders impossible 
the full accounting of costs and benefits that would be necessary to decide 
whether (or how much) a particular activity contributes to happiness. Hayek 
favors actions and policies based upon well announced principles (i.e., as 
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embodied in the rule of law) rather than case- by-case cost/benefit calculations 
because rule- guided action helps to overcome the arbitrary decisions that can 
result from our lack of knowledge of the true costs and benefits of a particular 
course of action. Hayek’s defense of the rule of law thus rests on the ubiquity of 
human ignorance.
 Hayek insists that any goal- oriented policy that does not abide by the rule of 
law arbitrarily obstructs voluntary exchange and impedes social co- ordination. 
Any government program that violates the rule of law to adjust the outcomes of 
the market process in favor of one group over another will be discoordinating 
and inefficient from a social perspective. If, for instance, government establishes 
a minimum wage to raise the incomes of the poor, workers that employers would 
be willing to hire at a lower wage will remain unemployed. Or if, say, govern-
ment attempts to protect the wages of auto- workers or farmers, consumers will 
be able to purchase fewer cars or less food than they would in an economy where 
government does not try to pick winners, or to protect the income of a particular 
group. Hayek argues that if a socialist- inspired government were to go even 
further and replace the private property, exchange economy entirely with social 
ownership and central planning, then it would face an insuperable knowledge 
problem regarding the centralization and co- ordination of the knowledge of the 
farmers, millers, bakers, and all other providers of the various goods and serv-
ices we enjoy in a modern economy. Central planners cannot obtain and co- 
ordinate the local, tacit, experiential knowledge of the various and dispersed 
individuals involved in producing bread. In addition, national economic planning 
cannot be rule- governed, since the planners would be in a position to command 
people to perform specific activities. For Hayek, this raises the specter of totali-
tarian political rule (Hayek 2007).
 So, where does that leave socialism? The concept of a rule- governed sponta-
neous order would seem to negate the socialist desire to end the exploitation of 
labor and to satisfy people’s material needs. Acceptance of Hayek’s defense of 
the rule of law might appear to condemn labor to be forever exploited in capital-
ist labor markets and to result in human needs being met only by chance, if at 
all, in a spontaneous market order. Hayek certainly thought that following the 
rule of law prohibits any form of socialism. But is this necessarily so? Let us 
consider the following remark from Hayek:
A free system can adapt itself to almost any set of data, almost any general 
prohibition or regulation, so long as the adjusting mechanism itself is kept 
functioning. And it is mainly changes in prices that bring about the neces-
sary adjustments. This means that, for it to function properly, it is not suffi-
cient that the rules of law under which it operates be general rules, but their 
content must be such that the market will work tolerably well.
(Hayek 1960: 228)
The impartiality and generality of government policy demanded by the rule of 
law is consistent with many different kinds of government- enforced restrictions 
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on human action and conveyances of benefits. There is, in other words, nothing 
about the principle of the rule of law that specifies what the substantive content 
of rules should be. Although we might accept Hayek’s understanding of the rule 
of law as a principle to follow in a world of ignorant government officials and as 
a potential safeguard against political tyranny, we need another (set of ) 
principle(s) to flesh out the actual content of specific rules. As Hayek notes, 
many types of rules are compatible with the requirements of universality, gener-
ality, and predictability. Some are consistent with free market capitalism (e.g., 
freedom of exchange, protection of private property, proportional taxation). 
Others, I argue, could generate a socialist spontaneous order.
 In his trilogy Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Hayek pointed to the evolution of 
the English common law as embodying a (mostly) class- neutral set of rules. 
Hayek maintained that common- law procedures generate a set of rules that 
adhere to the rule of law and serve the general interest. These rules also hap-
pened to promote the development of market capitalism. Hayek’s turn to the 
common law, however, is largely a failure since it presumes that common- law 
jurists typically reach their legal opinions from a disinterested, class- neutral per-
spective (Burczak 2006). He shares with his mythically objective common- law 
jurists blindness to the conflict between capital and labor in a conventional 
wage- labor employment relationship (e.g., Hayek 1960: 120–1). Another 
approach to develop substantive content for a rule- of-law framework is to con-
sider the Marxian- socialist tradition of human flourishing – a Marxian- socialist 
notion of the general interest – to obtain principles that we could use to develop 
socialist rules. The idea of a socialist spontaneous order that results from com-
bining the rule of law with a Marxian perspective on human flourishing acknowl-
edges Hayek’s theory of the beneficial effects of constrained government and 
spontaneous market outcomes but does not accept his tolerance of wage labor 
and a free market distribution of income. Let us then consider each of the social-
ist goals in order – ending the exploitation of labor and distributing income 
according to need – and show how these goals might be achieved in a manner 
compatible with general requirements of the rule of law.
Worker self- management
What would it mean to abolish labor exploitation? In a pamphlet written in 
English for the 1865 General Council of the First International, Marx was insist-
ent that the emancipation of the labor force required “the ultimate abolition of 
the wages system” (Marx 1965: 79). While he lauded trade unions for their 
ability to raise wages and reform conditions in the workplace, he chided them 
for failing to use their power to eliminate the wages system. Marx maintained 
that the problem with the wage- labor system is that the goal of capitalists is to 
extract as much effort out of wage- workers as possible, treating workers as their 
instruments, since it is only after workers have worked hard enough to “pay their 
own wages” that property owners can start receiving rent, interest, and profit. 
Inside the capitalist firm, capital- owning employers were in a necessary conflict 
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with workers. This remained true no matter how much workers were paid: the 
problem of exploitation was not correctable by raising labor’s standard of living, 
per se, but only by eliminating the wage- labor relationship which makes one set 
of human beings – wage- workers – the instruments of their employers’ profit- 
seeking goals.
 Unfortunately, Marx made a fundamental error, or certainly much of the 
socialist tradition made this error: accepting what David Ellerman (1992) calls 
the fundamental myth of capitalist property rights. That error involves believing 
the right to hire labor is somehow inherent in the ownership of capital goods. 
The consequence of this error is to think that the way to abolish the wages 
system is to abolish private property in the means of production, since if capital 
is no longer privately owned, capitalists would no longer exist who could hire 
and exploit labor. As a result, most real- world socialist movements and govern-
ments have attempted to socialize property, sometimes for the worst. There are 
two major problems with this strategy. One is the Hayekian knowledge problem. 
Socializing productive property abolishes capital goods markets, thereby neces-
sitating some sort of centralized production organized through command, rather 
than decentralized and rivalrous production organized spontaneously by the rules 
of market competition. Given the knowledge problem faced by central planners 
concerning the effective use of capital goods and organization of labor, wide- 
scale socialization of productive property – in the absence of market price 
signals – will generally be welfare- reducing, rather than welfare- enhancing.
 The second problem is what we might call the Marxian paradox. Actually 
existing socialist systems did not abolish the wages system. Instead, state- run 
firms hired wage- labor, rather than entrepreneurial or capitalist- run firms, with 
the government simply assuming the place previously held by the entrepreneur 
or capitalist. Socialist wage labor thus became the instrument of a new set of 
people, the managers of state firms. From this perspective, the Soviet Union was 
actually an example of state capitalism, rather than socialism (Resnick and Wolff 
2002).
 Although he generally distances himself from the Marxist- socialist tradition, 
Ellerman proposes a theoretical solution to these problems that is in keeping 
with Marx’s call to abolish the wages system: prohibit the wage- labor relation-
ship outright, while leaving the ownership of private property otherwise intact. 
This would mean that labor would have to hire capital, and capital owners would 
not be allowed to hire labor. Managerial responsibility would therefore have to 
be delegated by workers through some sort of democratic procedure, and profits 
would have to be shared among the workers in the firm in a manner determined 
collectively by the workers. Labor would thus assume the role of residual claim-
ant and have formal control over the governance of the enterprise. Current 
common stockholders would lose governance rights, perhaps having their 
common shares converted to preferred shares.
 Could this system be achieved in a manner consistent with the Hayekian rule 
of law? I believe so. Jaroslav Vanek, a long- standing advocate of worker co- 
operatives, has proposed the following constitutional amendment:
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Whenever people work together in a common enterprise (whatever their 
number), it is they and they only who appropriate the results of their labors, 
whether positive (products) or negative (costs or liabilities), and who control 
and manage democratically on the basis of equality of vote or weight the 
activities of their enterprise. These workers may or may not be owners of 
the capital assets with which they work, but in any event such ownership 
does not impart any rights of control over the firm. Only possession of and 
income from such assets can be assigned to the owners, to be regulated by a 
free contract between the working community (i.e., the enterprise) and the 
owners.
(Vanek 1996: 29)
To enforce such a proposed constitutional rule that requires firms to be demo-
cratically self- governing and labor- appropriating would not involve the arbitrary 
use of discretionary power, as Hayek understands it. The rule is universally 
applicable, well announced, and general, since it aims at no particular outcome 
for specific individuals. Such a rule would be similar to a constitutional provi-
sion against slavery. In this case, it is a constitutional restriction of “wage- 
slavery.” Implementing a system of universal self- employment that permits both 
independent contracting and self- managed firms would abolish the wages 
system, thereby achieving one socialist objective. Universal self- employment 
would not permit individuals to rent control of their time and cede the right to 
appropriate the product of labor to employers in exchange for a wage. There 
would thus be no capitalist labor market. A thriving co- operative labor market 
would exist, however, in which co- operatives would search for workers with an 
offer of democratic membership rights and profit- and revenue- sharing.
 Requiring firms to be democratically organized need not involve any central 
planning or state ownership of productive property. Self- managed firms can exist 
in an institutional context in which private property is widely held and in which 
those firms compete with each other in a rivalrous market process. But, is it pos-
sible to argue that such a system could be implemented without causing wide-
spread misery? We saw above that Hayek argues that the mere compatibility of a 
legal rule with the rule of law (e.g., requiring universal self- management in 
firms) does not necessarily mean that it is acceptable to adopt the self- managed 
rule. We also have to ask whether the rule would produce beneficial results. 
Would assigning the legal right of appropriation to labor in each separate firm, 
thereby giving workers responsibility for organizing production, contribute to 
the co- ordination of dispersed knowledge, the creation of wealth, and the promo-
tion of human flourishing, as effectively as a system populated with capitalist 
firms?
 A long- standing criticism maintains that self- managed firms display perverse 
responses to changes in output prices (Ward 1959). Neoclassical economists 
sometimes fault self- managed firms for reducing production and limiting 
employment in response to a price increase, thereby generating backward- 
bending product supply curves and falling employment. This contrasts with a 
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typical capitalist enterprise that follows, in theory, the more socially rational 
strategy of increasing output and employment in response to a rise in price of the 
product it sells. David Prychitko (1996) points out that this supposed fault of the 
self- managed firm is the result of adopting a short- run, equilibrium methodology 
that is hostile to the market- process perspective consistent with Hayekian spon-
taneous order theory. In a competitive market process, rising prices that create 
profit opportunities should elicit the entry of new self- managed firms. If so, Pry-
chitko argues that a system of competitive, self- managed firms will behave as 
rationally as a system of competitive capitalist firms. He concludes that Haye-
kian spontaneous order theorists should not be pessimistic when evaluating the 
feasibility of a market economy populated by self- managed firms.
 Bowles and Gintis (1993) go further than Prychitko and argue that self- 
managed firms may be more efficient than the typical capital enterprise. As it is 
often not possible to contract for the specific performance of effort and because 
the employer reaps the profit from harder- working employees, in the typical cap-
italist enterprise employers use two types of strategies to increase worker pro-
ductivity. First, they tend to pay above market- clearing wages, so that workers 
are not indifferent between keeping their jobs and being fired. Second, employ-
ers employ various resource- using technologies to monitor worker effort. Bowles 
and Gintis suggest that firms can reduce the use of monitoring resources by 
transferring the right of appropriation to the workers. In other words, if workers 
control the production process and receive a share of the profits, self- managed 
firms may be able to economize on monitoring costs, thus experiencing effi-
ciency gains. Self- managed, profit- sharing enterprises may be able to elicit the 
same level of worker effort at a lower resource cost, since workers who receive a 
portion of the profits may have less incentive to shirk than workers whose efforts 
result exclusively in capitalist profits. Self- managed firms are more likely to use 
wage incentives than resource- using monitoring techniques to elicit work effort.3
 Hayek’s idea of the central role that tacit, experiential knowledge plays in 
production suggests other potential efficiency- enhancing benefits of a system of 
self- managed firms. The importance of specialized human capital in modern pro-
duction processes may strengthen the argument for profit- sharing and worker 
control as an incentive for workers to undertake investment in firm- specific 
forms of human capital (Blair 1995). Workers in self- managed firms may also 
have more incentive to report their cost- saving ideas than workers in the capital-
ist firm, since they would share in any profits thereby generated. Insofar as capi-
talist firms often do not provide incentives to all employees to suggest 
cost- cutting measures, self- managed firms may be more innovative than the cap-
italist firm. On the other hand, innovative risk- taking often requires large outlays 
of financial capital. In this regard, there is reason to think a market system with 
self- managed firms could exhibit less technical change than capitalism. If so, it 
is possible that instituting worker self- management will require sacrificing a 
degree of technological progress, unless policy explicitly addresses this issue.
 Another potential issue with worker self- management relates to the problem 
of capital maintenance. Bowles and Gintis note that efficient use of the capital 
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stock is difficult to monitor, i.e., renters of capital equipment may overuse and 
under- maintain the capital stock. This might be one reason that capital owners 
are often not willing to rent their equipment at a competitive price to a group of 
workers, thereby giving those workers governance and appropriation rights. 
Renting capital equipment to non- owning workers, as would be required of non- 
working capital owners if the Vanek amendment were adopted, could result in 
an inefficient level of capital maintenance. In response, Bowles and Gintis 
suggest that worker self- managed firms may then need to require significant 
worker ownership of the firm’s capital assets, in order to realize a socially effi-
cient amount of capital maintenance. Worker ownership may in many cases be 
necessary to make self- management feasible. If so, workers may have difficulty 
sustaining the operation of heavily capital- intensive enterprises, since they will 
not desire or be able to fund ownership of the capital assets. To address this 
problem, Bowles and Gintis propose a combination of subsidized credit with 
unemployment and bankruptcy insurance, which is triggered by poor behavior in 
macroeconomic variables not controlled by individual firms. In an earlier work, I 
suggested creating large, taxpayer- funded, universally available capital accounts 
that workers could use to fund ownership stakes in self- managed enterprises 
(Burczak 2006). In the end, a socialist spontaneous order would have employ 
some sort of democratic process to negotiate the trade- off between enterprise 
size and innovation, while respecting the principles of self- management and the 
rule of law.4
Satisfying needs: a universal basic income
The other socialist objective is to move toward a system of distribution accord-
ing to need, and away from a system of distribution “in accordance with the per-
ceived value of a person’s actions and services to others,” i.e., according to 
market value (Nozick’s 1974: 158 characterization of Hayek). To achieve distri-
bution according to need, Robert van der Veen and Philippe Van Parijs propose 
a “capitalist road to communism” (van der Veen and Van Parijs 2006). They 
argue that society need not go through a socialist stage, as understood in tradi-
tional Marxism, that socializes productive property in order to overcome the 
impediments that the “fetters” of capitalist property relations supposedly place 
on the achievement of material abundance and the possibility of universal need 
fulfillment. Instead, a capitalist society could establish a universal basic income 
grant, large enough for individuals to satisfy their basic needs through ordinary 
market exchange.
 Van der Veen and Van Parijs believe that communism involves not only the 
satisfaction of basic needs but also the end of alienating, onerous work, so that 
labor becomes “life’s prime want.” As a result, “if communism is to be 
approached within a capitalist society, it must be by way of raising as much as 
possible the guaranteed income in the form of a universal grant” (van der Veen 
and Van Parijs 2006: 11). The larger the guaranteed income, the less attractive is 
alienating, burdensome work, which should put pressure on firms to increase the 
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non- monetary attractiveness of labor and to promote the evolution of more pleas-
ant jobs and worker- friendly technologies. But they recognize that the disincen-
tives created by high tax rates and a generous basic income can reduce the 
amount of productive activity, thereby threatening sustainability of the basic 
income. As such, in the manner of the Laffer curve, there are absolute limits to 
the size of tax revenues and the universal grant, both in the short and long runs. 
While they consider various principles for thinking about the trade- offs between 
increasing basic incomes and reducing economic growth (e.g. Rawlsian and 
egalitarian), ultimately those trade- offs would have to be negotiated through a 
democratic process. Whether or not advanced capitalist economies are currently 
productive enough to end alienating labor through a large basic income, they do 
believe that we have reached a stage where basic needs could be satisfied in a 
market system supplemented by a universal basic income grant.5
 There are interesting parallels between van der Veen’s and Van Parijs’s 
“communist” case for a basic income to satisfy human needs with Charles Mur-
ray’s “conservative” case for a basic income in order to eliminate poverty 
(Murray 2006). Murray advocates abolishing the welfare state institutions of the 
United States and replacing them with a guaranteed basic income of $5,000 to 
all non- criminal adult members of society. To this universal basic income, 
Murray would add another $5,000 grant that would be gradually “taxed away” 
(at a rate of 20 percent) after earned income reached $25,000, in the manner of 
Milton Friedman’s negative income tax proposal (Friedman 1962). Thus, 
someone unwilling or unable to work would receive $10,000 a year from the 
government, while someone earning the break- even income of $50,000, or 
above, would receive just the $5,000 basic income guarantee.6 Murray shows 
that this proposal is manageable within the current levels of government spend-
ing in the United States and argues that it would effectively eliminate poverty. 
While he does not go as far as van der Veen and Van Parijs to argue that the 
basic income grant should be gradually raised with the goal of liberating people 
from onerous work, his proposal demonstrates that the idea of a basic income to 
improve the distribution of income is attractive to proponents from diverse 
political- economic perspectives. The question is whether it might appeal to a 
Hayekian spontaneous order theorist.
 The institution of a basic income is based on the belief that the larger society, 
particularly government, has a responsibility to provide the resources necessary 
to meet human needs universally. Hayek rejects this position, arguing that the 
belief that people can make material claims on society is a baseless notion. 
“ ‘[S]ociety’ cannot think, act, value, or ‘treat’ anybody in a particular way. If 
such [material] claims are to be met, the spontaneous order which we call society 
must be replaced by a deliberately directed organization” (Hayek 1976: 103). 
Because the distribution of income in a market society is not determined by any 
responsible person – market distribution emerges spontaneously, like the weather 
– for Hayek, it makes as much sense for individuals to think they have a right to 
a certain income as it does for them to think they can make a claim on the 
weather to be sunny. “There is no individual and no cooperating group of people 
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against which the sufferer [of a low income] would have a just complaint” 
(Hayek 1976: 69). Since the distribution of income, like the weather, is not con-
trolled by human agency, at least not in a society absent a totalitarian dictator, 
government should not be responsible for “improving” market outcomes. Hayek 
thus rejects notions of distributive justice that give the government a role to play 
in determining the material benefits people receive.
 Hayek’s dismissal of distributive justice is, in the end, unsupportable. To see 
that, we should first notice that Hayek does advocate government action to 
protect individuals’ separate property rights. Because it serves what Hayek sees 
as the general interest, individuals have the right to expect government to employ 
coercively extracted resources (via taxation) to defend private property. Govern-
ment agents must deploy resources to apprehend and punish thieves, swindlers, 
and trespassers for individuals to be secure in their property. People have legiti-
mate expectations that government will take positive action to enforce the rules 
of law. To compare the spontaneous order of market to an impersonal and 
natural phenomenon like the weather is to ignore the role government and active 
human agency plays in defining and protecting property rights. Private property 
rights, as well as other individual rights (e.g., freedom of speech and association) 
require government agencies to provide individuals with material benefits, in the 
form of positive government action when those rights are violated. The enforce-
ment apparatus that is called into action when an individual’s property or per-
sonal right is transgressed requires government to allocate collectively 
appropriated resources. To protect their violated property and personal rights, 
individuals have a claim to substantive benefits from government agencies that 
is not categorically different from a claim to welfare rights.
 Stephen Holmes and Cass Sunstein similarly reject the conventional distinc-
tion between the idea of negative freedom associated with the possession of per-
sonal and property rights (the absence of government interference) and the 
notion of positive freedom associated with welfare rights (the capability to 
achieve a certain quality of life) (Holmes and Sunstein 1999). Hayek makes this 
distinction in his rejection of distributive justice. Yet property rights and welfare 
rights both require the performance of government action to secure those rights. 
Government must allocate tax revenues to care for the indigent, perhaps to 
obtain freedom from want, in the same way it does when it finances the punish-
ment of swindlers who run a Ponzi scheme. Because the security of any kind of 
legal right always depends upon government action, Holmes and Sunstein con-
clude that all rights are “positive.” “The financing of basic rights through tax 
revenues helps us see clearly that rights are public goods: taxpayer- funded and 
government- managed social services designed to improved collective and indi-
vidual well- being. All rights are positive rights” (Holmes and Sunstein 1999: 
48). Hayek’s rejection of distributive justice because it depends upon individuals 
having a claim to substantive benefits from the government is thus not sustaina-
ble. The real issue in a defense of a basic income against Hayek is the under-
lying conceptions of the general interest and individual well- being that justify 
government’s use of coercive power to reallocate resources.
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 Any socialist conception of distributive justice clearly requires at least a 
minimum baseline of need satisfaction for all citizens as a matter of right. In an 
argument with a Hayekian spontaneous order theorist, we need to ask, first, 
whether basic needs can be secured in a manner that does not violate the princi-
ples of non- discrimination and universality mandated by the rule of law and, 
second, whether the provision of basic needs is compatible with the spontaneous 
order that arises out of market competition. The answer to both questions is 
“yes,” if the strategy to satisfy basic needs is through a basic income. Basic 
income proposals advocate the provision, by the state, of a guaranteed minimum 
income to all adult, law- abiding citizens, rich and poor, regardless of their con-
tribution to production.7 Basic income proposals do not attempt to alter or protect 
the incomes people do receive through market exchange and are thus imple-
mented “outside” the market. They do not, like other social democratic policies 
(minimum wages, farm price supports, affirmative action laws, etc.) interfere 
with the market exchanges individuals negotiate voluntarily. Van der Veen and 
Van Parijs make a Hayekian argument that a basic income should be 
“[c]ombined with some deregulation of the labor market (no administrative 
obstacles to part- time work, no compulsory minimum wage, no compulsory 
retirement age, etc.)” (van der Veen and Van Parijs 2006: 11). A large basic 
income is consistent with policies producing labor market flexibility, since the 
policy goal is not to regulate the labor exchange but to free people from involun-
tary, unattractive labor. The need of enterprises, whether capitalist or self- 
managed, to attract necessary workers will lead firms to offer better working 
conditions.
 To implement a universal basic income entails a negative tax rate on those 
who perform no productive labor, which takes the form of the basic grant. 
Earned income is subject to a positive tax, although for low- income earners, the 
basic grant will exceed the value of the tax due, up to the point of the break- even 
income level of earned income. At the break- even level of income, the income 
tax paid by an individual equals the amount of the basic income guarantee. 
Above that point, taxable earned income begins to produce revenue for the gov-
ernment budget. Thus, a basic income produces overall progressivity in the 
income tax structure, which Hayek resisted. He believed that the rule of law 
requires a flat or proportional income tax rate. Hayek used some very strong 
words against income tax progressivity: “ ‘progression is simply hateful arbitrari-
ness’ ” (Hayek 1960: 308, quoting A. Theirs).
Unlike proportionality, progression provides no principle which tells us 
what the relative burden of different persons ought to be. It is no more than 
rejection of proportionality in favor of a discrimination against the wealthy 
without any criterion for limiting the extent of this discrimination.
(Hayek 1960: 313)
Progression violates the notions of neutrality and universal- applicability that lie 
at the heart of the rule of law. Hayek was worried that democracies might use 
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progressive tax policy to establish a tyranny of the poor against the rich and to 
produce unconstrained growth of the public sector (Hayek 1960, 314; 1979, 
51–4).
 A basic income can be funded with both a flat tax rate, applied above the 
break- even level, or with a marginal tax rate that rises with increases in earned 
income above the break- even level. Either a flat or progressive marginal tax rate 
will produce progression in the overall tax structure in a society that establishes 
a universal basic income guarantee. But Hayek’s principled arguments against 
progressive taxation are mainly applicable to an increasing marginal tax rate and 
not to progression in the overall tax structure. In this discussion of the merits of 
proportional taxation, Hayek concedes that there is “no justified objection to a 
majority deciding to grant an economically weak minority some relief in the 
form of a proportionately lower taxation” (1960: 322–3). As long as the majority 
is willing to tax itself at the highest legislated marginal tax rate in order to 
achieve objectives in the social interest (perhaps the socialist impulse to satisfy 
basic needs), Hayek apparently has no problem with the state using tax and 
welfare policy to alter the market distribution of income. His view, derived from 
the priority of the rule of law, is that democracies should not use variations in 
the legislated marginal tax rate to treat differently the higher incomes of a rela-
tively rich minority. He is willing to countenance tax relief to the minority of 
people who earn less than median income, thereby injecting progression into the 
overall tax structure. Along these lines, Van Parijs acknowledges that a basic 
income scheme could be funded using a proportional marginal tax rate (Van 
Parijs 2006: 31). All earned income could be subject to the same flat tax, in 
effect making the rate at which the grant is “taxed away” the same as the rate at 
which taxes are paid above the break- even level. If implemented in this fashion, 
Hayek’s defense of the rule of law does not provide an impediment to adopting a 
basic income.
 Critics might ask how we can know whether the basic income is large enough 
to satisfy basic needs for the typical person. A capability theorist, like Amartya 
Sen, would go further and point out that a universal basic income that enables 
the average person to meet a usual set of needs will not produce satisfactory 
need- satisfaction in people with special needs. For example, a physically handi-
capped individual will require more resources to achieve the same level of need- 
satisfaction as an able- bodied person. A social democratic critic might ask how 
we can be sure that the basic income is large enough to allow relaxation of labor 
market regulations. What is the feedback mechanism through which the govern-
ment can learn whether or not these socialist goals have been achieved (Storr 
2007)?
 A similar problem faces advocates of the rule of law when the question 
emerges about how many resources the government should devote to the courts, 
police, jails, military, and fire departments to protect private property fairly and 
adequately. Questions regarding the amount of public funds to allocate to rights 
protection and provision have no final answer. Effective democratic procedures 
and processes need to be in place to give some direction to government officials 
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about how many resources to devote to the maintenance of rights, whether that 
be the security of property or an adequate basic income. While the feedback 
mechanisms to learning through democracy may be weaker than the feedback 
mechanism to learning through profit and loss accounting, markets provide no 
signal to entrepreneurs about how to get food to the poor, who lack the means to 
express any effective demands (Sen 1981). Likewise, markets provide no signal 
to help decide how many police officers should be assigned to patrol the neigh-
borhood. There is thus an irreducible role for democracy to negotiate some 
aspects of the general interest (diZerega 1989).
 Still, even if it were possible to implement a high basic income, people with 
unusual needs will remain deprived. It is not likely that government officials 
with limited knowledge will be able to target aid effectively to those people. 
Such targeted aid would also come into conflict with the principle of non- 
discrimination that lies at the heart of Hayek’s rule of law. There thus remains 
an important role for non- governmental, philanthropic organizations in a social-
ist spontaneous order. Community- based charities will generally be better situ-
ated to channel aid to those who remain in need after the institution of a basic 
income. To facilitate funding those groups, Bowles and Gintis suggest that tax-
payers be able to fund these organizations directly, deducting their contributions 
up to a specified limit, directly from their tax obligations (Bowles and Gintis 
1998: 54).
A socialist spontaneous order
Establishing a universal basic income and instituting universal self- employment 
are not policies motivated by the desire to convert a capitalist cosmos into a social-
ist taxis. A basic income aims first to guarantee all people equal resources to parti-
cipate in market exchange, irrespective of their labor contribution, so that they 
have the capability to fulfill their basic needs as a matter of right. Society might 
also use an expansion of the basic income to put pressure on the development of 
more satisfying work processes. Neither goal is connected to a desire to expand the 
power of the state over the direction of individual lives. The second goal – putting 
pressure on the direction of the evolution of work processes – may be less import-
ant if the implementation of universal self- employment itself leads to more satisfy-
ing work, which we might expect with the abolition of the inherent conflict 
between capitalist bosses and their employees. Bowles even suggests that the only 
way to achieve a sizable basic income is to institute worker self- management 
simultaneously, since a large universal grant will likely reduce the quantity of 
labor demanded (since workers will have less incentive to work hard) and increase 
involuntary unemployment in a capitalist environment (Bowles 1992: 576). In any 
event, universal self- employment can be implemented in a manner that preserves 
market competition, with the attending possibilities of profit and loss and the 
decentralized co- ordination function those incentives perform.
 A system of universal self- employment and a universal basic income has not 
yet spontaneously evolved. To some extent, the political evolution of welfare 
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state policies moves us closer to a universal basic income. Self- managed worker 
co- operatives, on the other hand, while they do exist, do not enjoy anything close 
to a dominant position in the United States. This perhaps speaks against any sup-
posed efficiency advantages of co- operatively organized firms. Before resting 
with this conclusion, however, we might consider that most workers do not 
possess a great deal of wealth, and access to credit is difficult, if not impossible 
to obtain in financial markets that routinely allocate credit to those with market-
able wealth. The unequal distribution of wealth has had an important role in how 
industrial structure has evolved, and it may serve to block the competitive emer-
gence of potentially more efficient self- managed firms (although we should 
recognize that the advocacy of universal self- employment does not rest on effi-
ciency arguments alone).
 Does it make sense to think that government might cultivate a socialist spon-
taneous order? Hayek was not a spontaneous order theorist who believed that we 
should let the forces of social evolution proceed where they might. In Political 
Order of a Free People (Hayek 1979), he suggested a constitutional design that 
would establish a political structure to protect a capitalist market order. The idea 
of a socialist spontaneous order is proposed in a similar spirit of institution build-
ing. The goals of socialists might be attainable through a set of universal rules: a 
constitutional prohibition of wage- labor and a legislated guarantee of a basic 
income. Such a socialist constitutional design would not require central 
command of production and the social ownership of capital goods. It would 
allow what Hayek called the spontaneous, creative powers of a free civilization 
(Hayek 1960).
Notes
1 Thanks to Andrew Farrant and Robert Garnett for helpful comments on earlier drafts of 
this chapter.
2 Jeffrey Friedman (2005) criticizes Hayek for persistently arguing that the social demo-
cratic impulse in the twentieth century harbors an engineering or planning mentality. 
Friedman maintains that we can understand the various political- economic programs of 
the post- World War II Left not as the result of a supposed planning mentality but as the 
product of a mistaken belief that the capitalist profit motive does not generally produce 
socially beneficial outcomes. Rather than possessing a desire to implement central 
planning, the Left is motivated by a moralistic mentality that does not accept that the 
unintended consequences of morally suspect intentional action (i.e., self- interested 
gain- seeking) can generally lead to socially beneficially outcomes.
3 Bowles and Gintis’s conclusion is exactly the opposite of the more conventional view 
of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that capital owners tend control the governance of the 
firm because they can discipline labor most efficiently.
4 Vanek (1996) contains a discussion of several other potential advantages of worker 
self- management.
5 Van der Veen and Van Parijs do not examine the possibility that the implementation of 
universal self- employment might itself lead to more attractive work, absent the pres-
sures of a basic income.
6 This summarizes Murray’s presentation of his idea. In effect, he is combining a 
$10,000 basic income with a $25,000 earned income tax exemption. Once a person 
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starts earning more than $25,000, the basic income is taxed away, in his case, at a rate 
of 20 percent (the negative tax rate). Conceived in this way, the break- even level is 
$75,000. See Van Parijs (2006: 30–1) for a nice discussion of the potential formal 
symmetry, depending on program design, between a basic income and negative 
income tax.
7 There is some debate whether or not basic income grants should be extended to chil-
dren. Charles Murray, for example, argues that children should not receive a basic 
income, in order to encourage responsible parenting. Some Left advocates of a basic 
income believe children should not be excluded. Since defining the rights of children is 
a contentious issue in a capitalist spontaneous order, I will not attempt to resolve this 
issue in the context of a socialist spontaneous order.
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6 Hayek and philanthropy
A classical liberal road not (yet) taken
Robert F. Garnett, Jr.
Introduction
Like many classical liberals of the Cold War era, F. A. Hayek was of two minds 
about the role of philanthropy in modern commercial societies. In digressions 
sprinkled throughout his published works, Hayek hailed philanthropy as a Toc-
quevillian alternative to the welfare state and praised voluntary associations for 
their “recognition of many needs and discovery of many methods of meeting 
them which we could never have expected from the government” (Hayek 1979: 
50). At the same time, Hayek built his case for a free society on a principled cri-
tique of philanthropic action. The moral imperative to do “visible good to [our] 
known fellows (the ‘neighbor’ of the Bible)” is, in his view, “irreconcilable with 
the open society to which today all inhabitants of the West owe the general level 
of their wealth” (Hayek 1978: 268).
	 In	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	structure	and	significance	of	the	commerce/phi-
lanthropy relationship in Hayek’s thinking and in the evolving discourse of clas-
sical liberal economics. I begin by linking Hayek’s critique of philanthropy to 
the anti- socialist economics he formulated in the aftermath of the Great Depres-
sion and World War II. Widening the lens, I show that Hayek’s treatment of 
commerce and philanthropy as separate spheres, and his reduction of the 
economy to commerce only, were typical of twentieth- century economics at 
large	 –	 specifically,	 the	 modernist	 genre	 of	 economic	 theory	 that	 Hayek	 so	
trenchantly criticized from the 1930s on (Burczak 1994, 2006). I conclude by 
employing the ideas of Hayek, Amartya Sen, and other critics of economic mod-
ernism to recast Adam Smith’s commercial society as an extensive network of 
voluntary co- operation in which commerce and philanthropy work together to 
promote	human	freedom	and	flourishing.
Philanthropy as socialism: Hayek’s Cold War economics
Hayek’s vision of Adam Smith’s Great Society of Mankind (Smith 1976a 
[1759]) was forged in part through his leadership role in the Mont Pèlerin 
Society, a post- World War II movement to promote classical liberalism as a 
positive alternative to statism (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). Chief among 
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Hayek’s priorities during this period was the formulation of a comprehensive 
and robust economic theory. Socialist economists were touting central planning 
as the modern solution to humankind’s economic problem. So Hayek and his 
radical cohort aspired to defeat the socialists on their own terms – to set forth a 
philosophy and analytic framework that would trump their enemy’s economics 
in rigor, scope, and rhetorical force.
 Through a series of essays, beginning in the 1950s and culminating in The 
Fatal Conceit (1988), Hayek argued that the socialist project – construed by 
Hayek	as	the	construction	of	a	fair,	efficient,	centrally	planned	economy	–	was	
based	 on	 a	 conflation	 of	 ancient	 and	 modern	 economic	 orders.	 Advocates	 of	
socialism, says Hayek, imagine that a modern socialist economy can function 
like an Aristotelian oikos: a community in which order arises from the “deliber-
ate organization of individual action by an ordering mind” (Hayek 1988: 11, 
45–7). The ruling ethos in such an economy is to “to restrict our actions to the 
deliberate	pursuit	of	known	and	observable	beneficial	ends”	 (ibid.:	80).	Hayek	
deems this ethos a tribal morality, a set of norms “which are essential to the 
cohesion of the small group but which are irreconcilable with the order, the pro-
ductivity, and the peace of a great society of free men” (Hayek 1978: 66).
 Though he never speaks of philanthropy per se, Hayek’s bright line distinc-
tion between ancient and modern moralities leaves little doubt about his general 
view. He memorably declares: “An order in which everyone treated his neighbor 
as himself would be one where comparatively few could be fruitful and multi-
ply”	(Hayek	1988:	13).	Persons	committed	to	finding	“a	proper	cure	for	misfor-
tunes about which we are understandably concerned” (ibid.) should “[withhold] 
from the known needy neighbors what they might require in order to serve the 
unknown needs of thousands of others” (Hayek 1978: 268) since the latter 
“[confers]	benefits	beyond	the	range	of	our	concrete	knowledge”	(Hayek	1988:	
81)	and	thus	provides	“a	greater	benefit	to	the	community	than	most	direct	‘altru-
istic’ action” (ibid.: 19). Hayek urges modern humanitarians to devote fewer 
resources to charity and more to commerce – to “earning a living” – since the 
latter	will	provide	“a	greater	benefit	to	the	community	than	most	direct	‘altruis-
tic’ action” (ibid.: 19; see also Hayek 1976: 90, 136, 144–5; Hayek 1978: 19, 59, 
60, 65–6; and Hayek 1979: 60, 161–2, 165, 168).
 Hayek’s view of a Smithian commercial society is thus structured by a series 
of interlocking dualisms (Hayek 1976, 1979, 1988) (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1 
Markets Philanthropy
Great Society tribal society
(modern, open, cosmos) (ancient, closed, taxis)
modern morality tribal/socialist	morality
(serving unknown others via commerce) (serving known others via gifts and solidarity)
Adam Smith Aristotle
150  R. F. Garnett, Jr.
Despite his expressed support for private philanthropy as an alternative to gov-
ernment largesse (Hayek 1979: 50–1, 186), Hayek theorized an “extended order 
of human cooperation” (Hayek 1988: xi, 6) in which philanthropy and civil 
society were pushed to the margins as vestiges of pre- modernity.
 To illustrate the logic of Hayek’s position, consider his view of corporate phi-
lanthropy – an argument that echoes Milton Friedman’s infamous claim that “the 
social	 responsibility	 of	 business	 is	 to	 increase	 its	 profits”	 (Friedman	 1970).	
Hayek objects to “socially responsible” giving by publicly held corporations on 
both epistemic and economic grounds, arguing that corporate managers lack the 
knowledge to effectively allocate resources to social endeavors “for which 
proven	 abilities	 to	 use	 resources	 efficiently	 in	 production	 does	 not	 necessarily	
confer special competence” (Hayek 1967b: 311). As Friedman explains:
Suppose a business wants to do charity. What is it that gives it any special 
ability to do charity properly? The XYZ Company, in addition to producing 
XYZ trucks, also wants to be socially responsible and so it does what it 
thinks is charity. What is its special capacity for that? It may know how to 
make trucks, but does it know the right way to spend charitable money?
(Friedman 2006: 11)
Unchecked by market forces, managers’ pursuit of “what they regard as socially 
desirable purposes” (Hayek 1967b: 304) transforms corporations into “self- 
willed and possibly irresponsible empires, aggregates of enormous and largely 
uncontrollable power” (ibid.: 311).
	 Beyond	 allocative	 inefficiencies,	 Hayek	 condemns	 managers’	 redirection	 of	
shareholder resources to their own ends as tantamount to theft (Hayek 1967b: 301). 
He also fears that corporate philanthropy will be a slippery slope to socialism.
[Managers’] power to do good according to their own judgment is bound to 
be merely a transitory stage. The price they would soon have to pay for this 
short- lived freedom will be that they will have to take instructions from the 
political authority which is supposed to represent the public interest.
(ibid.: 312)
The	overarching	 implication	of	 the	Friedman/Hayek	view	 is	 that	philanthropic	
ends are better served by the commercial machine than by individual acts of 
caring and sharing.
 Hayek’s commerce- only view of the Smithian Great Society placed binding 
constraints on his liberal project. Had his economic philosophy been less rigidly 
bound by the aforementioned dualisms, Hayek’s liberal commitment to volun-
tary co- operation might have inspired him to theorize the co- articulation of civil 
and commercial society. James Buchanan offers a similar conjecture:
To secure freedom from the collective . . . was, properly, the predominant 
objective for the post- Marxist classical liberal. It is not surprising that the 
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rejection of collectivism . . . should have involved a complementary neglect 
of and appreciation for the communitarian elements in a well- functioning 
social order informed by liberal value norms.
(Buchanan 2005: 78)
Hayek’s neglect of communitarian elements is evident in his discussion of equal 
opportunity. Though committed to the Rawlsian norm of seeking to “improve 
the chances of any member of society, taken at random, as much as possible” 
(Hayek 1978: 62), Hayek never articulated a cogent account of where, why, and 
by whom inequalities of opportunity should be redressed (cf. Dobuzinskis 2008). 
He recognizes the need to provide assistance to “people who, for one reason or 
another, cannot through the market earn a minimum income” (Hayek 1978: 64, 
92) and argues that public action “outside the market” (governmental or other-
wise) is the best way to provide such assistance, in preference to price controls 
and other market restrictions. He endorsed universal education, for example, as a 
way to “place all of the young at the foot of the ladder on which they would then 
be able to rise in accordance with their abilities” (Hayek 1978: 142). However, 
Hayek	provides	no	explicit	economic	or	normative	justification	for	such	actions.
 The eclipse of civil society in Hayek’s theory of the Great Society was brought 
to light four decades ago by Richard Cornuelle (1993 [1965]). In Reclaiming the 
American Dream: The Role of Private Individuals and Voluntary Associations, 
Cornuelle outlines the structure and dynamics of what he termed the “independent 
sector”: a pluralistic array of voluntary, non- commercial institutions that “functions 
at any moment when a person or group acts directly to serve others” (ibid.: 38). 
Cornuelle tethers a Tocquevillian image of voluntary public action onto a Mises–
Hayek theory of markets to envision a society that is “both free and humane” (ibid.: 
xxxiv; see also Cornuelle 1991). In his Afterword to the 1993 reprint of Reclaiming, 
Cornuelle laments that so few libertarians had been willing to accept his concept of 
a	flourishing	voluntary	community	beyond	the	commercial	sphere:
Most of my libertarian friends were willing to discuss possible market solu-
tions to public problems, but, lacking any analytical device but market 
theory,	continued	to	believe	that	anything	that	could	not	be	done	profitably	
should probably not be done at all.
(Cornuelle 1993 [1965]: 186)
Hayek,	for	his	part	–	as	if	to	affirm	Buchanan’s	“post-	Marxist	classical	liberal”	
conjecture – praises Cornuelle’s ideas (Hayek 1979). He calls Reclaiming an 
“unduly neglected book” and “one of the most promising developments of polit-
ical ideas in recent years” (ibid.: 186, 51). He also laments his own inability to 
explore more fully “the actual and potential achievements of the independent 
sector”:
I wish I could write about the subject at length, even if it were only to drive 
home the point that public spirit need not always mean demand for or 
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support of government action. I must, however, not stray too far from the 
proper subject of this chapter, which is the service functions which govern-
ment might usefully perform, not those which it need not take upon itself.
(ibid.: 51)
The enduring “Adam Smith Problem” of modern economics
As further context for the marginal place of philanthropy in Hayek’s economics, 
one must acknowledge that among professional economists of Hayek’s era, such 
treatments of non- commercial motives and processes were commonplace. Most 
twentieth- century economists advanced or accepted the monist premise that 
commerce alone – commodity production and exchange – was the proper domain 
of economic theory (Mirowski 1989, 2001). Without a priori intent to exclude 
philanthropy, economists’ commitments to the mathematical formalisms of 
received theories of value led them to follow the lead of Adam Smith himself, 
who “did not give private benevolence associations much of a role in solving 
social problems” (Fleischacker 2004: 275).
 In the language of intellectual history, this pervasive neglect of philanthropy in 
economic	 theories	 of	 commercial	 society	 signifies	 an	 enduring	 “Adam	 Smith	
Problem” (ASP). The ASP, in its classical form (Oncken 1897), refers to an alleged 
discontinuity between Smith’s two major works (Smith 1976a [1759] and 1976b 
[1776]), namely: “the hypothesis that the moral philosopher who made sympathy 
the basis for social behavior in the Theory of Moral Sentiments did an about- turn 
from altruistic to egoistic theory in the Wealth of Nations”	 (Raphael	 and	Macfie	
1976: 20). Few contemporary Smith scholars still regard the classic ASP as a 
problem since most now subscribe to a conception of Smithian “self- interest” 
whose breadth dissolves the bipolarity of self- interest and sympathy.
 The ASP that endures today, what I describe as the modernist ASP, is an institu-
tional binarism: a “separate spheres” model of economic life in which the economy 
is reduced to commerce only, and commerce and philanthropy – impersonal Ges-
ellschaft and face- to-face Gemeinschaft (Tönnies 1887) – are treated as distinct and 
antithetical worlds. Much as the original ASP arose from a monist view of the indi-
vidual as narrowly self- interested, so the modernist ASP presupposes a monist 
economy:	a	unified	and	complete	system,	governed	by	a	single	self-	organizing	prin-
ciple and capable of serving as the principal provider of societal wealth.
 This line of economic thinking predates the twentieth century but ascended to 
new heights after World War II. American economists emerged from World War 
II “covered in glory” (Morgan and Rutherford 1998: 13), having solved many 
wartime policy problems with their newly acquired mathematical and statistical 
expertise (Sent 2006: 83; Morgan and Rutherford 1998: 9–11). Inspired by the 
rise of national income accounting, mathematical control theory, and the Walra-
sian theory of “general equilibrium,” professional economists in the 1940s and 
1950s promulgated the idea that national economies were engineerable systems, 
i.e., machines. This idea was systematized at the highest levels of theory, both in 
the reduction of the economic sphere to commerce (economics as the science of 
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exchange) and in the further reduction of commerce to the clean, tidy world of 
generic	rational	agents	and	efficient	markets	(Weintraub	2002).
 This general equilibrium model was embraced by conservative and liberal 
economists alike. Chicago School formulations emphasized its verisimilitude to 
the real world – a world populated, in their perception, by highly rational agents 
and highly competitive markets. MIT and Harvard economists used the general 
equilibrium ideal as a yardstick to measure the shortcomings of real- world econ-
omies and to justify government interventions to correct these imperfections 
(Garnett and Butler 2003). Either way, the modernist economy – whether regu-
lated or unregulated – was seen as the generative core of economic life (potent, 
efficient,	systemic),	in	contrast	to	charity	and	other	forms	of	philanthropic	giving	
which	were	regarded	as	outmoded,	inefficient,	and	ad	hoc.
 Through the lens of gender, the separate spheres view of commerce and phi-
lanthropy echoes the historic separation of male and female domains (Coontz 
2005: 146, 155–6; McCloskey 2006: 254–5; Nelson 2006: 33–7; Pallotta 2008: 
28–30). In her history of the modern family, Stephanie Coontz argues that the 
eighteenth century was marked by a growing “sense that men and women lived 
in different spheres, with the man’s sphere divorced from domesticity and the 
woman’s divorced from the ‘economy’ ” and by a parallel segregation of motives 
and behaviors: commercial spaces occupied by “rational and active” men, and 
households occupied by “humanitarian and compassionate” women (Coontz 
2005: 155–6). “The husband was the family’s economic motor,” Coontz writes, 
“and the wife its sentimental core” (ibid.: 146).
	 Even	 today,	 the	 common-	sense	 view	 of	 the	 for-	profit	 sector	 as	 “dominant	
over charity” is laced with a gender- laden assumptions (Pallotta 2008: 30) such 
as “charities cannot take chances,” “[charities] cannot have the same level of 
compensation as business,” “[charities] must be supervised and measured by 
their	 efficiency,”	 and	 “we	must	 always	 be	 on	 the	 lookout	 for	 how	 [charities]	
spend our money” (ibid.: 30). Hence the economic role and status ascribed to 
philanthropy remains analogous to Simone de Beauvoir’s “second sex”: a sepa-
rate and secondary form of economic co- operation.
 These entrenched dualisms limit our ability to understand and improve the 
humane ecology of commercial societies. Public understanding of economic life 
is diminished when commercial society is seen through the monist lens of Wal-
rasian models in which narrowly self- interested agents interact in markets- only 
economies (McCloskey 2006). Philanthropic endeavors are particularly undercut 
by the notion of an all- providing commercial or mixed economy. For if our 
modern	economy	can	generate	and	allocate	resources	more	efficiently	than	any	
other conceivable “system,” then it is no longer necessary to engage in informal, 
local, non- commercial – in a word, pre- modern – modes of giving and learning.
Deconstructing commerce, rethinking commercial society
At the Mont Pèlerin Society’s inaugural meeting in 1947, Hayek challenged his 
colleagues to tackle the “great intellectual task” of “purging traditional liberal 
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theory of certain accidental accretions which [had] become attached to it in the 
course of time,” and to “[face] up to certain real problems which an oversimpli-
fied	liberalism	[had]	shirked	or	which	[had]	become	apparent	only	since	it	had	
become a somewhat stationary and rigid creed” (Hayek 1967a: 237–8). As we 
sit	 today,	 just	 one	 generation	 removed	 from	 the	 official	 end	 of	 the	Cold	War,	
classical liberals are once again confronting a “great intellectual task”: the re- 
examination of the liberal ends and means of voluntary co- operation and the 
refashioning of Adam Smith’s Great Society beyond the reductive conceptions 
of economic modernism and Cold War anti- socialism.
 To take up this task is to embark anew on Cornuelle’s quest for a “free and 
humane” society comprising market processes and “aggressive and imaginative 
voluntary action in the public interest” (Cornuelle 1992: 6 and Cornuelle 1993 
[1965]). Many contemporary thinkers have indeed begun to recast commercial 
society	as	“a	free	society	that	leads	to	and	depends	upon	flourishing	human	lives	
of virtue” (McCloskey 2006: 497), refusing to allow their liberal imaginations to 
be bound by their predecessors’ dichotomies (Gesellschaft/Gemeinschaft,	Smith/
Aristotle,	 negative	 liberty/positive	 liberty).	 Intentionally	 or	 not,	 these	 scholars	
are taking up the challenge Don Lavoie posed to the “more liberal elements of 
the left and right sides of the old political spectrum,” namely: “to transcend the 
confines	of	these	obsolete	ideologies	and	work	together	to	articulate	a	new	vision	
of the free society” (Lavoie 1994: 283).
 Adam Smith’s writings, though containing only inchoate hints about the eco-
nomic role of philanthropy per se, nonetheless provide a rich starting point for 
contemporary	 reflection	 on	 the	 contours	 of	 commercial	 society.	 Smith’s	 com-
mercial	society,	as	defined	in	Wealth of Nations chapter 5, is ostensibly nothing 
more than a market economy: a social order in which “every man . . . lives by 
exchanging” (Smith 1976b [1776]: 37). However, if one refracts the term 
“exchanging” through Smith’s larger oeuvre, it points to multiple modes of reci-
procity, market and non- market, through which individuals give and receive the 
means	to	create	a	flourishing	life.	Here,	 too,	Buchanan	agrees.	“The	normative	
ideal [of classical liberalism] is not laissez- faire without qualifying adjectives,” 
he argues. “The normative ideal must include reciprocity” (Buchanan 2005: 84; 
original emphasis). This expanded concept of exchange implies an equally 
expansive view of the Smithian invisible hand: the complex process whereby our 
human capacity to “treat strangers as though they were honorary relatives or 
friends” (Seabright 2004) gives rise to unplanned moral, economic, and social 
order.
 Hayek opens the door to this broader economic vision through his emphasis 
on the humane effects of the invisible hand. He describes the market order as a 
catallaxy, in part because the latter’s Greek root (katalattein or katalassein) 
means both “to exchange” and “to receive into the community” and “to turn 
from enemy into friend” (Hayek 1988: 112). By way of this strategic renaming, 
Hayek highlights the cosmopolitan character and moral consequences of the 
market	process:	“The	morals	of	 the	market	do	lead	us	to	benefit	others,	not	by	
our intending to do so, but by making us act in a manner which, nonetheless, 
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will have just that effect” (Hayek 1988: 81). However, Hayek never challenged 
the	market-	centered	definition	of	economic	science	and	was	thus	unable	to	inte-
grate philanthropy into his fundamental theory of commercial society. Like most 
twentieth- century economists, he failed to exploit the overlay of Smith’s two 
famous books, for example, the notion that Smith’s Wealth of Nations is but a 
special case of the general theory of social co- operation outlined in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments	(Evensky	2005:	20;	see	also	Macfie	1967;	Fleischacker	2004).	
Had Hayek or his fellow moderns attempted a more radical reformulation of eco-
nomics as moral philosophy, they might have advocated a Smithian science of 
reciprocity,	i.e.,	exchange	broadly	defined.
	 As	we	seek	to	advance	this	expanded	Smithian	science	today,	a	necessary	first	
step is to replace philosophical monism (the meta- economic framework that 
gave	 rise	 to	 the	ASP	 in	 the	first	 place)	with	 cogent,	 pluralistic	 conceptions	 of	
human action and economic organization. In other words, we must undo the 
modernist separation of economic science from economic anthropology – to 
recognize that market- based economies are characterized by the very qualities 
generally ascribed to “pre- modern” gift economies such as thick sociality, 
complex networks of interlocking obligations, and temporal separations of 
outlay and return.
 Colin Danby (2002) elegantly outlines the logic and importance of this decon-
structive	project.	Danby	argues	that	 the	familiar	gift/commerce	dichotomy	pre-
supposes a Walrasian model of market exchange. In standard versions of this 
model,	market	 transactions	 are	 conceived	 as	 fleeting	 and	 impersonal,	 as	 “spot	
transactions in which one thing is instantaneously swapped for something else 
by transactors who may never meet again” (ibid.: 15). Anthropologists tacitly 
accept	this	model,	Danby	contends,	when	they	define	gift	exchange	as	the	mirror	
image of Walrasian exchange: reciprocal transactions that occur over time 
between parties who share an ongoing relationship (ibid.: 15).
	 Danby	 attacks	 this	 gift/market	 dichotomy	 at	 two	 levels.	 First,	 he	 situates	 it	
within a larger philosophical and historical context. He writes:
The	problem	with	the	gift/exchange	dichotomy	goes	deeper	than	its	notion	
of exchange. . . . It is an expression of an underlying a priori dichotomy 
between non- modern and modern, or non- West and West . . . The non- 
modern in this pairing is a shaggy periphery, a detritus category of all that 
does	not	fit	the	imagined	modern.	It	represents	what	the	modern	lacks,	what	
the modern is leaving behind, what the modern will inevitably overcome. 
The essential assumption . . . is that there exists an underlying modern or 
Western social topos	 (field),	 unified,	 bounded,	 and	 possessing	 inherent	
characteristics, which can be analytically separated from one or more non- 
modern or non- Western social topoi. This self- congratulatory idea can be 
expressed	 through	 space	 (West/East,	 North/South,	 First	 World/Third	
World),	 time	 (advanced/backward,	 late/early,	 progressive/traditional),	 and	
other pairings too numerous to list.
(ibid.: 14)
156  R. F. Garnett, Jr.
Second, Danby points to multiple traditions of economic thought that challenge 
the Walrasian reduction of economic life to atemporal, asocial exchange. For 
example, Post- Keynesian, Austrian, Institutionalist, and Marxian theories all 
emphasize the “through- time organization of material life” (ibid.: 14) – the dia-
chronic and socially embedded nature of exchange and all other economic proc-
esses. In Post- Keynesian models, for instance, the typical transaction is the 
“forward transaction, by virtue of which the parties involved are likely to have 
an institutional or embedded relationship” (ibid.: 15; original emphasis). Con-
versely, once we reconceptualize market exchange outside the modernist frame, 
we	can	no	 longer	 regard	“either	a	delayed	return,	or	difficulty	 in	assessing	 the	
value of that delayed return, [as] special characteristics of ‘the gift’ ” (ibid.: 32).
	 Danby’s	analysis	 is	directly	germane	to	the	philanthropy/commerce	dualism	
at issue in this chapter. Of the latter, Danby would say that economists have yet 
to understand philanthropy and commerce on their own terms inasmuch as we 
continue to see both through reductive lenses: commerce as a robust self- 
organizing system and philanthropy as its good- hearted but asystematic 
subsidiary.
 If we were to reconstruct the economics of commercial society along the general 
lines suggested by Danby’s approach, the resulting framework would make room 
for	philanthropy	in	three	significant	ways.	First,	economic	plurality	would	be	etched	
into the language and ontology of the new Smithian economics. No part of the 
economy would be conceived as inherently commercial or philanthropic. The 
general presumption would be that every aspect of the economy comprises com-
mercial and philanthropic elements. Characteristics once ascribed exclusively to 
markets or philanthropy would be seen as general features of both, for example, 
calculation (Boettke and Prychitko 2004; Chamlee- Wright 2004), reciprocity, self- 
interest, benevolence, large- scale co- operation via adherence to abstract rules 
(Lewis 2009), knowledge problems, intended and unintended consequences, inte-
gration and disintegration of individual identities and communities, and so on.
 Seeing the economic world as inherently pluralistic in these ways would allow 
economists to recognize the nuance and complexity of hybrid forms such as “for- 
profit	social	ventures	and	entrepreneurial	non-	profits”	(Fulton	and	Blau	2005:	15,	
28; see also Strong 2009). It also would put more economists in dialogue with the 
fascinating studies of human co- operation now emerging from leading edges of 
network theory (Benkler 2006; Lessig 2008), evolutionary biology and psychology 
(Gintis et al. 2005), experimental economics (Smith 2008), post- Maussian gift 
theory (Godbout 1998; Vandevelde 2000), Hayekian social capital theory 
(Chamlee- Wright 2008, 2010; Lewis 2008; Lewis and Chamlee- Wright 2008; 
Chamlee- Wright and Myers 2008) and other genres of classical liberal economics 
(McCloskey 2006; Storr 2008), social economics (van Staveren 2001), develop-
ment economics (Sen 1999), feminist economics (Nelson 2006), behavioral eco-
nomics (Meier 2006), and positive psychology (Garnett 2008).
 A second key element in this rethinking of commercial society would be the 
adoption of broader views of the self, self- interest, and human action via a 
Smithian notion of rule- guided action (Smith 1976a [1790]: 161–70). For Smith, 
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human	action	 is	not	driven	not	by	“rational	choice”	as	defined	 in	modern	eco-
nomics. By emphasizing the limited knowledge and limited benevolence of 
“man as he actually is” (Coase 1976: 544), Smith recognizes that human action 
is often guided by tacit knowledge and the observance of learned (social) rules. 
On these grounds, he argues that individuals are capable of caring for a variety 
of “others” via voluntary associations with groups and the adoption of their rules 
and norms. He envisions an individual who is capable of ethical action beyond 
narrow self- interest by virtue of her ability to identify with others and to judge 
others’ actions (and her own actions) with respect to the goals, needs, or norms 
of the group as a whole (Lewis 2009).
 Hayek’s work speaks eloquently to this point. Hayek emphasizes the impor-
tance of abstract rules in the formation of extended orders. He also argues that 
our instinctual drives cause us to resist many established rules whose origins and 
consequences are mostly unknown to us (Hayek 1988: 71–82). He thus describes 
rule- guided action as a liminal space “between instinct and reason” (ibid.) 
whereby individuals follow rules based on their tacit knowledge of social norms 
but not based on conscious, rational knowledge.
 Lewis (2009) claims that Hayek, by theorizing rule- guided action as a feature 
common to all forms of social co- operation, opens the door to a classical liberal 
rethinking	of	the	commerce/philanthropy	dual.	Hayek	himself	did	not	pursue	this	
line of inquiry. But as Lewis perceptively observes, Hayek’s “road not taken” 
has been well traversed by another classical liberal economist, Amartya Sen. Sen 
advocates a pluralistic conception of “economy” (Sen 2009) based on his rigor-
ous theorization of human action beyond standard notions of instrumental ration-
ality. Of particular interest to Hayekian scholars is Sen’s attention to the human 
propensity	 to	 act	 “according	 to	 fixed	 rules,	 without	 following	 the	 dictates	 of	
goal- maximization” and the related human capacity for commitment: action 
guided by the acceptance of “rules of conduct toward others with whom one has 
some sense of identity” (Sen 2002: 217). This little noted consilience between 
Sen and Hayek suggests the value of a broader conversation among classical 
liberal thinkers (including Buchanan, McCloskey, Douglass North (2005), and 
others) who have moved decisively away from the prudence- only, commerce- 
only economics of modernism.
 Finally, a revamped Smithian view of commercial society would recognize 
the “positivity” of philanthropy as a generative element in the economy of 
human co- operation. Philanthropy would be seen as not as a mere supplement to 
the	real	economy	–	a	palliative	to	fill	gaps,	redistribute	resources,	repair	damage,	
and otherwise heal the pathologies of modern commercial societies – but as a 
fundamental	part	of	what	defines	and	propels	every	economic	system.
 By theorizing commercial society as a self- organizing, positive- sum network 
of commercial and philanthropic processes, the new Smithian economics would 
take a broad view of the signaling mechanism whereby individuals receive 
“profit-	and-loss”	 feedback	 on	 their	 actions.	 Such	 feedback	 need	 not	 take	 the	
form of calculable prices in order to motivate action and promote co- operation 
among known and unknown others (Chamlee- Wright 2008, 2010).
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 In addition, philanthropy would be seen as a generative process, a positive- 
sum interaction (net gain of human betterment) among donors and recipients, not 
just a one- way, zero- sum transfer. As Gunderman explains:
When	we	 see	philanthropy	 as	part	 of	 a	fixed-	sum	system,	we	perceive	 its	
mission in terms of redistribution. . . . [In contrast,] the most enlightened phi-
lanthropy	aims	at	increasing	non-	fixed-sum	relationships	throughout	a	com-
munity. In other words, decreasing want is ultimately less important than 
increasing	generativity,	our	capacity	to	contribute	to	our	own	flourishing.	In	
this vision, philanthropy . . . enhances both our capacity and our inclination 
to make a positive difference in the lives of others.
(Gunderman 2007: 41–2)
Philanthropy,	if	successful,	betters	the	human	condition	of	both	parties.	Specifi-
cally, it enhances the freedom of donors and recipients, i.e., their effective 
opportunities for “loving, befriending, helping, sharing, and otherwise intertwin-
ing our lives with others” (Haidt 2006: 134). By increasing all parties’ capabil-
ities to give and receive assistance, philanthropy augments their social or 
humane capital. It has the potential, like commerce, to address “complex modern 
problems” by continually expanding our philanthropic capacities and guiding 
our actions to better serve others (Cornuelle 1993 [1965]: 62).
The humane ecology of Smithian liberalism
Adam Smith argued that free markets and the rule of law are necessary but not 
sufficient	for	achieving	“the	liberal	plan	of	equality,	liberty,	and	justice”	(Smith	
1976b [1776]: 664; Harpham 2006: 27–8; Evensky 2005; Sen 2009). A central 
challenge for classical liberal economics, going forward, will be to offer mean-
ingful responses to this challenge. Such responses require a view of human 
freedom and economy larger than the modernist liberalism of “commerce only.”
 The modernist approach still holds considerable appeal for classical liberal 
economists, as it did for the Mont Pèlerin Hayek. Peter Boettke, for example, 
advocates	a	“robust	political	economy”	in	which	 liberalism	is	 identified	with	a	
markets- only economic order (Boettke and Leeson 2004), even as he praises vol-
untary and philanthropic associations as engines of social co- operation in the 
post- Katrina context (Boettke et al. 2007). Boettke claims that such a liberal 
order is more robust than its socialist counterparts because it minimizes the harm 
that	any	individual	can	inflict	upon	others,	even	in	the	worst-	case	scenario	where	
individuals are ignorant, narrowly self- interested knaves (ibid.).
 But if our Great Society is modeled on such thin notions of humankind and 
social	 order,	 how	 robust	 can	 it	 truly	 be?	This	 gadfly	 question	 has	 been	 posed	
many times over the years by Cornuelle, Boulding, McCloskey, and others, who 
argue	 that	 the	 best	 (indeed	 only)	 hope	 for	 the	 survival	 and	flourishing	 of	 free	
societies lies in broader views of human nature and voluntary co- operation. If 
we really want to enhance the robustness of commercial society, they argue, then 
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our liberal vision must include the full spectrum of human motives, actions, 
institutions, and processes that generate the capital – economic, social, and 
humane reserves – that allow communities and individuals to “withstand various 
negative shocks or conditions” and to “ward off illness easily or, once diseased, 
to	 fight	 off	 illness	 and	 retain	 [their]	 original	 degree	 of	 functionality	 after	 the	
disease is gone” (Boettke and Leeson 2004: 102).
 The humane possibilities of commercial society are better understood by eco-
nomic theories that recognize philanthropy – “voluntary giving and association 
that	serves	to	promote	human	flourishing”	(Ealy	2005:	2)	–	as	an	integral	dimen-
sion of economic life, and by broad- angle views of the liberal tradition as a 
defender	 of	 the	 positive	 capability	 to	 pursue	 the	 good	 life	 as	 one	 defines,	 for	
example, “to experience meaningful personal engagement in community life” 
(ibid.: 4), as well as the negative freedom from coercion. A turn away from eco-
nomic	modernism	is	thus	an	opportunity	for	economists	to	redefine	their	scient-
ific	domain	in	a	Smithian	fashion,	not	 just	a	commodity	space	but	a	pluralistic	
provisioning space comprising multiple forms and scales of actions that enable 
individuals to secure “the cooperation and assistance of great multitudes” (Smith 
1976b [1776]: 26).
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